AbstractManagers and shareholders engage in Financial information quality and conservatism in order to maximize benefits and maintain collaboration. Or for whatever reason (perhaps morally) they refrain from doing so. The purpose of examining this conflict and cooperati More
AbstractManagers and shareholders engage in Financial information quality and conservatism in order to maximize benefits and maintain collaboration. Or for whatever reason (perhaps morally) they refrain from doing so. The purpose of examining this conflict and cooperation between managers and shareholders of listed companies using game theory is to find a balance point in which the manager and the shareholder are satisfied as the main elements of the game in order to maximize their interests. Accordingly, this study seeks to find a strategy to maximize the equilibrium benefits of managers and shareholders by applying strategic features of accounting information and accounting conservatism. The method of data collection is the method of document mining during the period (1391-1391) and the method of data analysis is inferential and the software used to prepare the data and estimate the models is SPSS. The test results of the research hypotheses show that the combination of high conservatism strategies - high reporting quality and low conservatism - low reporting quality - are the equilibrium points (Nash equilibrium) in the game between the manager and the shareholder. The results show that game theory plays an important role in the relationship between managers and stakeholders; and finding the equilibrium points of the game can play an effective role in the decisions of the game parties (managers and shareholders). In this way, it informs the parties of the game of the strategy that has been most desirable and beneficial for them.
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