A Critical Review of Brown's Solution to the Problem of Accessibility
Subject Areas : Philosophy
Keywords: causal theory of knowledge, epistemic accessibility, EPR experiment, the mind’s eye,
Abstract :
According to the causal theory of knowledge, there mustbe a causal connection between the knower's belief and the fact known. On the other hand, Platonism requires accepting the things that have not causal power, and so mathematical entities cannot be objects of our knowledge. This conflict is called “the problem of accessibility”. Brown, contemporary American philosopher, claims that he has solved this problem. First, he appeals to EPR experimentation, as a counterexample, and argues that the causal theory of knowledge is not correct. Then, he concludes that the condition of the causal connection is not necessary for knowledge. On the other hand, he assumes that there is a perceptual faculty, called “mind’s eye", and tries to show that there is a non-causal access to the mathematical entities. But neither of these two arguments is tenable. Because even if “the results of EPR cannot be explained on the basis of causal relation between the knower and the known” we cannot conclude that the causal theory of knowledge is not correct. We can only draw that the realm of scientific knowledge is divisible into two sub-realm: causal and quantomic. Therefore EPR, although may not be explained by theory of relativity, have another scientific support. While, there is no similar scientific theory for mathematical entities. On the other hand, mind’s eye only has explanatory role, not justificatory. It is clear that the access problem cannot be solved by appeal to unwarranted supposition of perceptual faculty
بناسراف، پال، صدق ریاضی، در از ارسطو تا گودل: مجموعه مقالههای فلسفی منطقی، ضیاء موحد، هرمس، 1382ش.
هی، آنتونی و پاتریک والترز، جهان کوانتومی نوین: مهندسی کوانتومی به زودی از راه میرسد، ترجمه محمدرضا محجوب، تهران، شرکت سهامی انتشار، 1387ش.
Benacerraf, P. and Putnam, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Mathematics, 2nd edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Brown, J. R., Philosophy of Mathematics: A Contemporary Introduction to the World of Proofs and Pictures, Routledge, 2008.
Idem, Platonism, Naturalism, and Mathematical Knowledge, New York and London, Routledge, 2012.
Chihara, C., Ontology and the Vicious Circle Principle, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1973.
Frege, G., The Thought: A Logical Inquiry, trans. A. Quinton and M. Quinton, Reprinted in Klemke, 1968.
Gödel, K., What is Cantor’s Continuum Problem? Reprinted in P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam (eds.), Philosophy of Mathematics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1947.
Goldman, A., “A Causal Theory of Knowing”, The Journal of Philosophy 64, no.12, Jun. 22, 1967.
Maddy, P., Realism in Mathematics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990.
Rosen, Gideon, “Abstract Objects”,The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 2012.
Schaffer, J., “The Metaphysics of Causation”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 2016.
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/causation-metaphysics/
Stiner, M., “Platonism and the Causal Theory of Knowledge”, Journal of Philosophy, 70/3, 1973.