The Investigation of the Board Characteristics' Effect on Firm Debt Maturity Structure

Subject Areas : Management Accounting

زهره  حاجیها ¹ (ندارد)
حسنعلی  اخلاقی ² (ندارد)

Received: 2012-06-21 Accepted : 2012-09-10 Published : 2014-03-16

Keywords: Debt maturity structure, Board size, Percentage of Non Executive&#x0D, &#x0D, ,

Abstract :

In this study, the effect of board characteristics as corporate governancedeterminants on the firm debt maturity structure has been investigated. Therefore, themain objective of this paper is to review the effect of board size, percentage of nonexecutive directors in the board and CEO/Chair duality as independent variables on debtmaturity structure as a dependent variable in Tehran Stock Exchange. To achieve theobjective, 8 year information (2002-2009) of 72 firms were analyzed. To hypothesestesting, we have employed multivariate regression with panel data.The research results imply that there is a positive significant relation between boardsize and debt maturity structure. There is also a negative significant relation betweenpercentage of non executive directors and debt maturity structure. Additionally, it wasnot found any relation between CEO/Chair duality and debt maturity structure. Researchfindings represent the effect of strong board on financing decisions. Furthermore,hypnoses testing among different industries indicate that about relation of the board sizeand debt maturity structure in Drug and Automobile industries there are significantpositive relations and in Cement industry there exists a negative relation. In Cementand Food Industries, percentage of non executive directors in the board has a significantnegative relation. The relation between CEO/Chair duality and debt maturity structure isalso negative in the level of Chemical, Drug and Food.

References:

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