Hegemonic Model of Stakeholders Interest Conflict o in Family-Owned Companies: The Theory of Caudilloism in Corporate Governance

Subject Areas : Management Accounting

mohsen Sharififard ¹ , Ahmad Kaabomeir ² , Ali Mahmoodi ³ , Fatemeh Mehrabani ⁴

1 - PhD Student, Department of Accounting, Islamic Azad University, Ahwaz, Iran
2 - Assistant Professor, Accounting Department, Ahvaz Branch, Islamic Azad University, Ahvaz, Iran
3 - PhD in Accounting, Department of Accounting, Islamic Azad University, Ahwaz, Iran
4 - PhD in Economics, Department of Economics, Islamic Azad University, Ahwaz, Iran

Received: 2022-05-09 Accepted : 2022-09-12 Published : 2023-02-20

Keywords: The Power Hegemonic Structure, Stakeholders Interest Conflict, Caudilloism in Corporate Gover,

Abstract :

Meeting stakeholder expectations is an integral part of governance structures, so the presence of effective functions in governance structures reduces the conflict of interest of external stakeholders with the company due to the existence of effective oversight. However, family ownership structures, as part of corporate governance, always face the premise that they may simply seek to meet the expectations of those in power in the corporate structure by ignoring the interests of other shareholders. Therefore, this study seeks to provide a hegemonic model of creating a conflict of interest between stakeholders in family-owned companies by developing the theory of Caudilloism. In this research, which is considered as a methodology of development and composition, an attempt was made to identify the components of the hegemonic structure of family-owned companies in terms of creating conflicts of interest with stakeholders, relying on meta-hybrid and Delphi analysis processes in the qualitative part of the research. Then, in a quantitative method, interpretive ranking analysis and Mick Mac used to identify the most influential component of the hegemonic structure of family-owned companies in terms of creating conflicts of interest with stakeholders. The statistical population in the qualitative section was 13 specialists and experts in the field of accounting at the university level, and in the small section benefited from the participation of 20 managers of family-owned companies in the capital market who had both knowledge and experience was taken. The basis for sample selection was the use of homogeneous method. The results of the research in the qualitative section, after screening the content of 10 approved studies, indicated the existence of seven components of the hegemonic structure of family-owned companies in terms of creating conflicts of interest with stakeholders. These components evaluated through Delphi analysis and the results of this section showed that all seven components analyzed individually. The results in the quantitative part of the research showed that from the total impact based on the pair scale between research components, the percentage of impact of the non-independence component of the board is higher than other components of hegemonic structure in family owned companies, which means to implement the approach. The hegemonic structure of family-owned companies at the level of capital market companies, the disclosure of information about the functions of the board of directors is more effective than other components.

References:

• بادآور، یونس.، نظاری، فیروز.، دهقان، رقیه. (۱۳۹۸). ارتباط هزینه های نمایندگی و سلب منافع سهامداران اقلیت با تاکید بر نقش کیفیت گزارشگری مالی، نشریه حسابداری و منافع اجتماعی، ۹(۲): ۱-۲۴.


• بخردی‌نسب، وحید.، ژولانژاد، فاطمه.، رحمانی، حسام. (1399). واکنش سرمایه‌گذاران به حمایت در برابر تضاد منافع طی دوره رکود اقتصادی، توسعه و سرمایه، 5(2): 211-230.


• حسنی، محمد.، صالحی، آزاده. (1399). ارزیابی تحلیلی آثار روابط سیاسی مالکیت-مدیریت و نظارت حسابرسان مبتنی بر انگیزة شهرت در کاهش هزینه‌های نمایندگی ناشی از تضاد منافع، پژوهش های حسابداری مالی، 12(3): 1-22.


• شریفی، سمیه.، واعظ، سیدعلی.، بصیرت، مهدی. (1400). توسعه پارادایم حسابداری قضایی در نوسان‌پذیری سطحِ حفاظت از منافعِ سهامداران در بین شرکت‌ها: تحلیلی مبتنی بر آزمون نظریه ثرندایک، حسابداری مدیریت، 14(48): 69-86.


• صادقیان‌ندوشن، مهرداد.، باقری، محمود. (۱۳۹۵). تعارض منافع ذی‌نفعان شرکت‌ها و راهکارهای حل آن، پژوهش‌های حقوق تطبیقی، ۲۰(۳): ۱۳۶-۱۶۳


• طاهری، ماندانا.، امینی، یاسین. (1399). نقش حاکمیت شرکتی و رعایت حقوق ذی‌نفعان در بانکداری اسلامی، تحقیقات مالی اسلامی، 10(1): 1-38


• عرب‌کیاسری، محسن.، عبدی، سامان. (1394). طراحی و تحلیل بازی استراتژیک مدیرـسهامدار: به‎کارگیری نظریه‌های بازی، مدیریت سود و حاکمیت شرکتی، بررسی‏‌های حسابداری و حسابرسی، 22(2): 221-242.


• قادرزاده، کریم.، علوی، سید مصطفی. (1400). اجتناب مالیاتی: مسئولیت اجتماعی و نقش تعدیل‌گر مالکیت خانوادگی، مجله دانش حسابداری، 12(3): 111-128


• نوابی‌مقدم، زینب.، زارع، علی.، یوسفی‌صادقلو، احمد.، جمالی، جعفر. (1400). بررسی تعارض منافع سهامداران بانک با رویکرد حاکمیت شرکتی، فصلنامه تحقیقات حقوقی، 24(96): 360-387


• Astrachan, C, B., Astrachan, J, H., Kotlar, J., Michiels, A. (2021). Addressing the theory-practice divide in family business research: The case of shareholder agreements, Journal of Family Business Strategy, 12(1): 212-239. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2020.100395


• Baek, H.Y., Cho, D.D. and Fazio, P.L. (2016). Family ownership, control and corporate capital structure: An examination of small capitalization public firms, Journal of Family Business Management, 6(2): 169-185. https://doi.org/10.1108/JFBM-02-2015-0006


• Belic, J., Miklosi, Z. (2020). Cosmopolitanism and unipolarity: the theory of hegemonic transition, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2020.1766815


• Bigoni, M. (2021). Accounting for hegemony. Fascist ideology and the shifting roles of accounting at the University of Ferrara and the Alla Scala Opera House, Accounting History, https://doi.org/10.1177/10323732211009517


• Caputo, A., Marzi, G., Pellegrini, M.M. and Rialti, R. (2018). Conflict management in family businesses: A bibliometric analysis and systematic literature review, International Journal of Conflict Management, 29(4): 519-542. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJCMA-02-2018-0027


• Chithambaranathan, P., Subramanian, N. and Palaniappan, P.K. (2015). An innovative framework for performance analysis of members of supply chains, Benchmarking: An International Journal, 22(2): 309-334


• Chrbel, S., Elie, B., Georges, S. (2013). Impact of family involvement in ownership management and direction on financial performance of the Lebanese firms, International Strategic Management Review, 1(1/2): 30-41 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ism.2013.08.003


• Derluguian, G. and Earle, T. (2010). Strong chieftaincies out of weak states, or elemental power unbound", Berg Harpviken, K. (Ed.) Troubled Regions and Failing States: The Clustering and Contagion of Armed Conflicts (Comparative Social Research, Vol. 27), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley, 51-76. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0195-6310(2010)0000027006


• Hopewell, K. (2021). Strategic Narratives in Global Trade Politics: American Hegemony, Free Trade, and the Hidden Hand of the State, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 14(1): 56-86. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poaa020


• Iqbal, A., Zhang, X., Tauni, M.Z. and Jebran, K. (2020). Principal–principal agency conflicts, product market competition and corporate payout policy in China, Journal of Asia Business Studies, 14(3): 265-279. https://doi.org/10.1108/JABS-02-2018-0038


• Jamel, L., Albogami, H.E., Abdulaal, M.A. and Aljohani, N.A. (2021). Do agency conflicts between managers and shareholders affect corporate risk management and financial performance of Saudi firms?, Journal of Investment Compliance, 22(1): 58-73. https://doi.org/10.1108/JOIC-11-2020-0044


• Jong, L. and Ho, P.-L. (2020). Family directors, independent directors, remuneration committee and executive remuneration in Malaysian listed family firms, Asian Review of Accounting, 28(1): 24-47. https://doi.org/10.1108/ARA-04-2019-0099


• Jong, L., Ho, P, L., Elliott, C. (2018). Inside the family firms: The impact of family and institutional ownership on executive remuneration, Cogent Economics & Finance, 6(1): 107-129. https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2018.1432095


• Lee, Y. (2022). The Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on the Commitment of Managers in an IPO Setting: Evidence from Korean Small and Venture Firms, Sustainability, 14(1): 730-764. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14020730


• Liew, C.Y. and Devi, S.S. (2021). Family firms, banks and firm value: Evidence from Malaysia, Journal of Family Business Management, 11(1): 51-85. https://doi.org/10.1108/JFBM-03-2019-0015


• Liu, M., Tsai, K, S. (2021). Structural Power, Hegemony, and State Capitalism: Limits to China’s Global Economic Power, Politics & Society, 49(2): 88-103. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329220950234


• Lyytinen, K., Maaranen, P., Knuuttila, J. (1993). Unusual Business or Business as Usual: An Investigation of Meeting Support Requirements in Multilateral Diplomacy. Accounting, Management and Information Technologies, 3(2): 97–119.


• Mondal, A., Ray, S., Lahiri, S. (2022). Family ownership, family management, and multinationality: Evidence from India,Journal of Business Research, 138(1): 347-359. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2021.09.017


• Ogbor, J.O. (2001). Critical theory and the hegemony of corporate culture, Journal of Organizational Change Management, 14(6): 590-608. https://doi.org/10.1108/09534810110408015


• Pascucci, F., Domenichelli, O., Peruffo, E. and Gregori, G.L. (2021). Family ownership and the export performance of SMEs: the moderating role of financial constraints and flexibility, Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development, https://doi.org/10.1108/JSBED-03-2021-0113


• Qiu, H., Freel, M. (2020). Managing Family-Related Conflicts in Family Businesses: A Review and Research Agenda, Family Business Review, https://doi.org/10.1177/0894486519893223


• Ramaswamy, V. (2019). Director interlocks and cross-cultural impact on strategies affecting shareholder–creditor conflicts: A conceptual analysis, Management Decision, 57(10): 2693-2713. https://doi.org/10.1108/MD-10-2017-0956


• Saaty, T. L. (1990). How to make decision: the analytical decision process, European Journal of Operational Research, 48(1): 9-26


• Sakawa, H. and Watanabel, N. (2019). Family control and ownership monitoring in Stakeholder-oriented corporate governance, Management Decision, 57(7): 1712-1728. https://doi.org/10.1108/MD-04-2018-0480


• Setiawan, D., Bandi, B., Kee Phua, L. and Trinugroho, I. (2016). Ownership structure and dividend policy in Indonesia, Journal of Asia Business Studies, 10(3): 230-252. https://doi.org/10.1108/JABS-05-2015-0053


• Sushil (2009). Interpretive ranking process, Global Journal of Flexible Systems Management, 10(4): 1-10.


• Sushil (2017^a), “Multi- criteria valuation of flexibility initiatives using integrated TISM–IRP with a big data framework, Production Planning & Control, 28(11/12): 999-1010


• Tapaninaho, R., Kujala, J. (2019). Reviewing the Stakeholder Value Creation Literature: Towards a Sustainability Approach, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03562-4_1


• Trebing, H, M., Goldstene, P, N. (1990). Corporate Hegemony, Journal of Economic Issues, 24(4): 1147-1155. https://doi.org/10.1080/00213624.1990.11505109


• Vallas, S, P. (2003). The Adventures of Managerial Hegemony: Teamwork, Ideology, and Worker Resistance, Social Problems, 50(2): 204-225. https://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2003.50.2.204


• Zhou, L. (2014). Social responsibility and employees’ organizational identification in Chinese family firms: Influence of family ownership and family commitment, Chinese Management Studies, 8(4): 683-703. https://doi.org/10.1108/CMS-11-2012-0159


• Zimmermann, E. (2020). Caudillos, democracy, and constitutionalism in mid nineteenth-century Argentina, Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies, 26(2): 1800-1870. https://doi.org/10.1080/14701847.2020.1789378