سهام عدالت و کیفیت سود: دیدگاه اقتصاد سیاسی

محورهای موضوعی : حسابداری مدیریت

محسن ایمنی ¹ ( دانشجوی دکتری گروه حسابداری، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی واحد رشت، رشت، ایران )
فریدون رهنمای رودپشتی ² ( استاد گروه حسابداری دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی واحد علوم و تحقیقات، تهران، ایران )
بهمن بنی مهد ³ ( دانشیار گروه حسابداری دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، واحد کرج، کرج، ایران. (نویسنده مسئول) )
هاشم نیکومرام ⁴ ( استاد گروه حسابداری دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی واحد علوم و تحقیقات، تهران، ایران )

تاریخ دریافت : 1397/09/04 تاریخ پذیرش : 1398/01/01 تاریخ انتشار : 1401/09/01

کلید واژه: سیاست‌های اقتصادی دولت, اقتصاد سیاسی, مدیریت و کیفیت سود, سهام عدالت, اصل 44,

چکیده مقاله :

اقتصادسیاسی، علمی اجتماعی است که به بررسی تعامل پویای بین نیروهای بازار و دولت می‌پردازد و چگونگی تأثیرات تنش و تضاد بین این دو را برجامعه بررسی می‌کند. نفوذ قدرت‌های سیاسی بر عملکرد شرکت‌ها مؤثر است و مدیران شرکت‌های که در کانون توجه سیاسی قرار دارند، این انگیزه را پیدا می‌کنند تا از روش‌های حسابداری اقتباس کنند که از طریق آن بتوانند سود را مدیریت کنند. براساس طرح سهام عدالت، دولت موظف است سهام شرکت‌های سودده دولتی را بین مردم توزیع کند؛ و ممکن است این شرکت‌ها با‌استفاده از نفوذ سیاسی، سود خود را مدیریت کنند و بنابراین مطالعه اثر این نفوذ بر کیفیت سود اهمیت خواهد داشت. از این‌رو این پژوهش به بررسی ارتباط بین سهام عدالت و کیفیت سود با تأکید بر دیدگاه اقتصاد سیاسی در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران پرداخته است. نمونه آماری پژوهش شامل 130 شرکت طی سال‌های 1391 لغایت 1396 می‌باشد و برای آزمون ارتباط بین متغیرهای از مدل‌ رگرسیون چندمتغیره خطی استفاده‌شده است. یافته‌های پژوهش نشان می‌دهد که وجود سهام عدالت در ساختار مالکیت بر کیفیت سود تأثیر منفی معناداری دارد. چراکه در کشورهای در حال توسعه، نظام اقتصادی، به‌طور غالب مبتنی بر روابط و نفوذ حاکمیت است و به این دلیل توسط دولت و نهادهای وابسته به آن کنترل و حمایت می‌شود؛ لذا می‌توان بیان داشت نفوذ حاکمیت و مدیریت سیاسی در شرکت‌ها می‌تواند کیفیت سود آن‌ها را کاهش دهد. از این‌رو، نتایج پژوهش کاربرد نظریه اقتصاد سیاسی درخصوص اتخاذ سیاست‌های کلان اقتصادی (سهام عدالت) و تأثیرش بر کیفیت سود را تأیید می‌نماید.

چکیده انگلیسی:

Political economy, social science is that explores the dynamic interaction between market forces and the government, and examines the effects of the tension and conflict between the two is in the community. The influence of political powers is effectively on firms' performance, and corporate managers that are at the center of political attention, they find motivated to adapt to accounting practices through which they can manage earnings. Under justice Share's scheme, the government is required to distribute shares of profitable state-owned firms to the public; And may these companies managers through the use of political influence their manage earnings, and therefore will be important the study of the effect of this influence on the quality of earnings. This research studies the effect justice shares on the quality of earnings, with an emphasis on political economy perspective in the listed firms in Tehran Stock Exchange. Linear multivariate models have been used to test the relationship between research variables. The research sample consisted of 130 firms during the years 2012 to 2017 (6 years period). The results of the research indicate that the existence of justice shares in the ownership structure has a significant negative effect on the quality of earnings. Because in the developing countries, the economic system is dominated the connection and influence of government, and therefore be controlled and supported by the state and its affiliated institutions; thus, the influence of government and political management in companies can reduce their quality of earnings. Hence, the results of the research confirm the application of the theory of political economy regarding the adoption of macroeconomic policies (justice shares) and their effects on the quality of earnings

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