Nowaday, competition affects all processes of production and supply of products, so that most manufacturers and suppliers of materials can not have a market share if they do not think about increasing quality and reducing prices, so in this article the effect of competi More
Nowaday, competition affects all processes of production and supply of products, so that most manufacturers and suppliers of materials can not have a market share if they do not think about increasing quality and reducing prices, so in this article the effect of competition of raw material suppliers on supply and procurement costs Materials for manufacturers in a multi-product supply chain Green closed loop is examined. First, competitive modeling in the supply process between raw material suppliers in different groups is done by estimating the demand for each of the chain products and setting the demand quantity parameters of each product. And the rate of return flow in the competitive model using the principles of game theory to find the equilibrium point of competition among each group of chain suppliers. Then by solving the model of changes in the cost of supply and goods for manufacturers and suppliers of chain raw materials in two cases The existence of competition and its absence are compared and decisions are made
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The purpose of this article is to describe and explain the strategic behavior of managers and shareholders in the interactive-conflict environment of joint-stock firms using the tools of game theory and in the form of signaling games. In such a way that first, taking in More
The purpose of this article is to describe and explain the strategic behavior of managers and shareholders in the interactive-conflict environment of joint-stock firms using the tools of game theory and in the form of signaling games. In such a way that first, taking into account the level of quality of internal controls, the manager acts on (deceptive and informative earning management) and then the shareholder with strategies (high capital cost, low capital cost) and also (high-quality audit services, low-quality audit services) reacts to it. The findings of the research, theoretically, the necessary conditions for establishing balance in the strategies (deceptive earning management, high capital cost), (deceptive earning management, high-quality audit services) in the environment of weak internal controls. In addition, it shows the condition of establishing equilibrium in the strategies (informative earning management, low capital cost), (informative earning management, low-quality audit services) in the environment of strong internal controls..
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Abstract
The purpose of this article is to examine the cooperation between Iran and Qatar in withdrawal of shared reservoirs of South Pars gas field (in Qatar: North Dome) by using game theory. The failure of a credible international agreement in determining the magnit More
Abstract
The purpose of this article is to examine the cooperation between Iran and Qatar in withdrawal of shared reservoirs of South Pars gas field (in Qatar: North Dome) by using game theory. The failure of a credible international agreement in determining the magnitude of the exploitation has led Qatar to become more promising by investing more in its oil and gas industries than Iran; this imbalance has caused a rash and pernicious competition. Following this incident, the main purpose of the paper is to examine the type of communication (cooperative or non-cooperative) through the game theory to achieve an optimal economic strategy for Iran. Results based on non-cooperative game design, solving methods through methods of elimination of dominated strategies (dominate strategies equilibrium), and Nash equilibrium showed that choosing the non-cooperative strategy is optimized for both countries and non-cooperation has more economic benefits for Iran.
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Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) is a concept commonly used in Game Theory. The game between the kicker and goalkeeper in soccer penalty kicks is a real game used to examine the application of the MSNE concept or the rate of its accuracy. The data were colle More
Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) is a concept commonly used in Game Theory. The game between the kicker and goalkeeper in soccer penalty kicks is a real game used to examine the application of the MSNE concept or the rate of its accuracy. The data were collected on the direction of kicks and jumps in 106 penalties kicked in Premier League of Iran and the predictions of the model analyzed. The observations represented that given the probability distribution of kick direction, the optimal strategy for goalkeepers is to stay in the center of the goal; but the goalkeepers, almost always, jumped to the right or left. Finally, the “left-left” pattern is the most frequent and have the greatest number of observations.
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In this paper a new bidding strategy become modeling to day-ahead markets. The proposed algorithm is related to the point of view of a generation company (Genco) that its end is maximized its benefit as a participant in sale markets of active power and spinning reserve. More
In this paper a new bidding strategy become modeling to day-ahead markets. The proposed algorithm is related to the point of view of a generation company (Genco) that its end is maximized its benefit as a participant in sale markets of active power and spinning reserve. In this method, hourly forecasted energy price (FEP) and forecasted reserve price (FRP) is used as a reference to model the possible and probable price strategies of Gencos. A bi-level optimization problem That first level, is used to maximize the individual Genco’s payoffs for obtaining the optimal offered quantity of Gencos. The second one, uses the results of the upper sub-problem and minimizes the consumer’s payment with regard to the technical and network constraints, which leads to the awarded generation of the Gencos. In this paper use of the game theory in exist optimization model. The paper proposes a linear programming approach. A six bus system is employed to illustrate the application of the proposed method and to show its high precision and capabilities.
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Oligopoly is one of the common structures of the market and is actually a state between pure competition and pure monopoly. The theoretical literature distinguishes between the behaviors of companies in adopting competitive pricing strategies. It is common to study mode More
Oligopoly is one of the common structures of the market and is actually a state between pure competition and pure monopoly. The theoretical literature distinguishes between the behaviors of companies in adopting competitive pricing strategies. It is common to study models where all firms are price-makers or price-takers, but the simultaneous application of price-making and price-taking strategies by firms producing a similar product using game theory has not received much attention. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to use game theory with equilibrium concepts forward-looking equilibrium reasoning, and backward-looking individual learning simulation tools to investigate the behavior of companies. The results of the recent study showed that the Cournot-Nash model is a stable model for the real evaluation of pricing strategies in a dynamic oligopoly market. However, with a larger number of firms, a unilateral deviation from Cournot's behavior becomes profitable. In this paper, we have formally proved that the only possible stable market is the Cornot market, where every firm can be a price taker. Conversely, a market in which all firms accept only prices is never stable, and therefore Walrasian equilibrium is not applicable according to the findings. When there are no stable markets, the market does not evolve toward a fixed composition, but the number of price takers typically decreases. In such a situation, the market composition follows a cyclical pattern that is related to the stability or volatility of crude expectations.
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This article aims to describe and explain the strategic behavior of managers and shareholders in the interactive conflict environment of joint-stock firms using the tools of game theory, specifically through signaling games. Managers, considering the quality of internal More
This article aims to describe and explain the strategic behavior of managers and shareholders in the interactive conflict environment of joint-stock firms using the tools of game theory, specifically through signaling games. Managers, considering the quality of internal controls, engage in both deceptive and informative earnings management strategies. Shareholders then respond with strategies involving high or low capital costs and opt for either high or low-quality audit services. The findings of the research outline the theoretical conditions necessary for establishing balance in strategies such as deceptive earnings management with high capital costs and deceptive earnings management with high-quality audit services in environments characterized by weak internal controls. Additionally, it highlights the conditions required to establish equilibrium in strategies like informative earnings management with low capital costs and informative earnings management with low-quality audit services within environments boasting strong internal controls.
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