Fallibility and Certainty of mathematics in the perspective of Deductivism
Subject Areas : Epistemological researches
mahmood
koohgasht
1
(department of philosophy Azad university)
ahmad
shahvarani
2
(department of maths sciece and research Azad university)
mahmood
abaee kopani
3
(Department of philosopia azad university)
Keywords: Deductivism, Certainty, Proof, : Mathematics, Fallibility,
Abstract :
Fallibility and Certainty of mathematics in the perspective of DeductivismAbstractThis research shows that fallibility, with all the transformations it has created, is flexible to some extent, and it is possible to establish a relationship between it and the certainty of mathematical concepts. This possibility is done through the revival of analogy. The distinction between pure and applied mathematics leads to an indisputable form of mathematical fallibility, especially in pure mathematics. Moreover, this distinction fits well with analogicalism. Because according to Einstein's attitude, although it is not possible to prove mathematical certainty in reality, it is possible in pure mathematics. As a result, analogism with the aim of proving theorems and mathematical concepts can eliminate some possible errors in mathematics, and corrections are integrated into analogism, and fallibility claims are recounted in their non-controversial forms.Key words: Mathematics, Fallibility, Certainty, Deductivism, ProofKey words: Mathematics, Fallibility, Certainty, Deductivism, Proof
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