Tax Avoidance and Agency Theory: Evidence from Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE)

Subject Areas : Management Accounting

Shokrollah Khajavi ¹ , Amir Sarvestani ²

1 - استاد حسابداری، دانشکده مدیریت، اقتصاد و علوم اجتماعی دانشگاه شیراز، شیراز، ایران
2 - دانشجوی دکتری حسابداری، دانشکده مدیریت، اقتصاد و علوم اجتماعی دانشگاه شیراز، شیراز، ایران

Received: 2016-11-19 Accepted : 2017-04-04 Published : 2017-09-23

Keywords: Tax Avoidance, Agency theory, Effective Tax Rate, Agency cost,

Abstract :

This research, from an agency theory perspective, evaluates the influence of agency costs on the tax avoidance of firms. Because tax aggressiveness is a risky action and can cause loss of shareholders, risk averse firms do not follow such actions. However, the companies that represent high agency costs are expected to be a high degree of risk and take an aggressive approach about paying tax. Thus the level of agency costs of firms can influence their tax avoidance. The results obtained in this study, justify this statement. To empirically test of this matter, 138 companies in the period 2006 to 2014 is used. Obtained results support the positive influencing of agency cost on the tax aggressiveness. These findings contribute toward a better understanding of agency theory on the context of corporate tax aggressiveness and show how agency problems affect corporate tax approach.

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