List of Articles ویتگنشتاین

• Open Access Article
  • Abstract Page
  • Full-Text
  
  1 - Wittgenstein and “Overview”
  مالک حسینی
  A very important element in Wittgenstein’s thought is “overview”(“Übersicht”). In the philosophical method of the so called laterWittgenstein this concept obtains special importance, and alongwith other concepts forms his method as a n More

  A very important element in Wittgenstein’s thought is “overview”(“Übersicht”). In the philosophical method of the so called laterWittgenstein this concept obtains special importance, and alongwith other concepts forms his method as a new one in the history ofphilosophy. Quoting Wittgenstein’s sayings on “overview”, thepresent article tries to introduce this main element of hisphilosophical method and to explain its significance for his idealphilosophizing. Manuscript profile
• Open Access Article
  • Abstract Page
  • Full-Text
  
  2 - On Carnap's Endeavor for By-Passing the Barriers of Meaningful Speech
  مجید داودی بنی
  In this paper, I try to give a clear reading of Carnap's conventionalismagainst the prevalent philosophical back ground of the day. Thebackground had been painted in Wittgensetinian colors, which weredeemed by Carnap to be rusty, dogmatic and unacceptable. It beginswith More

  In this paper, I try to give a clear reading of Carnap's conventionalismagainst the prevalent philosophical back ground of the day. Thebackground had been painted in Wittgensetinian colors, which weredeemed by Carnap to be rusty, dogmatic and unacceptable. It beginswith the primary satisfaction of logical empiricists with Wittgensteinianapproach to truth and the status of logical sentences (a satisfactionwhich ended to a deep dissatisfaction soon enough). Then I attend toCarnap's remarkable criticisms of Wittgenstein's absolutist point ofview, which is devoid of necessary conventional elements. At the end,we will see that Carnap's attempt at suggesting an alternative schemefor explaining the status of logical and mathematical sentences, as it isput forward in Logical Syntax of Language (1934), suffers from similarshortcomings. This does not need to debase the brilliant points whichemerged out of Carnap's critical reading of Wittgenstein's philosophy,though. Manuscript profile
• Open Access Article
  • Abstract Page
  • Full-Text
  
  3 - درآمدی بر ماهیّت اندیشه در زبان صوفیانه و ادب عرفانی
  سعید اکبری ابراهیم رحیمی زنگنه غلامرضا سالمیان
  Manuscript profile
• Open Access Article
  • Abstract Page
  • Full-Text
  
  4 - واکاوی تطبیقی مساله شناخت از دیدگاه آیر و ویتگنشتاین
  آسیه اکرمی
  Manuscript profile
• Open Access Article
  • Abstract Page
  • Full-Text
  
  5 - An Attempt to Show the Possibilities of the Kant's Third Critique with Regard to the Concept of Common Sense.
  jafar mazhabi Yosoof Shaghool
  This paper is an attempt to show arguably how, and to some extent, Kant's third Critique is more prone than other ones to tackling a problem which can be called transcendental philosopher's main problem, i.e. how it is possible to have rules which both determine the val More

  This paper is an attempt to show arguably how, and to some extent, Kant's third Critique is more prone than other ones to tackling a problem which can be called transcendental philosopher's main problem, i.e. how it is possible to have rules which both determine the validity (universality and necessity) of our propositions and accord with the changeable facts of our life. In Critique of Judgment, Kant brings up this main problem in this form: how is it possible to reach reliable rules for aesthetic propositions which are not objective? What may enable Kant's third Critique to overcome the given problem is his referring to the concept of common sense which provides an open forum for the construction of more dynamic rules. Therefore, here by focusing on the concept of common sense, I attempt to indicate that how kant in third Critique provides a circumstance prone to resolve the main problem, and also open to two readings followed by Hegel and Wittgenstein in two different ways. Manuscript profile
• Open Access Article
  • Abstract Page
  • Full-Text
  
  6 - بررسی دیدگاه ویتگنشتاین متأخر درباره گزاره های پایه
  ABDOLLAH MOHAMMADI
  ویتگنشتاین متأخر گزاره‌های پایه را مبتنی بر نظریه خویش در بازی‌های زبانی و چارچوب ذهنی، تفسیر می‌کند. وی با شکاکیت مقابله کرده وآن را خودمتناقض می‌داند و گزاره‌های بدیهی را از ساختار بشر حذف‌ناشدنی شمرده است. با اینحال از نظر او میان گزاره‌های پایه تجربی و ریاضی، مرز رو More

  ویتگنشتاین متأخر گزاره‌های پایه را مبتنی بر نظریه خویش در بازی‌های زبانی و چارچوب ذهنی، تفسیر می‌کند. وی با شکاکیت مقابله کرده وآن را خودمتناقض می‌داند و گزاره‌های بدیهی را از ساختار بشر حذف‌ناشدنی شمرده است. با اینحال از نظر او میان گزاره‌های پایه تجربی و ریاضی، مرز روشنی نیست. گزاره‌های پایه ریاضی نیز متأثر از بازی زبانی و مبتنی بر حافظه هستند و به همین دلیل، ممکن است مورد فراموشی، غفلت یا اشتباه واقع شوند. از نظر وی گزاره‌های پایه تنها تصدیق ضروری دارند ولی خطاناپذیر نیستند. در نظریه ویتگنشتاین، میان مفهوم و زبان خلط شده است. بازی زبانی، فرهنگ و تاریخ بر ساحت زبان اثر می‌گذارند، در حالیکه صدق گزاره‌های بدیهی منطق و ریاضی در ساحت مفهوم سنجیده می‌شود. همچنین تفاوت میان یقین روانشناختی و یقین منطقی را می‌توان با روش تحلیل آنها و نیز امکان یا عدم امکان ناسازگاری مفهومی بررسی کرد. صدق گزاره‌های بدیهی نیز با ارجاع آنها به علم حضوری اثبات‌پذیر است. Manuscript profile
• Open Access Article
  • Abstract Page
  • Full-Text
  
  7 - Epistemological Nihilism: The Failure of Signs in Wittgenstein's Metaphysics and Epistemology
  Ahmad Ebrahimipur Malek Hosseini
  Although Wittgenstein is known as one of the opponents of philosophical skepticism, some aspects of his epistemology in the picture theory of language and the philosophy of ordinary language have nihilistic features. According to Wittgenstein's linguistic attitude, thes More

  Although Wittgenstein is known as one of the opponents of philosophical skepticism, some aspects of his epistemology in the picture theory of language and the philosophy of ordinary language have nihilistic features. According to Wittgenstein's linguistic attitude, these features are intertwined with his semiotics and metaphysics and are inseparable. This article examines the nihilistic tendencies in Wittgenstein's semiotics and metaphysics and analyzes the nihilistic features in his epistemology. From Wittgenstein's point of view, the sign cannot refer to an extraterrestrial world, to us, to the other, or to philosophical implications. He denies the possibility of research in metaphysics: in Tractatus because of the limitations of logic, in PI because of the non-application of metaphysical expressions, and in On Certainty because of inevitability of the linguistic frameworks governing doubt and certainty. Accordingly, in a logical space, nothing is really recognizable because cognition is confined to meta-logic. Cognition is completely relative, temporal, and contextual, because our world is only a possible world, and not just the world that exists. However, Wittgenstein does not say that cognition is absolutely impossible, but that cognition is a function of our logic and linguistic play, and not directly a function of the things or facts. Now, although logic and linguistic play are not unrelated to the fact, this does not mean that they reflect reality. Manuscript profile
• Open Access Article
  • Abstract Page
  • Full-Text
  
  8 - Theory of Correspondence and the Difficulties Applied to it
  Fateme Sadat Hashemi Soleyman Habibi Amir Abbas Alizamani
  Manuscript profile
• Open Access Article
  • Abstract Page
  • Full-Text
  
  9 - On Wittgenstein's Certainty and Critics of Descartes’ “Dreaming Argument”
  Aezam Mohseni Seyyed Maseoud Sayf
   Wittgenstein frankly is speaking on certainty as a basic term which precedes skepticism believing that doubt game is possible in certainty ground, and we have no ground except certainty, extremist skepticism is self contradiction. Wittgenstein claims that Descarte More

   Wittgenstein frankly is speaking on certainty as a basic term which precedes skepticism believing that doubt game is possible in certainty ground, and we have no ground except certainty, extremist skepticism is self contradiction. Wittgenstein claims that Descartes' “Dreaming Argument” is the deepest and most powerful form of skepticism; in the first Meditation, Descartes is able to infect himself, as it were, with a profound skeptical difficulty about perceptual knowledge: what he calls "the principal reason for doubt, namely my inability to distinguish between being asleep and being awake". From past to the present, the attempts to neutralize such threats have been largely regarded as unsuccessful. But the writings of Wittgenstein mark a new development in defusing this deflationary posture. Unlike most philosophers who have assumed that Skepticism represents a coherent position that demands a responsible rebuttal, Wittgenstein emphasized that it was senseless, and required no formal refutation. In this paper we seek to demonstrate that Descartes' purpose has never been to remain uncertain; he always tries to overcome doubt and he wants to come to a certainty; In the case of “Dreaming Argument” ultimately in the sixth Meditation Descartes is prepared to solve and dismiss this very same difficulty in a mere paragraph; here we told that "the exaggerated doubts of the last few days should be dismissed as laughable". He writes that there is a vast difference between being asleep and being awake. Manuscript profile
• Open Access Article
  • Abstract Page
  • Full-Text
  
  10 - گرایشها و مدلهای ایمانگرایی ازپیدایش تا دوره معاصر
  فهیمه خوشنویسان زینب شکیبی
  Manuscript profile
• Open Access Article
  • Abstract Page
  • Full-Text
  
  11 - Examining Avrom Stroll's point of view about Wittgenstein's two different understandings of the foundations of certain beliefs
  mohammad saied abdollahi Mohammad Ali Abdollahi
  Since the time of Aristotle, some philosophers have insisted on the point that a part of knowledge is more fundamental than other parts. There have been various forms of foundationalism in epistemology, ethics and logic, and each of them has considered a certain matter More

  Since the time of Aristotle, some philosophers have insisted on the point that a part of knowledge is more fundamental than other parts. There have been various forms of foundationalism in epistemology, ethics and logic, and each of them has considered a certain matter as the basis according to the field under discussion. Avrum Stroll believes that Wittgenstein is a fundamentalist, but his fundamentalism is completely different from the approach of traditional fundamentalists, and Wittgenstein's intelligent distinction between knowledge and its foundations keeps his fundamentalism away from the problems that traditional fundamentalists have. Stroll enumerates nine conditions for fundamentalism and believes that these nine conditions exist in Wittgenstein's epistemological system. He believes that Wittgenstein gives two different understandings of the basis of certain beliefs, one is relative (propositional) fundamentalism and the other is absolute (non-propositional) fundamentalism, and over time Wittgenstein moves away from relative fundamentalism and leans towards absolute fundamentalism. In this article, after clarifying Stroll's argument about Wittgenstein's fundamentalism and the difference between this fundamentalism and its traditional interpretations, we examine Stroll's distinction between Wittgenstein's two conceptions of fundamentalism and show what characteristics each of these two conceptions has and how Wittgenstein prefers the absolute fundamentalism and expands it. Manuscript profile