The degree of managerial risk appetite due to managerial motivation can lead to companies' performance in irresponsible social activities to compensate for their lack of reward. This study examines the relationship between the CEO's risk-taking incentives and irresponsi More
The degree of managerial risk appetite due to managerial motivation can lead to companies' performance in irresponsible social activities to compensate for their lack of reward. This study examines the relationship between the CEO's risk-taking incentives and irresponsible social activities using the annual reports of accepted companies In the Tehran Stock Exchange. The results indicate that the manager's risk-taking incentives have a positive relationship with irresponsible social activities. In addition, we have found in this research that the responsible social activities of the company act as an intermediary agent and enhance the above-mentioned relationship. Our results show that incentives and incentives for risk appetite in managing director remuneration are of great importance to corporate policies against irresponsible social activities.
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