نقش مجتمع هاي نظامي - صنعتي در سياستگذاري هاي امنيتي ترامپ
محورهای موضوعی : آمریکامنصور حاجی پور 1 , آرمین امینی 2 , رضا شیرزادی 3
1 - دانشجوی دکتری رشته روابط بین¬الملل، واحد کرج، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، کرج، ایران.
2 - دانشیار گروه علوم سیاسی و روابط بین الملل، واحد کرج، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، کرج، ایران (نویسنده مسئول)
3 - استادیار گروه علوم سیاسی و روابط بین الملل، واحد کرج، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، کرج، ایران
کلید واژه: لابی گری, اقتصاد و سیاست, مجتمع نظامی - صنعتی, سياستگذاري هاي امنيتي, نظامی¬گری.,
چکیده مقاله :
چیستی و ماهیت مجتمع نظامی ـ صنعتی، چگونگی شکل گیری و بین المللی شدن آنها، رابطۀ مجتمع نظامی ـ صنعتی با بحران های پیرامونی در بازخیز مجتمع نظامی - صنعتی و تأثیر آن بر سياستگذاري هاي امنيتي ترامپ بین سال¬های 2016 تا 2020 مواردی است که در مقاله حاضر به آنها پرداخته شده است. پرسش اصلی این است که مجتمع¬هاي نظامي - صنعتي چه نقشی در سياستگذاري¬هاي امنيتي ترامپ بین سال¬های 2016 تا 2020 داشته اند؟ فرضیه این پژوهش که از نوع توصیفی- تحلیلی مبتنی بر روش مرور نظام‌مند با تجزیه و تحلیل رفتار ترامپ بر اساس رویکرد نظریات امنیتی صورت گرفته است نشان می دهد مجتمع هاي نظامي - صنعتي به عنوان عنصر هويت بخش و مشروعيت آفرين سياست گذاري هاي راهبردي و امنيتي ترامپ را به سمت يكجانبه گرايي غيرمشاركتي بین سال های ٢٠١٦ تا ٢٠٢٠ سوق داده است.داده های این پژوهش نشان می دهد که زمینۀ اصلی شکل گیری مجتمع های نظامی ـ صنعتی «ترس امنیتی» یا باور به آسیب پذیری امنیتی نظامی است. به عبارت دیگر، دلیل اصلی شکل گیری این مجتمع ها پاسخ به چالش های امنیتی پیرامونی است.
What and the nature of the military-industrial complex, how they are formed and internationalized, the relationship between the military-industrial complex and the surrounding crises in the resurgence of the military-industrial complex and its impact on Trump's security policies between 2016 and 2020 are things that They are discussed in the present article. The main question is, what role did military-industrial complexes play in Trump's security policies between 2016 and 2020? The hypothesis of this research, which is descriptive-analytical based on a systematic review method with the analysis of Trump's behavior based on the approach of security theories, shows that military-industrial complexes as an identity-giving and legitimizing element of strategic and security policies has pushed Trump towards non-participatory unilateralism between 2016 and 2020. The data of this research shows that the main ground for the formation of military-industrial complexes is "security fear" or the belief in military security vulnerability. In other words, the main reason for the formation of these complexes is the response to surrounding security challenges.
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