ارائه مدلی به منظور تعیین نقطه تعادل استراتژیهای قیمت‌گذاری و قیمت‌پذیری در بازار انحصار چندجانبه با رویکرد نظریه بازیها
محورهای موضوعی : مدیریت بازرگانی- بازرگانی
رضا بصیری
1
(دانشجوی دکتری گروه مدیریت، واحد دهاقان، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، دهاقان، ایران.)
منصور عابدیان
2
(استادیار گروه مهندسی صنایع، واحد نجف آباد، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، نجف آباد، ایران. (نویسنده مسئول) )
سعید آقاسی
3
(استادیار گروه مدیریت، واحد دهاقان، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، دهاقان، ایران. )
زهرا دشت لعلی
4
(استادیار گروه مدیریت، واحد دهاقان، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، دهاقان، ایران (نویسنده مسئول))
کلید واژه: قیمت‌پذیری, تعادل کورنو, قیمت‌گذاری, الیگوپولی.,
چکیده مقاله :
انحصارطلبی چندجانبه یکی از ساختارهای رایج کسب‌وکار بازار است و در واقع حالت میانی بین رقابت محض و انحصار محض است. بررسی و مطالعه رفتارهای استراتژیک در بازارهای انحصاری در اقتصاد مدرن توجه بسیاری از پژوهشگران را جلب نموده است. هدف از این پژوهش استفاده از مدل نظریه بازیها برای تحلیل و بررسی استراتژیهای قیمت‌پذیری و قیمت‌گذاری در بازارهای انحصاری چندجانبه استفاده خواهد کرد. به‌طوری که در آن شرکت‌ها قادر به انتخاب رفتار قیمت‌پذیری از طریق آزمون و خطا و پیروی از الگوی سوددهی قبلی خود و یا استراتژی قیمت‌گذاری از طریق تحلیل ساختار، عناصر بازار و رفتار رقبای تجاری خود هستند. در پژوهش حاضر از نظریه بازیها و ترکیبی از ابزارهای تحلیلی با مفاهیم تعادل آینده‌نگر و نرم‌افزار مطلب جهت حل و تحلیل معادلات نظریه بازیها برای بررسی رفتار شرکت‌ها در بازار انحصار چندجانبه استفاده شده است. پژوهش اخیر متعلق به ادبیات اقتصادی در حال گسترش است که با انحصارات رفتاری سروکار دارد و به جای در نظر گرفتن یک نقطه تعادل در فضای استراتژی به‌عنوان یک نتیجه معین از تعامل شرکت‌ها، جنبه‌های یادگیری و رفتار تطبیقی و پویایی شرکت‌ها را هم در شرایط واقعی در نظر می‌گیرد. نتایج این مطالعه نشان می‌دهد که مدل انحصارطلبی کورنو به مکانیسم یادگیری اساسی، عقلانیت شرکت‌ها، یادگیری اجتماعی و اندازه حافظه شرکت‌ها بستگی دارد. این مقاله نشان می‌دهد که یکی از بازار باثبات ممکن، بازار کورنو است که در آن هر شرکت می‌تواند یک قیمت‌گذار باشد. برعکس، بازاری که همه شرکت‌ها در آن فقط برمبنای یادگیری فردی قیمت‌ها پذیرند، هرگز باثبات نیست و بنابراین، طبق یافته‌ها تعادل والراسی قابل استفاده نیست.
Oligopoly is one of the common structures of the market and is actually a state between pure competition and pure monopoly. The theoretical literature distinguishes between the behaviors of companies in adopting competitive pricing strategies. It is common to study models where all firms are price-makers or price-takers, but the simultaneous application of price-making and price-taking strategies by firms producing a similar product using game theory has not received much attention. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to use game theory with equilibrium concepts forward-looking equilibrium reasoning, and backward-looking individual learning simulation tools to investigate the behavior of companies. The results of the recent study showed that the Cournot-Nash model is a stable model for the real evaluation of pricing strategies in a dynamic oligopoly market. However, with a larger number of firms, a unilateral deviation from Cournot's behavior becomes profitable. In this paper, we have formally proved that the only possible stable market is the Cornot market, where every firm can be a price taker. Conversely, a market in which all firms accept only prices is never stable, and therefore Walrasian equilibrium is not applicable according to the findings. When there are no stable markets, the market does not evolve toward a fixed composition, but the number of price takers typically decreases. In such a situation, the market composition follows a cyclical pattern that is related to the stability or volatility of crude expectations
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