This research, from an agency theory perspective, evaluates the influence of agency costs on the tax avoidance of firms. Because tax aggressiveness is a risky action and can cause loss of shareholders, risk averse firms do not follow such actions. However, the companies More
This research, from an agency theory perspective, evaluates the influence of agency costs on the tax avoidance of firms. Because tax aggressiveness is a risky action and can cause loss of shareholders, risk averse firms do not follow such actions. However, the companies that represent high agency costs are expected to be a high degree of risk and take an aggressive approach about paying tax. Thus the level of agency costs of firms can influence their tax avoidance. The results obtained in this study, justify this statement. To empirically test of this matter, 138 companies in the period 2006 to 2014 is used. Obtained results support the positive influencing of agency cost on the tax aggressiveness. These findings contribute toward a better understanding of agency theory on the context of corporate tax aggressiveness and show how agency problems affect corporate tax approach.
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Introdution and aim: The agency model of dividends maintains that dividend payout help address the agency problems between managers and shareholders by distributing cash at the discretion of managers and forcing firms to interact more frequently with capital market. but More
Introdution and aim: The agency model of dividends maintains that dividend payout help address the agency problems between managers and shareholders by distributing cash at the discretion of managers and forcing firms to interact more frequently with capital market. but the main problem is the detecting of effective components for adopting a dividend policy that one of them is the managements’ culture. this research aimed to clarify the relationship between managements’ cultural dimensions and agency base model of firms’ dividend policy.
Methodology: The research type is experimental and nature of research is descriptive-survey. The information related to managements’ cultural dimensions is collected by questionnaire of hofstede. In order to measuring dividend policy, we gathered Data from rahavard novin data. Variables are 3 index including D/S، D/CF and D/NI and agency cost is studied by leverage. Hypothesis was tested by 73 samples during 2002-2012.
Finding & Conclusion: Findings indicate that in the all of dividened policy variables used, Uncertainty avoidance index and power distance index have a weak negative relation and masculinity index has a weak positive relation to dividened policy. while, there is no relationship between Individualism and dividened policy. meanwhile agency cost, has adjusted the relationship between uncertainty avoidance and power distance with dividend policy when D/S and D/CF were used. finally, Agency cost has no effect on the adjustment of the relationship between Individualism and Masculinity with dividened policy.
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The main purpose of this research is to investigate the effect of social responsibility on the relationship between investment and performance of firms and the managerial compensation incentives, stakeholder engagement and government ownership as factors based on the ag More
The main purpose of this research is to investigate the effect of social responsibility on the relationship between investment and performance of firms and the managerial compensation incentives, stakeholder engagement and government ownership as factors based on the agency theory. The research method is quasi-experimental and the number of 127 firms in Iran Stock Exchange for the period of 1390 to 1396 were selected as the sample of study. Regression analysis based on panel data was used to test the hypotheses. Research results show that social responsibility reduces the sensitivity of investment to performance. Also, the effect of this variable on the sensitivity of investment to performance is stronger for firms with weak managerial compensation incentives and higher stakeholder engagement, but weaker for government companies.
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According to agency theory, CEO can inefficiently use the firms assets to promote their personal interests at the expense of shareholders, leading to agency costs such as weak internal controls, which the CEOs Recruitment can serve as a strategy for the board to improve More
According to agency theory, CEO can inefficiently use the firms assets to promote their personal interests at the expense of shareholders, leading to agency costs such as weak internal controls, which the CEOs Recruitment can serve as a strategy for the board to improve controls. Internal and reduce firm representation problems. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between the weakness of internal controls and the employment of CEOs in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange with respect to agency theory. To test the research hypothesis, the financial information of firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange in the period between 2016 and 2020 has been used, so that after applying the restrictions in this study, the final sample consisting of 163 companies was selected. After measuring the research variables, multivariate linear logistic regression analysis was used to test the research hypothesis. Hypothesis testing was also performed using Eviews econometric software and statistical techniques of integrated data. The results of the statistical test of the research show that there is a positive and significant relationship between the internal controls weakness and the CEO Recruitment.
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