Providing a Solution to Increase the Key Distribution Rate in Measurement Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution

Subject Areas : Information Technology in Engineering Design (ITED) Journal

Mohammadreza Soltanaghaei ^{1 *} , Farzaneh Kaviani ²

1 - Department of Computer Engineering, Isfahan (Khorasgan) Branch, Islamic Azad University, Isfahan, Iran
2 - Department of Computer Engineering, Technical and Engineering Faculty, Isfahan Branch (Khorasgan), Islamic Azad University, Isfahan, Iran

Received: 2024-07-08 Accepted : 2025-05-18 Published : 2025-08-02

Keywords: : Quantum cryptography, secret key distribution rate, MDI-QKD ,

Abstract :

Quantum key distribution algorithm independent of measuring devices (MDI-QKD) has been used due to its compatibility with common technology, higher speed and range than other quantum cryptography methods and covering device defects. Despite the mentioned advantages, the speed of key distribution in quantum cryptography protocol, including MDI-QKD, needs to be optimized. The purpose of this article is to provide a solution that improves the speed of key distribution compared to current methods while ensuring complete security and transfer range in the MDI-QKD algorithm. The paper presents a new model for the MDI-QKD algorithm through eliminating the middleman, using a weak coherent pulse instead of a single photon, the signal-trap states, and a coherent path instead of two independent paths for the quantum channel, using random data with a uniform distribution. Therefore, with a frequency of 20 MHz, it has obtained a key distribution speed of 2.1 Mbps and a range of 220 km. While the previously presented optimizations in the field of MDI-QKD algorithm have achieved a speed of 1 Mbps, which the superiority of the presented model over them is evident.

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