AbstractThe truthmaker principle – which looks to be based upon a seeminglyplausible intuition – faces a number of troubles, including that ofnegative truths. According to the truthmaker principle, truepropositions are true in virtue of what exists. But, int
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AbstractThe truthmaker principle – which looks to be based upon a seeminglyplausible intuition – faces a number of troubles, including that ofnegative truths. According to the truthmaker principle, truepropositions are true in virtue of what exists. But, intuitively, negativetruths are true in virtue of what does not exist. Adding negative facts toone’s ontology isa metaphysical cost that has been paid to solve theproblem of negative truths. In this paper, I firstly mention somepreliminary issues about the truthmaker principle. After enumeratingpossible solutions to negative truths, I will deal with the solution whichappeals to negative facts. Then I will argue that which kind of negativefacts does better its jobs. In the rest of the paper, I will disallow somepropounded difficulties with this solution. Afterwards, I will illustratethat negative facts face three new problems.
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