Analysis of Labor-Management Negotiation based on Chicken Evolutionary Game and Catastrophe Theory

Subject Areas : Game Theory

ahmad makui ¹ ( School of Industrial Engineering, Iran University of Science and Technology, Tehran, Iran )
Seyed Mohammad Seyedhosseini ² ( School of Industrial Engineering, Iran University of Science and Technology, Tehran, Iran )
Parinaz Esmaeili ³ ( School of Industrial Engineering, Iran University of Science and Technology, Tehran, Iran )
Seyed Jafar Sadjadi ⁴ ( School of Industrial Engineering, Iran University of Science and Technology, Tehran, Iran )

Received: 2020-03-17 Accepted : 2021-01-09 Published : 2020-12-01

Keywords:

References:

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