Using A Multivariate Statistical Method of Factor Analysis and Grounded Theory to Review the Theory of Agency in Developing Countries (A Case Study of Iran)

Subject Areas : Statistical Methods in Financial Management

Mirza Mohammadi ¹ , Rahmatollah Mohammadi pour ² , Ghodratallah Talebnia ³ , Negar Khosravipour ⁴

1 - Faculty of Economics and Accounting, Islamic Azad University, Central Tehran Branch, Tehran, Iran
2 - Faculty of Accounting, Islamic Azad University, Ilam Branch, Ilam, Iran
3 - Faculty of Accounting, Islamic Azad University, Science and Research Branch, Tehran, Iran
4 - Faculty of Economics and Accounting, Islamic Azad University, Central Tehran Branch, Tehran, Iran

Received: 2020-05-13 Accepted : 2021-04-12 Published : 2023-07-01

Keywords: Supervision, Risk Aversion, Reward, Corporate Governance, Agency Theory,

Abstract :

The asymmetry of information between managers and shareholders significantly affects the company's investment decisions and exacerbates the problems of agency. It seems that these problems in developing markets such as Iran are more than developed markets. This research is an exploratory study, and it aims at reviewing the theory of agency in Iran. In the present study, based on the research paradigm, first, data acquisition strategy is selected based on a qualitative approach, and then qualitative study and analysis, quantitative approach, and factor analysis approach have been used to confirm the validity of the extracted model. Statistical analysis of research data shows that among the hypotheses of agency theory, risk aversion, supervision, and reward are revised dimensions in Iran like examples of developing countries.The results confirm the existence of assumptions; 1. Conflict of interests of manager and owner, 2. Information asymmetry, 3. Reverse choice, 4. Ethical risk, 5. Maximizing the expected utility, 6. Forcing and 7. Failure to confirm the assumption is the ability to predict the future and receive information. due to the existence of information asymmetry, higher investment risks of minority shareholders and transparency problems, the lack of ability to predict the future and receive information is necessarily confirmed.

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