Can Alternative Scientific Theories Challenge Scientific Rationality?
Subject Areas : Philosophy
Keywords: : Incommensurability, Underdetermination, Alternative Theory, Unconceived Theory, Kuhn, Persistence Anomaly,
Abstract :
One of the reasons of the Relativism about Science is the impossibility of justifying scientists' decisions about conflicting or alternative scientific theories. Relativism argues that there is a situation in which scientists can never judge between alternative theories. From the point of view of the article, an alternative theory can only challenge scientific rationality if the two conditions of “methodological shortcomings of scientists” and “the existence of alternative theories” are established at a given time of decision-making. A major trend against relativism is the attempt to complement and equip scientists' methodology when confronting alternative theories. However, this article focuses on the study and evaluation of the “possibility of alternative theory”. To this end, we try to point out the various definitions of this concept in order to justify “alternativeness” of a theory. The important condition of independence from the current theory must be met. For this purpose, there must be a “complete formulation” of competing theories. According to this article, achieving this complete formulation to enumerate all the explanatory capabilities and empirical implications of the theory is a matter of history and depends on the emergence of the next successful theory. Therefore, only “after making a decision” a theory can be justified as “alternative”. Thus, the relativist claim is inconsistent because it must first accept the validity of the scientists' decision in order to attribute the alternative to a theory.
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