Wittgenstein V G. E. Moore A comparative study between Wittgenstein and Moore about the two concepts of knowledge and certainty

Subject Areas : Epistemological researches

mohammad saied abdollahi ¹ ( qom university )
Mohammad Ali Abdollahi ² ( University of Tehran, College of Farabi )

Received: 2024-01-07 Accepted : 2024-05-06 Published : 2024-09-24

Keywords: Wittgenstein, Moore, knowledge, certainty, hinge propositions,

Abstract :

Today, although the debates related to knowledge have expanded, the question of the possibility of knowledge and certainty is still the starting point of epistemological debates. Wittgenstein and Moore are two influential philosophers of the 20th century who stand in an important position against each other. Moore is the only philosopher that Wittgenstein mentions in the book On Certainty and it was Moores view on knowledge that is the basis of the Austrian philosopher for further discussions about knowledge and certainty. In response to the problem of the possibility of knowledge and the problem of skepticism, Moore claims that there are facts that we know and have knowledge of. He lists a list of propositions whose knowledge is certain. Wittgensteins approach to this claim has a negative and a positive side. According to Wittgenstein, Moores propositions such as here is a hand are not correct examples of knowledge or knowing Moore does not use them correctly. There is a difference between knowledge and certainty. Knowledge and certainty belong to different categories. On the other hand, Wittgenstein is with Moore in attributing a different role to the mentioned propositions in the epistemic system. Wittgensteins criticism of Moore does not weaken the epistemological status of Moores propositions, but gives a more fundamental basis to such propositions.

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