چکیده مقاله :
اهداف اصلی استفاده از بیمه فراورده های کشاورزی، ارتقاء سطح درآمد و کاهش نوسانات درآمدی بهره برداران، افزایش امنیت سرمایه‌گذاری در این بخش و در نتیجه استفاده کارا از نهاده ها ذکر شده است. لذا در این مطالعه چگونگی تأثیر بیمه بر کارائی تولید بهرهبرداران کشاورزی و گرایش به مخاطره آنها ارزیابی شده است. افزون بر آن با تعیین تابع تقاضای بیمه بهرهبرداران عوامل مؤثر بر آن مورد تجزیه و تحلیل قرار گرفت. وجود مسائلی از جمله ریسک سیستمی، انتخاب معکوس یا زیان آور و مخاطرات اخلاقی میتواند موجب کارایی نامناسب نظام بیمه گردد. از این رو، وجود این پدیده ها نیز در این مطالعه بررسی شده است. داده‌‌های مورد نیاز با استفاده از اطلاعات مقطعی بهره برداران سیب زمینی کار شهرستان اقلید در استان فارس با روش نمونه‌‌گیری خوشه‌‌ای چند مرحله‌‌ای و از طریق مصاحبه با سیب زمینی کاران بیمه شده و بیمه نشده، در سال زراعی 89-1388 جمع آوری گردیده است. تعداد بهرهبرداران وارد شده در جمعیت نمونة این مطالعه به ترتیب شامل 87 و 90 سیب زمینی کار بیمه شده و بیمه نشده بود. کارایی بهره برداران در استفاده از نهاده ها با استفاده از تابع مرزی تصادفی پس از تعیین فرم مناسب تابع تولید تخمین زده شد. روحیه کشاورزان در برخورد با مخاطرات و عوامل مؤثر بر تقاضای بیمه بهرهبرداران، به ترتیب با استفاده از "روش معادل قطعی محتمل برابر" و "روش گودوین" برآورد شد و مورد تحلیل قرار گرفت. وجود ریسک سیستمی، انتخاب معکوس یا زیان آور و مخاطرات اخلاقی به ترتیب با استفاده از روش های میراندا و گلابر (1997) و کویگین و همکاران (1993) بررسی شد. نتایج حاصل از این مطالعه نشان داد که بیمه بر کارایی فنی سیب زمینی کاران اثر مثبت معنی دار ندارد. با این حال محاسبه و مقایسه ضرایب ریسک‌گریزی بهره برداران عضو نمونه نشان داد که بیمه محصولات کشاورزی بر نحوه نگرش زارعین نسبت به مخاطرات تأثیر مثبت گذاشته و در کاهش سطح ریسک‌گریزی مؤثر بوده است. بررسی امکان وجود مسائل مختلف در عملکرد نظام بیمه نمایانگر احتمال وجود ریسک سیستمی ضعیف و همچنین مخاطرات اخلاقی و انتخاب زیان آور بود. تخمین تابع تقاضا نشان دهنده تأثیر مثبت ویژگیهای شخصی و مدیریتی بیمه گذار از جمله درجه‌ریسک‌گریزی، تحصیلات، تجربه, سن بهره بردار و همچنین مالکیت مزرعه بر تقاضای بیمه می باشد.
چکیده انگلیسی:
The objectives of crop insurance are to enhance the farmers' income level, decreasing income fluctuations, increasing investment security in agriculture and, thereby, more efficient use of agricultural inputs. So, in present study, effects of crop insurance on farmers' production efficiency, their attitudes toward risk as well as agricultural demand function were estimated and evaluated. Also, the probable affects of systematic risk, adverse selection and moral hazard on the efficiency of crop insurance were investigated. Data were collected from a sample of 87 insured and 90 uninsured potato farmers in Eghlid region by multistage cluster sampling method in 2009-10. Farmers' technical efficiency and attitudes toward risk were estimated by the stochastic frontier production function and ELCE method, respectively. Agricultural crop insurance demand function was estimated by using Goodwin (1993) model. Also, existence of systematic risk, adverse selection and moral hazard were investigated by Miranda and Glauber (1997) model. Results of the study revealed that, insurance effect on production of potato farmers was not positive. However, it was effective in increasing farmers' attitude toward risk. Investigating for adverse selection and moral hazard showed that they were most likely the main causes of negative effect of insurance. Results also revealed the existence of a weak systematic risk which is especially important in the case of private insurance. Demand function estimation showed the positive effects of farmers' personal and managerial characteristics such as degree of risk aversion, education level, experience, age and ownership on their demand for crop insurance JEL Classification : Q14
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