Moore's Open Question Argument Compared to the Ontology of Good in Ibn ʿArabi's Mysticism

Subject Areas : Philosophy

Alireza Aram ¹ (Ph. D in Moral Philosophy, University of Qom)

Received: 2022-03-07 Accepted : 2022-03-07 Published : 2022-02-20

Keywords: mystic morality, naturalistic fallacy, ontology of good, open question argument,

Abstract :

The present article describes the open question argument and while analyzing the semantics of ethics in Ibn Arabi’s view, deals with a critical comparison of these two views. From a point of view, the perception of good depends on the understanding of the truth of existence, and until existence is accepted as absolute good, the interpretation of the instance of good is not possible. However, philosophical ethics theory of Moore does not tend to such an ontological interpretation, and limits the good to the scope of semantic discussions. At first glance, the ontological interpretation of good, as a presupposition, seems to be hidden from Moore's view. But to formulate more comprehensive theory of ethics, it is necessary to moderate both views. With an acceptable interpretation of the theory of unity of existence, the mystical doctrine of good can be recognized as a basis for Moore's intuitionism. Also, by discovering the ontological assumptions from the inside of semantic theory of him, one can answer doubts about the objectivity and reality of ethics