The inclusion of representational theories about phenomenal features
Subject Areas : Epistemological researches
1 - PhD in philosophy of mind, researcher at institute of theosophy and philosophy
Keywords: Consciousness, Representationalism, Phenomenal features, Bodily Sensation, Intentional States,
Abstract :
The paper deals with a particular group of objections against representational theories about phenomenal experiences. The author, primarily, illustrates the importance of representational theories and clarifies some helpful categories of representational versions which has used in the paper. Then, it focuses on an especial group of objections against the inclusion of these theories. This group of objections undermines the inclusion of representationalism about "bodily sensations" and "intentional states". Opponents, in fact, make some doubts that representational approach cannot explain the phenomenal character of bodily sensations and intentional states. The paper has described these two difficulties, the first one has been discussed among scholars and the later represented by the author. It, finally, peruses the actual and potential responses of representationalists and, then, concludes that representational theories can come over the objections about bodily sensations, but they should give some explaination in order to unravel the objections about intentional states.
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