Components Incompatibility, A Way for Monopolization in Services
Subject Areas : Labor and Demographic Economics
kiumars shahbazi
1
,
jalil badpeyma
2
1 - Associate Professor at Department of Economics, University of Urmia, Iran
2 - Ph.D. University of Urmia Economics
Keywords: L96, Monopoly, JEL Classification: L15, D21. Keywords: Incompatibility, Production Equipment, Static Game with Imperfect Information,
Abstract :
The purpose of this article is to achieve the compatibility equilibrium of components. For this purpose, the components compatibility was investigated in the production equipment producers. In this research, a game has been designed in three stages with considering the available alternatives for equipment producers and service providers, in which the firms decide about compatibility before price competition in selling stages and providing services. Then, by means of static games solution with imperfect information, the game equilibrium has been exploited. The modeling results showed that the component incompatibility is the game equilibrium and the firms with monopolization incentives in providing the after sale services, produce own provided outputs under an incompatible situation. Based on results, is suggested the production equipment byers, if possible before purchase, evaluate the rate of breakdown of production equipment, and also, concurrent with purchasing the system, buy the spare parts.
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