The Jurisprudential and Legal Foundations for the Non-Acceptance of Women’s Testimony in Criminal Matters

Subject Areas :

کبرا جباری کیش ¹ , فریبا پهلوانی ² , زهره نیک فرجام ³

1 - Department of Veterinary Parasitology, Babol- Branch, Islamic Azad University, Babol, Iran
2 -
3 -

Received: 2025-11-13 Accepted : 2025-11-13 Published : 2025-11-13

Keywords: Women’s testimony, Islamic jurisprudence, Criminal law, Iranian legal system, Gender and justice,

Abstract :

Extended abstract Introduction: The question of women’s testimony in criminal proceedings has historically occupied a significant position within Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and modern legal scholarship. Throughout Islamic history, the evidentiary value of women’s testimony has been a subject of extensive debate among jurists, theologians, and contemporary legal reformers. In recent decades, the issue has gained renewed relevance due to the increasing intersection between Islamic law and human rights discourse, particularly concerning gender equality in judicial processes. This study examines the jurisprudential and legal foundations underlying the non-acceptance of women’s testimony in criminal cases, with a focus on classical Islamic doctrine and its incorporation into the Iranian legal system. By tracing the historical, doctrinal, and sociological contexts in which these rules were formed, the study seeks to determine whether the distinction between male and female testimony reflects a substantive inequality or a context-dependent legal mechanism designed to uphold justice and reliability in adjudication. Methodology: The research adopts a qualitative and library-based approach, employing a descriptive–analytical method to explore both classical and contemporary sources. Primary jurisprudential materials—including Qur’anic verses, Prophetic hadiths, and authoritative fiqh texts—were analyzed alongside Iranian statutory law to uncover the underlying rationale of testimonial differentiation. The study also reviews relevant scholarly commentaries, comparative legal perspectives, and modern interpretations that attempt to reconcile traditional jurisprudence with evolving social realities. This methodological framework allows for a comprehensive assessment of how gender-based testimonial distinctions have evolved and how they function within contemporary Iranian law. Through comparative analysis, the study highlights key similarities and divergences between the classical Islamic conception of testimony and modern evidentiary principles rooted in equality before the law. Findings and Discussion: Findings indicate that classical Islamic jurists largely regarded the exclusion of women’s testimony in specific criminal contexts not as a deprivation of rights but as a jurisprudential exemption (hukm taklifi). This rule was originally grounded in a concern for preserving judicial integrity, preventing undue psychological hardship on women, and ensuring the accuracy of evidence in serious cases such as hudud (fixed punishments) and qisas (retributive justice). Jurists argued that the testimonial differentiation between men and women stemmed from the social structure of early Islamic society, where women’s participation in public affairs was limited and thus their exposure to criminal incidents and forensic matters was minimal. The Qur’anic verse (al-Baqarah 2:282) prescribing two female witnesses for financial transactions is often misinterpreted as a reflection of inferiority. However, exegetical analysis reveals that the verse was context-specific, aiming to ensure accuracy through mutual recollection and memory reinforcement rather than denoting any inherent deficiency. In contemporary Iranian criminal law, this differentiation persists: women’s testimony alone is insufficient in hudud and qisas cases but may be valid in civil, family, and financial matters when corroborated by a male witness or the claimant’s oath. Modern scholars increasingly challenge this traditional view, arguing that the rationale—based on women’s limited societal role—no longer holds true in modern contexts where women are active in education, professions, and the judiciary itself. Some reform-oriented jurists propose that testimonial competence should be grounded in personal credibility, knowledge, and reliability rather than gender. From a theological standpoint, the principle of justice (‘adl) in Islam demands contextual interpretation of jurisprudential rules. Thus, the continued exclusion of women’s testimony without reconsideration contradicts the broader objectives (maqasid al-shari‘a) of fairness and equality. Empirical observation of modern judicial systems in Muslim-majority countries also supports the possibility of reinterpretation: several jurisdictions, such as Egypt and Malaysia, have moved toward gender-neutral evidentiary rules while maintaining fidelity to Islamic principles. Therefore, the study’s findings suggest that the rule restricting women’s testimony should be reconsidered through ijtihad (independent reasoning) that accounts for changing social structures and gender roles. Conclusion: This study concludes that the traditional restriction on women’s testimony in criminal matters originated as a context-sensitive legal safeguard, not as a manifestation of gender discrimination. The jurisprudential intent was to maintain evidentiary accuracy and judicial fairness within a social framework where women’s public engagement was limited. However, in the modern era—where women actively participate in legal, academic, and civic institutions—the original contextual justifications no longer apply. A dynamic and context-based reinterpretation of Islamic jurisprudence is therefore both possible and necessary. Such reinterpretation can uphold the spirit of Islamic justice while aligning evidentiary standards with contemporary notions of equality and human dignity. In conclusion, the non-acceptance of women’s testimony in criminal cases should not be perceived as immutable but rather as open to reform within the flexible and rational framework of Islamic legal thought.

References:

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