Criticism of reductionism and non-reductionism in the epistemology of Testimony

Subject Areas : Epistemological researches

سید مهدی کشمیری ^{1 *} , Mohammadreza Amini ² , منصور نصیری ³

1 - Teacher
2 - Teacher
3 - استادیار دانشگاه تهران

Received: 2024-07-22 Accepted : 2024-11-11 Published : 2025-05-14

Keywords: Reductionism, Non-reductionism, Testimony epistemology, Testimonial authority, Authenticity of authority ,

Abstract :

In the literature of epistemology of testimony, there are generally two competing views: reductionism and non-reductionism. According to the reductionist view, testimony is not an independent source of knowledge alongside other sources; rather, it can be considered a product of combining other sources (reason, memory, sensory experience, and inductive reasoning). According to this perspective, testimony is justified only if there are non-testimonial reasons supporting it. This position maintains that to accept testimony, we must have strong reasons showing that the testifier is truthful and has sufficient evidence to support their claim. On the other hand, non-reductionists argue that, first, testimony is an independent source of knowledge, and second, its acceptance does not depend on verifying the truthfulness of the narrator or having prior reasons to trust the speaker. This view holds that testimony can be justified on its own without needing validation from other sources. Non-reductionists believe that such an approach leads to significant epistemic costs. Conversely, reductionists argue that such an approach entails problematic consequences like intellectual laziness, gullibility, and irrational deference. This article, while describing and criticizing both views, has found the position of non-reductionists to be more defensible. This article employs a library-based method for gathering and discovering information and an analytical method for evaluation and critique.

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