Kim's Objections to non-Reductive Physicalism Regarding Mental Causation Problem

Subject Areas : Philosophy

Received: 2016-07-23 Accepted : 2016-11-06 Published : 2017-01-20

Keywords: Mind-Body Problem, Mental Causation, Non-reductive Physicalism, Jaegwon Kim,

Abstract :

In physicalism and its various types, it is often tried to explain the mind-body relationship scientifically and philosophically; but the main problem arises when two general and scientifically accepted principles, namely the completeness of physical world and the causal closure of physics, are considered along with the mental causation problem. In this paper, Kim's objections to non-reductive physicalism regarding mental causation problem will be discussed. These objections include casual exclusion and overdetermination of the mental. The former is the first problem with which, in Kim's sight, physicalism encounters. Kim also argues that mind-body supervenience is an accepted concept in all kinds of physicalism. Then he argues that non-reductive forms of physicalism, given that the mind-body supervenience is valid, lead to epiphenomenalism and even to its radical forms. He then argues that the same problem exists for physical realism. Moreover, Kim talks about various aspects of Anomalous Monism which had tried to solve the mental causation problem

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