تأثیر خط مشی رفتاری مدیران بر معاملات غیرعادی با اشخاص وابسته
محورهای موضوعی : خطمشی‌گذاری عمومی در مدیریت
نازنین بشیری منش
1
(
استادیار گروه حسابداری، دانشکده مدیریت، اقتصاد و حسابداری، دانشگاه پیام نور، تهران، ایران
)
زهره عارف منش
2
(
استادیار گروه حسابداری، دانشکده مدیریت، اقتصاد و حسابداری، دانشگاه یزد، یزد، ایران
)
محمد سوری
3
(
کارشناسی ارشد حسابداری، دانشکده مدیریت، اقتصاد و حسابداری، دانشگاه پیام نور، تهران غرب، ایران
)
کلید واژه: معاملات غیرعادی با اشخاص وابسته, خودشیفتگی مدیران, بیش اطمینانی مدیران, کوته بینی مدیران,
چکیده مقاله :
زمینه: نقش اصلی مدیران در شرکت‌ها، تصمیم‌گیری در حوزه‌های مختلف نظیر سرمایه‌گذاری، سیاست تقسیم سود، معاملات با اشخاص وابسته می‌باشد. یکی از عوامل موثر بر رویکرد‌های تصمیم‌گیری مدیران، خط مشی رفتاری آنها می‌باشد. هدف: هدف پژوهش حاضر بررسی تأثیر ویژگیهای رفتاری مدیران بر معاملات غیرعادی با اشخاص وابسته است.روش تحقیق: نمونه پژوهش شامل 146 شرکت پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران بوده که بین سال‌های 1392 تا 1398 بررسی شدند. جهت سنجش معاملات با اشخاص وابسته از دو شاخص اعتبار خالص غیرعادی و فروش خالص غیرعادی استفاده شد. همچنین از سه ویژگی خودشیفتگی، بیش اعتمادی و کوته بینی مدیران به عنوان شاخص‌های ویژگیهای رفتاری مدیران بهره گرفته شد. تحلیل فرضیه‌های پژوهش با استفاده از مدل‌های رگرسیون چند متغیره با داده‌های پنل و نرم افزار استتا صورت گرفته‌است.یافته‌ها: نتایج نشان می‌دهد که خودشیفتگی مدیران بر اعتبار خالص غیرعادی و فروش خالص غیرعادی تاثیر معکوس دارد. ولی، بیش اطمینانی و کوته-بینی مدیران بر اعتبار خالص غیرعادی و فروش خالص غیرعادی تاثیر مستقیم دارد و میزان معاملات غیرعادی با اشخاص وابسته را افزایش می دهد.نتیجه‌گیری: معاملات با اشخاص وابسته امکان تبادل منابع، خدمات و یا تعهدات با شخصیت هایی نظیر سهامداران عمده،شرکتهای وابسته و واحدهای فرعی فراهم می سازد.
Background: The main role of managers in companies is to make decisions in various areas such as investment, profit sharing policy, transactions with affiliates. One of the factors influencing managers' decision-making approaches is their behavioral policy.Objective: The present study investigates the effect of managers' behavioral bias on abnormal transactions with affiliates.Methods: The statistical population of the study is the companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange and using the systematic elimination sampling method, 146 companies were selected as the sample of the research in a period of 7 years between 1392 to 1398. The method used to collect information is a library and the relevant data for measuring variables were collected from the Cadal site and companies' financial statements and in Excel preliminary calculations were performed and then Stata software was used to test the research hypotheses.Findings: The results show that managers' narcissism has a significant inverse effect on abnormal net credit and abnormal net sales. However, managers' overconfidence has a direct and significant effect on abnormal net worth and abnormal net sales. Also, managers' shortsightedness has a direct and significant effect on abnormal net credit and abnormal net sales.Conclusion: Transactions with affiliates allow the exchange of resources, services, or liabilities with individuals such as major shareholders, affiliates, and subsidiaries. Therefore, the behavioral policy of managers affects the use of transactions with affiliates in order to achieve personal goals or promote profitability.
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