Rorty’s Criticism of Epistemology

Subject Areas : Philosophy

Received: 2017-01-31 Accepted : 2017-04-10 Published : 2017-07-23

Keywords: Rorty, Fundamentalism, Representationalism, Pragmatism, Epistemological Behaviorism,

Abstract :

Richard Rorty gives a descriptive-historical account of philosophical views. He criticizes fundamentalism and representationalism which, since Descartes, have dominated epistemology. The fundamental assumption of philosophers is that philosophy has a prominent role in our understanding of the world, and that philosophical issues are permanent. This means that philosophy is regarded as the ground for our knowledge. Rorty is against that, and so he is in fact against epistemology. Now, the question is whether Rorty is successful in freeing himself from representationalism. Rorty declares his pragmatism according to which knowledge requires dialogue and social action. He calls this view epistemological behaviorism. Charles Taylor describes Rorty’s view as a secular viewpoint which leads to unethical consequences. Taylor says that Rorty’s view is still under sovereignty of representationalism.

References:

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Rorty, R., Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton, University of Princeton Press, 1980.

Idem, Consequences of Pragmatism, Minneapolis, Brignton, The Harverster Press, 1994.

Taylor, Ch., “Rorty in the Epistemological Tradition”, Reading Rorty; Critical Responses to Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Alan R. Malachowski(ed.), Oxfor, Blackwell, 1996.

William, M., “Rorty on Knowledge and Truth”, Richard Rorty, David R. Hiley(ed.), Cambridge University Press, 2003.