This article aims to describe and explain the strategic behavior of managers and shareholders in the interactive conflict environment of joint-stock firms using the tools of game theory, specifically through signaling games. Managers, considering the quality of internal More
This article aims to describe and explain the strategic behavior of managers and shareholders in the interactive conflict environment of joint-stock firms using the tools of game theory, specifically through signaling games. Managers, considering the quality of internal controls, engage in both deceptive and informative earnings management strategies. Shareholders then respond with strategies involving high or low capital costs and opt for either high or low-quality audit services. The findings of the research outline the theoretical conditions necessary for establishing balance in strategies such as deceptive earnings management with high capital costs and deceptive earnings management with high-quality audit services in environments characterized by weak internal controls. Additionally, it highlights the conditions required to establish equilibrium in strategies like informative earnings management with low capital costs and informative earnings management with low-quality audit services within environments boasting strong internal controls.
Manuscript profile
