

Political Sociology of Islamic Awakening in the Middle East

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Abstract

In this article, the author discusses about the future of authoritative systems in the Middle East and argues that besides different manifestations that can be found in authoritarianism, the public mainstream is attend to critique and collapse of such systems internally. For explaining this situation, author has employed of "strong societies and weak states" theory and has achieved to strategic analysis about the future of authoritative systems in the Middle East by improving this theory proportionately to Middle East conditions. The author claims that Islamic awakening would be a comprehensive process in authoritative systems in the region that due to its sociological foundations have had significant effect, and finally would be lead to collapse of such closed systems. For this purpose, at first, a theoretical framework has been presented and then Middle East situation has been recognized and analyzed in terms of this framework.

Keywords: Strong State, Society, Weak State, Society, Modern State, Authoritarianism, Middle East

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Introduction

"providing an open space [in the Middle East] can be counterproductive ;{ that is} leading current and normal conditions towards authoritarianism and terror or resulting in realization of popular sovereignty "(cited from Lenore, 2001: 167).

Among obvious implications of expanding political Islamic thought is criticizing closed policies and promulgating of "Democracy" ⁽¹⁾ that as optimistic scholars of international relations claim, it establishes widespread wave that affect international network and also helping an improvement of political systems (Castells 1999,vol, 2). While scholars such as Martin Lenore, Modavi Rashid, A. R. Norton and Adam Przeworski argue that particular conditions of the Middle East has different requirements and cannot achieve to a general judgment in this regard. As Przeworski have expressed obviously, globalization and political sphere openness have had dual and contradictory results which involve from "critique of authoritarianism" to its "establishment".

In this article, the author discusses about the future of authoritative systems in the Middle East and argues that besides different manifestations that can be found in authoritarianism, the public mainstream are attend to critique and collapse of such systems internally. For explaining this situation, author has employed of "strong societies and weak states" theory and has achieved to strategic analysis about the future of authoritative systems in the Middle East by improving this theory proportionately to Middle East conditions.

The author claims that Islamic awakening would be a comprehensive process in authoritative systems in the region that due to its sociological foundations have had significant effect, and finally would be lead to collapse of such closed systems. For this purpose, at first, a theoretical framework has been presented and then Middle East situation has been recognized and analyzed in terms of this framework.

1-1. Conceptual framework

Since theories are based upon conceptual elements and semantic narrowness of words is the precondition of planning the theories and recognizing the facts; it is necessary to explain conceptual elements of the issue. The most important concepts include:

1-1-1. Islamic awakening

"Islamic Awakening" is a term that has formed to express a movement based upon awareness (related to emancipator principles of Islam), political practice (acting to change status quo in order to achieve ideal situation) and Islamism foundation (based on importance and priority of religious duty over transient peripheral interests) and its purpose is establishment of a type of political system (at first) which would not be in conflict with Islamic model of governance and (second) would be come out of a genius religious identical-epistemological foundations. Therefore, there are various spectrums of political streams or collective movements under the title of "Islamic awakening" that is considerable. What must not be ignored about Islamic awakening is unique role of "intellectual elements and sources" that points to preference of religious instructions in comparison with mere economic, political, pragmatic effects and/or etc. From this perspective, "Islamic awakening" has transnational aspect (and in fact universal) that represents it as a globalized rather than a national, regional or globalizing phenomenon. ⁽²⁾

2-1-1. Modern state

As Gianfranco Poggi suggests the "modern state" comes out of general category to "govern"; but as a constructing, growing and establishing element it is based upon the main, fundamental element of "national sovereignty". From this viewpoint, the modern state can be distinguished from the feudal, ethnical, tribal models and all of the governmental models in the age of before "civil". In this sense, "state" is a formal organization of power that relies on the principals such as state unity, authority in sovereignty, legitimacy and finally domain of influence (poggi, 1998, 162). Although, states in this sense rely on various theoretical foundations, they are regarded same because all defined and formed in relation with nation and the mediatory elements of "sovereignty and legitimacy". ^[3]

3-1-1. Authoritarianism

Authoritarianism has many and various instances of political regimes and such instance variety have made it difficult to conclude a framework for this term. Ashori believes that criterion of authoritarianism is decreasing of people share in legitimating power and its relying on particular functions that people have had not any role in its defining and they are doomed to mere adherence (Ashori, 1988, 248). But it seems that

Brooker approach is more precise, because he describes authoritarianism as a description for states that at least two following indicators are applicable about them (Brooker, 2000, 22):

1. Freedom has decreased and limited in favor of adherence from governing power will.

2. Government holder as a power enforcement agent doesn't accept and defer any limitations.

It appears that provided definition by Brooker is more meaningful and more applicable, because it refers to government substance and it is not merely based upon formal issues. In this article, this definition has been accepted as a conceptual base.

1-2. Theoretical Framework

Although attempts to provide a model with purpose of categorizing various societies had a long history in the area of political philosophy and until have designed various models which every model exhibit one part of social reality (See Shils 1975 , Stephan 1978), but among them, Joel Migdal approach have more validity. Because, proposed indicators by Migdal for categorizing societies is comprehensive as well as sociological approach is dominant to this model.

1-2-1. Secular Typology of States

According to Migdal viewpoint, the main indicators in measuring of weakness, strongness and typology of societies include (Migdal, 1988, 32):

The first indicator: people's tendency to complying government

Compliance shapes the proposed main indicator of Migdal; so that strong states have higher compliance of people and weakness of this indicator leads to weakness of state; even if governing power could impose its will by force and compel people to obey.

The second indicator: participation of people and civil institutions in national affairs

Although, the degree of popular compliance is regarded as a source of significant power, but states require more practical popular supports rather than "compliant attitude", which is represented in terms of widespread popular participations or civil institutions in implementing of national duties.

The third indicator: legitimacy of political power

This dimension of capability of states has abstract aspect and has more conformity with popular faiths than two another cases. This indicator means validity that the power can achieve to itself. This factor plays a role not only through influence on people's mentality but also through manipulation in mentality of power structure. Therefore, Migdal sorts weak and strong states in the form of square matrix that table 1 shows in the following:

Table1. Weak/ Strong Societies and States

	Strong	State	Weak
<i>Strong</i>	—	Dissolved	
<i>Society</i>	hierarchical (Pyramidal)	Anarchical	
<i>Weak</i>			

Source: Migdal 1988, 35

1-2-2. Normative Typology of States

since new developments in the Middle East and new conditions of international system during twenty five years after publication of Migdal Book on 1988, now we can reform and complete indicators and enforce his typology. The first step is separating the two main areas of state and nation from each other as well as providing indicators corresponding to circumstances of each of the mentioned two areas that author notes to it in the following:

First: Indicators of weak and strong states

States as formal power organizations that have a legitimate right to its enforcement are analyzed with the following indicators:

The first indicator: Mechanism of creating national solidarity

In viewpoints before sociology, powerful state was called as a state that could continue to its sovereignty without its subjects. In this approach, authority has been perceived by self-containment from society that subsequently has been criticized strongly in twenty century and principle of "power-society" has been settled as a foundation (Brooker, 2000, 22-35). Therefore, it is raised as an important question that, if

principle of existence of two different element such as "state" and "nation" has been accepted, how we can build and reinforce the relationship between these two elements. In fact, "national solidarity" implies relation between "state-nation" which is regarded as a measurement in weakness or strongness of states. That means:

One: Strong state relies on social power rather than military power in creating of national solidarity. "Social power" is attributed to capabilities emerged from sources that today we call it "social capital". Social capital due to including that have sources such as validity, trust... allows to states minimize split between self and people (Bawels, 2004, 358-350).

Two: In contrast, weak states due to lack of enjoyment from mentioned sources resort to hard power. As Joseph Nye suggests application of hard power is costly and has little effect and more vulnerability and consequently, produced solidarity in this realm is fragile (Nye, 2004, 5-10). Therefore, one can't assess necessarily that states enjoyed high stock of weapons or physical controls-and on this way warrant accompaniment of masses for themselves-as "strong".

The second indicator: Organizational Equality

So C. Offe has suggested in the anatomy of state that every state has at least three main aspects that include:

One: Ideological aspect that shapes "idea of state "and is also the issue of legitimacy.

Two: Bureaucratic aspect that involves administrative organization and is regarded as an instrument of implementing orders.

Three: Economic aspect that represents the beneficial function of state and helps groups to provide their economic interests as well as strategic think tanks inside society (Offe, 1984).

According to this analysis, a state is affected at least by three different forces; because every of aforementioned aspects has own reason and vary with other. Such situation has confronted unity and solidarity of state with threat and consequently its management style has significant impact on place and function of state. Regarding these considerations, Jurgen Habermas has talked about emergence of legitimacy crisis within modern political systems. He argues that these crises are relating to more modern states than simple or traditional types (Noroozi, 2001, 562).

Now, one can assert that states must necessarily make a unit

procedure and similar morale in all aspects of formal power in order to promoting their status and overcome legitimacy crisis. In fact, "organizational equality" is a phrase for achieving this strategic situation that in case of its absence or its weakness, *raison d'être* or proficiency of state would be destroyed severely due to internal conflicts.

Therefore, in regard to indicator of "scale of organizational equality", we can introduce weak and strong states as the following:

One: Strong states are generally implying for states that have achieved extreme consensus and equality among its various aspects; so aims, programs, and implemented policies by various sections of official power don't come into conflict with each other.

Two: Weak states are generally implying for states that its mentioned united procedure has not been defined or if exists, has not essential executive validity. Consequently, aims, programs and executive policies that introduced and implemented by various sections of state come into conflict with other sections and have had depreciation of sources and weakness of the whole system. In political developed systems, the different operational principles have been defined to achieve "organizational equality" that among them, we can point to compliance of powers separation, the emphasis on relative independence of powers together with "unity in national responsibility". These principles have been introduced and implemented so that on one hand, gives validity to various sections of state, and on other hand, deters them from isolation and implementing of independent programs. Of course, strategy of establishing unit states has been introduced sometimes in history of political developments that due to extending of human communities and their complications, has been become impossible the establishment of such systems and complex states with triple sections (executive, judiciary, and legislative) have been replaced. What is here important is that strongness of a political system had direct relationship with scale of its organizational equality.

The second: Indicators of Strong/ Weak Nations

Since, all of the political systems (closed or open) can't finally ignore effective and supportive role of people, it is necessary to examine indicators of weak/ strong societies. Suggested indicators include:

The Third indicator: Awareness and political vision

"Abdul Rahman kavakebi" have pointed to significant issue in

explaining the "nature of absolutism". While, he points to corruptive nature of "absolutism", claims that absolutism and absoluteness leads to "degradation" of societies and humans. In other words, autocratic models become applicable about degraded humans and in turn, decrease the bigness of the nations.

"Gist of speech is: despotism and science are two conflicting names that intend to overcome each other. Then, every despotic administration tries to extend its power to extinguish science light and hold people in ignorance and darkness... and mostly men of despotism drive back literati and hurt them (Kavakebi, 1986, 44).

Kavekebi's word applies also about authoritative regimes; so that "Samuel Huntington" and C.H. Moore have suggested obviously this aspect during their studying about cultural policies of authoritative regimes in eastern and western areas. According to "Huntington" and his colleges, enforcement of authoritative policies is possible for nations that are in lower level in terms of awareness and political vision. Certainly, knowledge of citizenship rights and structure of cooperative power deter power tendencies to authoritarianism and at the same reason; it can be set a relationship between type of political regime and scale of political vision in various societies (Huntington and Moore 1970). Now, we can distinguish between two types of weak/ strong societies:

One: Strong society enjoys an appropriate situation in terms of access to information, ability to understanding and analyzing as well as setting principals as a base in political practice and as such, such society has been composed of an educated nation.

Two: Weak states consist of masses whose political practice is exposed to damages at least from one of the following foundations – or all three foundations; A) relying on defective and incorrect information, or B) have not necessary ability to understand problems, and (finally) C) are unaware of the principals and making decisions on incorrect foundations. What is important in this regard is– in view of Ali Shariaty– coming out of society from situation based on "consciousness" and setting in "darkness of ignorance" that disturbs strongly progressive and healthy management in such society (Shariaty, 1990, 246).

A significant point is that consciousness and political vision – so mentioned above – is not necessarily like science and it can't be sized with a number of educated people in the society. "Vision" is a kind of

episteme that have been emerged by various ways and represented in practice. For this reason, Ali Shariaty claims to its combination with "to be illiterate" and don't negate this possibility (shariaty, 1990, 323-321). However, in this article, we consider combination of these two cases and "society strongness" has been related to scale and deep of knowledge in that society. "Level" has been measured by objective standard of "Learning of knowledge" and "deep" has been measured by qualitative standard of "type of behavior" and in sum, they form the "political vision" of the society.

The fourth indicator: political obligation

Although knowledge and episteme form foundation of behavior, in addition, it should also point to functional and operational standards in measuring capabilities of societies. What has called "political obligation" is an indicator to distinguish societies that circulate political philosophies in their daily lives and societies that has been produced a meaningful discontinuity between their philosophy and political practice (Gilbert, 2010, 57-55, Hurton, 2006, 44-33). Analysts attend to this separation who try to analyze and recognize societies by sociological or cultural approach and argue that culture is a foundation of formation of all of the practical models (for example, see, Sariolghalam 2007, Moor 1990; Ashena, 2004).

By this explaining, we can introduce weak/ strong societies as the following:

One: Societies on which knowledge has not found functional value and consequently political practice has not formed proportionate to related knowledge, are attributed as a weak society.

Two: Societies on which knowledge has found functional value and consequently, political practice is defined by related knowledge are attributed as "strong societies".

As suggested in these two definitions, weakness and strongness are not connected to particular containing of knowledge, but are related to a type of nation relation with that knowledge. Thus, the operability of democratic culture in the area of political practice implies strongness of that society as much as the operability of despotic culture. From this viewpoint, "obligation" has been measured as an independent issue of "knowledge and vision" and connected more to the behavioral model of nations, civil institutions and even present elements of power (see,

Eftekhari, 2003, 211-210).

The whole of considerations emerging from the four proposed indicators, provide a comprehensive narrative from theory of "strong societies and weak states" on the base of analytical model of author that can be applied in assessing of new conditions of Middle East. According to this model, current new developments from a kind of "awakening" (that have identity, epistemic aspects and are based on awareness) can be considered equal in its assessing within simple developments in the area of power, as scholars such as Nye and Sharp have claimed.

Three: Analytical model

In examining the relation between globalization with authoritarianism in the Middle East, it is necessary to bring the issue out ambiguous subjective and holistic meanings and recognize its objective applications to set foundation of our discussion. This method helps us to understand objective implications of globalization so the Middle East interacts with it, and avoid entering to important discussions that don't relate to the Middle East.

In regard to proposed theory about "weak state and strong society", we can see the four main relations between state and society in the Middle East. In other words, structure of political authoritarianism has defined in terms of four relations and has found operational identity; consequently, globalization would be connected to four relations effectively, and finally, we can found positive or negative effects in these four areas. The four relations include (see, Figure 1).


First: The mutual relation between state-nation in terms of producing a vision appropriate with identity of authoritative power.

Second: The mutual relation between state-nation in terms of producing a national obligation to issued orders by official power.

Third: The mutual relation between state-nation for producing a vision appropriate with authoritarianism in political culture.

Fourth: The mutual relation between state-nation for producing a national obligation as a part of political culture.

Figure (1): The four relations of social structure and authoritarianism in the Middle East



In the next section and in relation to the four mentioned relations, we would examine various aspects of Islamic awakening in the region.

1-3. Authoritative states in four spheres

Spreading of Islamism waves as an expanded phenomena that have gone beyond geographical borders, have affected the Middle East as well as its political systems. It is evident that political systems which have democratic systems in region, have not difficulty in understanding advantages of Islamic awakening and compliance with it, but most closed systems would be confronted by new challenges which the most important includes:

1-3-1. Crisis of awareness

Among new global manifestations, we can point to development of communication networks and fading role of national borders in transmission of "information". This aspect of global developments is so important and sensible that many analysts have considered it as a serious crisis for all authoritative regimes-that tend to canalize information and their reproduction in terms of certain standards.

This fact that authoritarianism have based upon some dogmas that are strongly vulnerable under democratic tendencies, leads us to talk about crisis facing authoritative regimes by development of knowledge through domination of global network. For example, Manuel Castells points to phenomena such as growth of internet, development of information networks, promoting of scale and level of education in global

community, and formation of new information paradigms that resulted meaning of all these phenomena is one important point: the limited access to knowledge and its definition cannot be more regarded as an exclusive goods as in the past (Castells 1999, vol. 1). In this case, most part of people in the Middle East who due to deprivation of political and social knowledge had been ignorant of own rights and ideals, would take the first necessary step through this way to express their democratic demands; that means learning the issue. On this characteristic of future developments in the Middle East, "Mustafa Kamel-Saeed" claims that the kind of political-social episteme in the Middle East has not consistency with authoritative foundational assumptions and consequently, future developments tend more to criticize authoritarianism rather than approve it (Kamel-Saeed, 2002, 110-105). Among cases that approve this claim, we can point to the following behaviors:

One: In relation to new political–social knowledge, inclination to establish civil institutions and their activation is rising, while authoritative regimes can't accept such role for these institutions. For example, we saw the plan of establishing Youth Association and such assemblies in Egypt that the state refrained practically from their confirmation and recognition.

"Jordan's Woman Association" (1974), "Public Union of Jordan's Woman", "Association of Democratic Tunisian Woman" (1989), "Assembly of Human Rights supporters in Tunisia", "Organization of Defense from Democratic Freedoms and Rights in Yemen", and many other civil establishments can be found that each of them have experienced the same fate (have not been allowed to establish or after a time have been closed).

Two: The degree of awareness has promoted in Arab societies and has raised critical thinkers and Islamism that could have find supporters among masses. In fact, intellectual stream connection with masses is a result of public knowledge promotion among people of these countries that certainly has been considered as a threat and suppressed by states. In this regard, Islamism process that calls for transformation in political system had higher success and almost had the ability to use much from opportunity and possibilities that have been provided by globalization to influence within domains under rule of authoritative states. Farhad Kazemi writes about this aspect of intellectual developments in the

Middle East: "Islamic movements... have destroyed exclusive domain of states on power resources, and also have questioned current rulers of region" (Kazemi, 2002, 167).

Intellectual plan of scholars such as Alqarzavi, Mohammad Tofiq, Ali Abdurazaq, Mohammad Saeed Alashmavi and Abdullah Alarvi confirm this claim and imply that elite society have influenced on conceptual-meaning borders beyond authoritarianism and one cannot hope to the continuity of intellectual process supporting closed models of ruling in most Arab countries in the Middle East.

1-3-2. Crisis in political stability

Among significant questions that have concerned analysts in relation to situation of the Middle East countries – especially countries which experiencing authoritative regimes – is that why is there relative stability in these countries? Most presented answers are connected to the role of following elements as stabilizer factors in these countries:

First: Economic welfare coming out of oil revenues (Byman et al, 2006, 193-89).

Second: Application of power instruments in order to enforce pressure on opposite/ opponent centers (Brooks, 1998).

So "John Akterman" has suggested, in regard to application of force about reform of procedures and international norms, authoritative states confronted with many limitations and it seems that degree of their relying to instrument of force is becoming more difficult (see, Byman et al, 2006, 219-215); so far Judith Yaphe and his colleagues claimed until 2015, monarchic systems which rely merely on their military capability, would be certainly encounter with crisis and would be dissolved by various ways. Clear example is Baath Regime in Iraq that had talked about decline of authoritative foundations of this regime as well as its early turndown in 2002 (Yaphe, 2002, 143-162).

Thus, the most important pillar of political stability in these societies has had economic nature and therefore the role of Islamic awakening in current developments in these societies become apparent. Among important aspect of these developments, we can point to considerations related to economy and network of economic relations. This development has been so deeply assessed that some scholars such as P.Wilkin introduce it as the main reason of destroying traditional states. Therefore, states find new form and content that the best interpretation is

"internationalization of states". Representations of this new state include (Hajiyousefi, 2003, 93-97):

One: the penetrability of states is rising.

Two: the degree of responsibility of states to resources and foreign centers is rising.

Three: the states become instruments for transferring global economy market-based regulations to its internal economy.

Four: the states have responsibility in front of new "trade civilization" and must comply with new norms and values and regulate own behaviors according to it. Trading liberalization is obvious example of ruling of this new civilization.

The meaning of above considerations seems clear in terms of authoritative states of the Middle East. While some of these elements have been accepted simply by these states, some of them can't be consistent with their renter economic structure; and for this reason, they resist against them compulsorily. In other words, authoritative states in confronting with new global and regional situation come across with a paradox: on one hand, resources of their revenues leading them to expand economic welfare in order to preserving public satisfaction and continuing stability, on the other hand, presence in global economy results in "internationalization of state" that conflicts with principal of power concentration, person-centric and monarchic hierarchy.

In this regard, it is useful to study results of major research that have been taken in relation to economic situation of the Middle East. Certainly, "Harvard" university, "United Nations Institute for disarmament" and "world bank" has accomplished comprehensive and detailed researches that finally the given mentioned paradox, their reformed proposals in economic area could not draw positive attention of rulers in most Arab countries. For example, Harvard research focused on use of particular capabilities of every country, enforcement of private section, establishment of Free Trading regions, establishment of the Middle East Bank and... that at first glance was assessed favorable, but due to critiques from state-based situation of current economy and attempts to reform this situation, could not become practically a dominant model for economic practice (Lenore, 2002, 265-264). Whereas viewpoint of scholars such as "Huntington" have been more welcomed: reforms require power and for avoiding Soviet Union experience, it is

necessary to submit to concentration of power as a necessity in early stages of reforms (Lenore, 2002, 266).

However, what can be said about economic conditions of the Middle East countries and position of authoritative states suggest that these states due to political motivations couldn't submit to requirements of internationalization of state, and from this viewpoint, confront with two strategic options – that also both are ridden with crisis: either must surrender in favor of authoritarianism to limit economic blooming that bring economic dissatisfaction forth and is not consistent with higher revenues of these countries, or must enter global economy and consequently satisfy adjustment of political power structure that means emergence of crisis in authoritarianism.

1-3-3. Crisis in social capital of authoritarianism

"I believe.... now we are living in turn of age on which science have shifted from conquering of external environment to conquering of internal environment (Berzinesky, 2002, 300).

Although "Berzinesky's analysis is general and has been presented about situation of democracies in international system, but considers formation of new conditions in the world society that may be find its examples in countries are experiencing authoritarianism. According to presented analytical model about situation of political systems in the Middle East, authoritative models are based upon social capital that have been formed traditionally and during history in this area, but now confronting with invalidity stemming from global processes. The most important social capital of these systems includes:

First: Monarchic narrative from religious government

Although doctrinal foundations of Islamic worldview are far from closed political systems due to enjoyment of supreme divine doctrines and emphasis on human nobility (Mousavi Khomeini, 50-45), but it can not be ignored that totalistic states in Muslim history have had obvious appearance and following formation of "state–nation" model, inclination to authoritative regimes has become a public and comprehensive procedure in political area (see, Eftekhari, 2005, 113-202). What need to be considered, is relying of authoritative propositions on foundations and elements of religion and in other words, use of religion as a source for authoritative confirmation that implies deal with religion as an instrument by authoritative regimes. "Ayoobi" has discussed about this issue widely

in Islamic countries domain and claims that no centrality like religion could help to continuity of authoritative regimes. For this reason, share of state is very high in promulgating and promoting of this narrative about religion and seeing its presentation from beginning of socialization process of individuals within society (Hins, 2002, 171-137).

In contrast, we have to point to functions of the new Islamist wave that have been influenced by Islamic revolution, and have challenged strongly this function of religion and consequently would bring a deep crisis for authoritarianism. The most effective pivots include:

One: Islamic wakening and producing the theory of religious democracy.

In this context, we see production of new narratives of religion that by using global sphere have expanded widely the possibility of presentation. Such political narration about religion as a practice produce serious damages for authoritative states that in view of Cheryl Bernard means dulling of instrument of religion to justify authoritarianism by the side of elites and masses in these societies (Bernard, 2005, 19-15).

Two: Islamic awakening and critique of secularism

An aspect of "globalization" implies development of liberal democracy norms that aftermath cold war also takes on imposed aspect and certainly, it has been sought in terms of secularism rule of project. Using of progressive instruments of propagation, promoting and educating, has been resulted in expanding anti-religious doctrines or inclination to limitation of religion in Arab countries intensely and consequently, producing religious secularism that had been appealed for most of Arab authoritative governments. "Savvaf" called this policy as a colonial action that have had a long history, but today have targeted Muslim world effectively and widely (savvaf, 1965). But "Aljaberi" emphasis more on epistemological aspect of this development and regard it as a requirement of new conditions of Muslim world that in response to inappropriate policies of authoritative and totalitar rulers has sought to new coming out-and of course, his approach has been influenced by liberal democracy secular doctrines (Aljeberi, 1994). Also, "Alashmavi" confirms this idea, when he has presented thinking dialectic and political practice and believes that one can understand secularism in terms of religious foundations and there is any necessity for xenophile. In other words, secularism has been assessed as a part of new achievements of

religion in contemporary era – and not merely the imported and western product (Alashmavi, 2004). What is important in this article is relative inclination of Arab societies to secular thinking.

A negative phenomenon that helped to the continuity of authoritative living in Arab countries and now been encountered with crisis and critique by Islamic awakening. From this viewpoint, authors' analysis such as "Alazmeh" and "Almasiri" is important, where they assess inclination to secularism in the region future as a dominant affair and according to it, regard reforms of monarchic and authoritative systems as an evident and certain issue (Alazmeh 1992; Alazmeh and Almasiri 1998). In other words, Islamic awakening implies declining of authoritarianism in the Middle East and not only western analysis but also Muslim thinkers have attended to this issue.

Second: Historical experience of monarchy

So "Pierre Bourdieu" has suggested social capital has various kinds and types that activate in each society some of these kinds proportionately. "Historical experience" is among these resources that have the possibility of activation in societies which have historic tradition (Tajbaksh, 2005, 146-144). In this respect; the Middle East is rich due to civilization background, while it has not been used properly. From this viewpoint, one can review the historical transformation process of Islam world following departure of Prophet Mohammad (peace upon him):

At first, there is a short term formation of caliphate that according to Shiite viewpoint, caliphate have not established based on presented foundations by Prophet Mohammad (that means continuing of prophetic mission is not consistent with Imamate), but attended to least fundamental principles and in this respect, religious principles is still concerned by Muslims (Alsyeed, 1997, chapter 1, chapter 2). But important and main development related to this article is change of caliphate to monarchy that is assessed as the second historical significant period in the area of Islam world. According to this attitude, the two schools called "sham" (Syria) and "kufa" emerge that in spite of their differences have same tendencies to monarchy. Umayyad by giving authority to "sword" (naked force), "instrumental use of religion (narrative building about religion) and finally compliance of concentration principle and inherited power in certain a dynasty established the primary foundations of authoritarianism (Eftekhari, 2000,

152-147). This policy was followed by Abbasids in terms of "kufa" school and consequently continuation and repetition of historical-traditional experiences, emerged –wrongly– in Islamic area that "Aljaberi" has construed it "power expediency" (Aljaberi, 1992, 237-228). That means "authorization" becomes a practical norm in Arab countries policy that has not been lifted even by entrance of this civilization area to nationalism area (after fall of ottoman Emperor) and appears in the form of national authoritative systems. Of course, we must not neglect this issue-as Kotharani and Abdurrazaq have pointed – although authoritative development in new period has been possible by helping and contributing of foreign forces, but favorable background come out of that historical experience has been more effective and active. In other words, authoritarianism has been product of interaction of foreign forces intervention with internal historical favorable conditions (see, Kotharani; Abdurrazaq, 1994, 50-40). In this prospect, it can be asserted that Islamic awakening has contributed to weakness and declining of social capital of authoritarianism and by this way, it is shaping new historical experience in region. This development has been explored by several methods:

First: Through revival of Islamic identity that would result in production of a new culture and political ceremonies and rites among Arab countries and finally fostering a "new generation" who have been very weak in terms of obligation to their historical background and have more desire to new models of Islamic living. Some Arab social analysts have felt threat out of this area and believe these cultural programs would be practically the backgrounds of emergence of political crisis in the future. (See, gharani and akhroon, 2003).

Second. By critique of current negative narratives from political Islam and containment of streams supporting Islam phobia in the region and the world, this approach would help widely to revive religious government (Amin, 2002).

1-3-4. Statecraft crisis

In addition to three previous spheres that have challenged directly authoritarianism and threatened continuation of life of these systems, it can be noted to the fourth spheres that although it has affected indirectly on activation of processes and critical centers for authoritative regimes in the region; but due to spaciousness of these impacts is worth to note.

Islamic awakening leads to complexity and difficulty of statecraft for authoritative regimes, because such awakening comes back to people awareness and revival of Islamic policy principles that is regarded as a crisis for authoritarianism by various ways:

First: Activation of social discontinuities

Among impacts of Islamic awakening is political awareness that promote people effective participation in political affairs and governance of their countries and also regulation of arrangements according to Islam." Political awareness" in authoritative – because, it has not found a response without suppression and enforcement of its dominance for establishment of stability – regimes would be severely cause the crisis. For example, it can be noted to social unrests in Iraq that is rooted in political awareness of majority Shiite who were deprived of government during Saddam Hussein (Roshandel, Seifzadeh, 2003, 40-38). It has been anticipated the same condition for Saudi Arabia. Political–doctrinal stream such as Wahabism by political, religious and even economical deprivation of Shiites tries to inactivate and extinct this discontinuity, whereas, Shiites have enjoyed from least opportunities in this closed space and couldn't express their protest. For example, it can be noted to 1980 event that had heavy consequences for Shiites. However, it seems that such policy cannot be responsible in long term and finally, it would bring together protests to reform conditions. (See, Roshandel and Seifzadeh; 2002, 40-42). The similar cases are much in areas of culture, economy and ideology that challenges authoritative regimes in countries such as Egypt, Bahrain, and Jordan and

Second: Reinforcement of people position in politics

In regard to increasing emphasis on participation of people in policy making, most of authoritative regimes addressed this issue and tried to give full appearance to public support from them. This action results in approving and implementing of formal policies that have been defined for the purpose of giving a role to people in order to support from regime. However, important point is that these formal policies were not limited to formal defined scale and contribute to the enforcement of democratic process in social context. Consequently, democratic indicators of authoritative regimes are decreasing and people alienate from them that finally resulting in negative reaction by state. For example, Kuwait's princess implemented such plan after Kuwait got free of Saddam Hussein.

Under the new conditions, he agreed to make elections for the beginning of the parliament that had been dissolved by himself; but entrance of 30 opponents to the parliament – in spite of more implemented controls-provided dissatisfaction of state and function of parliament encountered with difficulty. The similar situation threatens Saudi Arabia "Majlis Al-Shura" (Consultative Council) or Bahrain "consulting assembly" that shows authoritative regimes have inclined to democratic mechanisms coercively, but have not capability to manage and control them (Roshandel and Seifzadeh, 2003, 110-102). Its reason comes back to complexities of new institutions that in principle, their governance seems impossible for authoritative regimes. Continuation of this process would result in efficiency crisis of these systems and enforcement of demands about religious democracy.

Third: weakness of authoritative internal order

Among important phenomena encountering traditional transient societies is entrance of new human forces inside of power structure that enjoy expertise and required knowledge. D. Lerner sees this process as a normal issue and come out of new conditions that lead the states toward it necessarily. Experience of countries such as Turkey and Lebanon confirms this claim and that other countries are also experiencing more and less this same process. But what is here important is that Islamic awakening impacts on professionalism have resulted in vulnerability of cohesion of internal authoritative regimes and lost their internal validity. This is because of elites that are influenced by Islamism intellectual waves. Therefore, the Middle East authoritative regimes in response to their requirement to attract new elites provide opportunities for Islamic elites not only they enter to official structure of open power, but also they support from necessity of reformative methods or authoritative models that finally entangle authoritarianism in crisis internally. What has been called "Reconstruction of power", in fact implies this aspect of Islam awakening that have gotten authoritarianism into difficulty and finally would follow political regime reformation or internal purification.

Conclusion

"When states rely more on force rather than public consensus in governing, and when it is dealt with their authority within seriously and by coercive instruments, then concept of national security lose its social

political meaning." (Buzan,1999,42-41).

What Buzan calls as "desocialization" security involves a process that according to it, security has lost its originality, domains and its social nature and necessarily becomes a "hardware and militarily" category. According to it, criterion of "weak/ strong" states has changed and measured by their hardware capability, so Barry Buzan "believes it can be a crisis-building focus for these societies and even regions."Azar", "Astyvjen", "Davis, Bi Babro" and "Chong In Moon" confirm this perception, when talking about declining of closed regimes in the third world and believe social collapse of these regimes have provided background for functioning and activating of foreign threats (see, Azar and In moon, 1999).

The Middle East can be assessed as a region that is vulnerable severely by desocialization security. The authoritative regimes that have based their governance model upon authoritative tradition without considering requirements and necessities of "religious democracy", has put region in a sensitive situation. This new situation has emerged often from supports of liberal democracies of these closed systems, and now challenged by Islamic awakening and has been unstable. In other words, Islamic awakening encountered foundations, pillars and model of authoritarianism with crisis. Therefore, new generations in these societies have surpassed from their own states in terms of political vision and knowledge, modeling in political culture and even direction to political behaviors. In other words, society becomes stronger than own state in terms of societal and consequently, authoritarianism cannot anymore achieve necessary social satisfaction, and that means collapse of authoritative social foundation in these societies.

What here is important is that: if collapse of social foundation of authoritarianism being realized, two main options would shape future of these societies:

One: Making serious reforms and reproduction of state theory that means a revolution in political system – but by a nonviolent instrument – seems impossible for monarchic regimes being able to make such important development.

Two: implementing of supportive policies in order to decelerating or preventing from declining of authoritative social foundations in these societies that is consistent with morale and experience of most countries,

but its impact was little only helps to postpone the emergence of crisis.


In terms of second option, dependency of these regimes on foreign factors is increasing to achieve necessary supports for continuation of their own living, but this strategy would not be responsive. Because of changing conditions through globalization, most of these powers had been critics' of authoritarianism and forced to reform and change these regimes in order to preserve their interests. Consequently, authoritarians would be encountered with difficult conditions come out of declining of their social foundations internally and decreasing of external supports that require their reform or change. In this meantime, it is not impossible using of military instrument by external supporters of these regimes in order to enforce change and has been assessed achievable experience (Eftekhari, 2001, B). But, an effective force would be come out internally and attended to strengthening of nations through new global conditions that other weak authoritative states appearing very weak to govern them and managing their problems. The meaning of this speech is that "Islamic awakening" due to enjoyment of social–doctrinal supports would be presented effectively in power arrangements of these countries and the future of political systems influenced by Islamic awakening waves would be shaped.

Notes

1) Of course, democracy that Castells speaks about was not consistent with current models and definitions and in fact it is a reformed type that has conformed to new conditions of world. Among these factors is obvious and unique role of new information technology that has a main part in creating a different political behavior model than past. In this regard, particular role of media (including electronic and its traditional type) is presented that has a main part of policy space. However, it should not be ignored that democratic doctrines have still most acceptance-as Castells believe- as behavioral principles in limiting of policy borders in future (See Castells, 1999, Vol. 2, Chap 6).

2) In Iranian approach, so called situation of "globalized" is considered by two main and different narratives. In a way that: if there had been an element of imposition and uniformity in globalization, it would be interpreted as " globalizing"; and if plurality and variety be maintained in globalization process, it would be interpreted as " universalism"(see Sekelton & Allen 1999).

3) It would be necessary to pay attention to three elements in "state understanding" discussion: nation, legitimacy and sovereignty. Therefore, state system is based upon four main elements(see following figure 2):



First element: official power system; usually forms of governments has a considerable effect in. For example, aristocrat systems, labor, and aristocrat and....

Second element: Nation; it can be considered at the head of power pyramid in every society.

Third element: sovereignty; this element implies on particular powers of official system in order to imposing power. Sovereignty lies on extreme and dissipation spectrum. Therefore, extreme attitudes tend to despotism and dissipated attitudes tend to anarchism.

Fourth element: legitimacy; this element is related to third element. Therefore, it talks about people's role in shaping political systems. Fading people's role results in highlighting of governmental elements and consequently closing of political system (and conversely).

4) Although the incomplete or disaffirmed presented statistics are complete, but are meaningful in terms of procedural presentation. For example, in Egypt the number of political prisoners decreased from 18027 in 1989 to 16708 in 1995. In Iraq this number has reached to 10454 and in Libya from 16 to 6000. Similarly, the statistics about murders and political conflicts suggest considerable growth. For example, in Egypt from 35 people in 1989 to 366 in 1995, in Iraq from 750 to thousands (not researchable) in 1995 has increased. In Libya has increased from 2 to 100 (Kamel Alsaeid, 2002, 105-123).

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