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## The Role of Obama and Trump's Foreign Policy on International System Structure

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### Abstract:

Obama's announced policies and approaches despite emphasizing on economic cooperation's, new regional and international capacity buildings, democracy, human rights, multilateralism and Emphasis on soft power, included realist principals and results while Trump's unilateral, aggressive and beneficial approaches emphasize on American values and national interests as the main factors influencing his administration foreign policy. This article with using explanatory research method, is considering to have study about the role of Obama and Trump's foreign policy on International System Structure. The results of the study indicate that Obama's foreign policy despite adhering realistic principles, with paying special and smart attention to internal interests and military power, increased the importance of diplomacy and soft power, functional capabilities of international institutions and organizations, avoided preventive wars and emphasized on multilateralism, while Trump's foreign policy had results like increasing the importance of hard power, growth of Current international order brittleness, tendency towards national economy and global economic tensions, diminishing the Importance of diplomacy and negotiation, decline in the importance of international law and international institutions, growth of regional economic exchanges, facilitating the process of moving towards a multipolar order, increasing pessimism to future security trends, formation of new international and regional arm races and finally is increasing the level of disputes and instability in the current international system structure.

**Keywords:** Obama, Trump, Foreign policy, International system structure

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## Introduction

U.S foreign policy and decision-making structures are based on certain principles or doctrines which is based on the U.S National Security Strategy and documents such as defense strategy and military strategy. These documents are the result of some grand strategies which are developed by the President in collaboration with researchers from the Department of Defense, the CIA, the U.S. Congress, think tanks, private research centers, universities, and other institutions and cover all issues related to U.S foreign policy and the interests of the United States in all over of the world.

This foreign policy which refers to the actions taken by presidents abroad to pursue their goals to create a more secure, democratic and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and to process of making foreign policy in international community and sustain values like security, democracy and prosperity are determined by five major categories of sources (i) the external environment, (ii) the societal environment of the nation, (iii) the governmental setting, (iv) the roles of foreign policymakers, and (v) the individual personalities of foreign policy-making elites (Wittkopf et al, 2008, pp. 15-25). By considering that a change in administration in U.S is bound to produce changes in drawing and conducting of U.S foreign policy, we can see that transition from the Obama administration to that of Donald Trump is taking its toll on the manner of making American foreign policy. The calm and relaxed view of Barack Obama was replaced with the ill-tempered view of President Trump, who seemed eager to impress a more rigorous perspective of foreign policy, aiming to turn the United States into an isolationist country. Far from being an

appeaser, Obama managed to pursue a proactive foreign policy, establishing a working relation even with rogue states. On the other hand, Trump is attempting to bolster the state's foreign policy, by reasserting sovereignty and entering competition with rogue leaders, rather than focusing on dialogue. (Branda, 2018, p. 160)

Issues like Supporting and defending United States against its enemies, US cohesion and integration, supporting U.S economy, maintaining U.S military power, increasing the efficiency of international organizations and international law, controlling the destructive forces of the world in fight against terrorism, Setting up new regional and international mechanisms with its partners and allies, Supporting the continuation of U.S global leadership and spread of democracy, human rights, free trade, cyber security and human security, resolving the Iranian nuclear issue, need to pay attention to Asia-Pacific and Environmental Pollution, Climate Change, Peacebuilding Process, Outbreaks of Infectious Diseases, Transnational Organized Crimes, common World Heritage including Sea, Air and Space, and many other subjects were addressed in strategies related to the U.S National Security during Obama's administration in 2010 and 2015 (National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2010 and 2015) while Trump and his administration have stressed competition between states, shifted U.S focus to hard power, emphasized the conditionality of alliance commitments, shown a preference for bilateral transactions, and paid less attention to America's core liberal values. Nevertheless, in practice the U.S has been less disruptive than initially feared. In particular, it remains committed to NATO, continues its

engagement in the Asia-Pacific and Afghanistan, combats transnational terrorism and views China and Russia as strategic competitors. Yet, the oscillation between change and continuity has alarmed America's allies and partners. A transatlantic "waiting game" has emerged, defined by the need to pursue both strategic patience and selective sector-based proactivity (Aaltola and others, 2018, p. 2). Trump's new national security strategy approach in 2017, by criticizing former U.S president is concerned on a kind of irresponsible global interventionism in which American welfare must be protected and that foreign economies are seen as rivals, not partners. This strategy addresses challenges such as China's and Russia's threat to U.S interests, containment of Iran and North Korea and support for its aggressive policies toward these two countries, protection of homeland, improved welfare conditions within the United States, demonstrating peace through power and advancing American influence, supporting the construction of a wall on the Mexican-U.S border, supporting the U.S withdrawal from some unfair treaties and pay attention to six regions of India and the Pacific, Europe, Middle East, South and Central Asia, Western Hemisphere and Africa (National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2017).

During Trumps presidency results show that The US' main role of international system leadership is under threat. Obama with being aware about the limitations of country's foreign policy recourses and after loss of Congressional support in 2014, moderated his foreign policy to soft policy and limited it to strategic interests of U.S in international system structure. But in presidential time of Donald Trump, due to structural changes in the international system and with this fact

that U.S is under threat for Sudden and unconventional changes in foreign policy, we can see a kind of uncertainty in the structure of American foreign policy that worry many other international players and will hasten their efforts to develop a more independent Security and economic system. Also from another perspective, results show that Trump's destructive role in international system structure is constraining and declining with many global oppositions to his destructive and aggressive policies and also with effective and limiting role of international system structure and its main powerful factors some of his policies will be adjusted.

On the basis of a comparative study the purpose of this article is to analyze the U.S foreign policy during both administrations of Obama and Trump while focuses on the effects of their approach on the international system structure and in defensive and offensive realism can be considered as theoretical framework.

### **Theoretical Framework: Realism (Defensive and Offensive)**

In the second half of the past century, an important division inside the realism camp emerged. Offensive and defensive realism, despite starting from roughly the same set of bedrock assumptions of realism in international politics, arrived at fundamentally divergent conclusions about the nature of international politics (Ross and Feng, 2008, pp. 148-149). Defensive realism and offensive realism are two dominant theories which put forth strong arguments that U.S foreign policy are the consequences of external pressures stemming from the distribution of power in the international system. Both defensive realists and offensive realists have the same assumptions about the international system which in their viewpoints play a decisive role

in shaping U.S foreign policy behavior. These assumptions include the anarchic structure of the international system; states' uneven levels of capabilities; states' uncertainty about the intentions of the other states; survival as the ultimate aim of states; and the rationality of states. Defensive realism and offensive realism view the lack of a higher power above the state governments in the international system as the major driver behind the power-seeking behavior of states. It implies that the U.S foreign policy character at a particular point of time in the history is shaped by its relative amount of power. According to offensive realists, there is a trend that weaker states will bandwagon with the stronger or the most threatening power in order to be out of fear or to gain profit, rather than balance against it. Henceforth, offensive realists' strategy for maximizing power and achieving hegemony is to exploit the weaker states' tendency to bandwagon with the superior power (Schweller, 1994, pp. 72-107). Once having gained primacy in the international system, the hegemon has to defend its power preponderance by maintaining a wide power gap between itself and potential challengers. It will use force to deter any threats to its predominance. Without such measures, its rivals are likely to grow mightier at its expense and will pose a challenge to its security as well as its superiority. This is what has been underlined by Meirsheimer: 'the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system' (Meirsheimer, 2001, p. 33) According to Meirsheimer (2008), the United States is the only state to ever obtain the hegemonic position in the international system. A careful reading of U.S history of foreign policy in the nineteenth century indicates that the United States succeeded in expanding across the North America and gained a number of offshore territories

after the Spanish and American War (1898). This leads to Mearsheimer's conclusion that the U.S is 'well suited to be poster child for offensive realism' (Meirsheimer, 2001: p. 238). When the U.S became a regional hegemon, offensive realism's prediction is that U.S foreign policy's goal was to prevent the emergence of a hegemonic state in other regions in the world. It means that the U.S has tried to deter the emergence of a hegemon in either the European continent or Asian continent. Offensive realism is supportive of an offshore strategy, and Mearsheimer (2001) believed that this is also the strategy that has been pursued by the U.S since the end of the Second World War. Offensive realists like John Mearsheimer also claim that international system consists of an anarchic structure which no authority to enforce agreements (Snyder, 2002, pp. 149-173). Under anarchy, states should maximize power as much as possible to maintain security. Even if a competition among states seems hard today due to geographical, technological superiorities from each other, there is no guarantee that a "friend" state will not be a prospect "enemy" state in the future. Therefore, states should be confident of their security and observe other states' increasing power capabilities with suspicion. Given this uncertainty, states often attempt to strengthen themselves, and/or weaken others to survive in anarchy condition (Wohlforth, 2012, pp. 35-53). Unlike offensive realists' pessimistic ideas, defensive realists like Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, and Robert Jervis argue that although systematic factors have causal effects on state's behavior, states cannot estimate other states' actions in advance. Therefore, states' attempts in maximize of power brings them into conflict. Although defensive realists admit an importance of power, they claim that states maximize their security

through preserving the existing balance of power (Lobell, 2002, pp. 165-195). So Defensive realism places emphasis on security maximization through balancing, deterrence and multilateral arms control. Defensive realists argue that power maximization can be counterproductive and harm state security (Jervis 1978; Waltz 1979; Posen 1984; Walt 1987, 2005; Snyder 1991; Glaser 1994/5; and Van Evera 1999).

### **Obama's foreign policy approach**

After aggressive and interventional foreign policy of Bush administration, Moderate foreign policy of Obama as the former president of U.S and his international Liberalism approach, was perceived eagerly by most of the nation states and the international community. But in most of the policy areas, Obama's achievements, shortfalls and still uncertain outcomes relate to incremental inflections of U.S foreign policy (Unger, 2016, pp. 15-16) but Obama hoped to be something more. He spoke in terms of a transformational presidency. And the strong national desire at the time he took office for a clear break with the wars of the recent past seemed to offer an opportunity for transformation. But to be truly transformational in terms of American foreign policy required more than just memorable one-off achievements, like the Iran nuclear deal or diplomatic normalization with Cuba. It required transforming key aspects of the institutional structures that grew out of the Cold War and transformed the United States into a kind of permanent warfare state that has trouble recognizing the difference between true vital interests and merely annoying defiance of American policy preferences. These have conferred on the modern presidency dangerously unchecked powers that the framers of the U.S Constitution never meant for it to exercise (Zakaria, 2016).

Obama never identified or targeted the emergency state as a root of America's strategic insolvency or a threat to its constitutional balance. Though Obama's temperament is cool and deliberative, his commitment to the supremacy of the rule of law genuine and his preference for bipartisanship real, he remains a believer in modern forms of presidential power, especially in foreign affairs. Losing his initial Democratic House and Senate majorities seemed to push him even further in the direction of overstressing presidential powers. The paradox in all this is that the chronic strategic over-ambition and under-constrained presidentialism of the emergency state tends to produce politically isolated presidents and less adequately resourced foreign policies with reduced chances of success. So long as this emergency state mentality continues to enthrall Washington at the expense of America's older democratic traditions, the foreign policy legacies of all American presidents are likely to be painfully constrained and ultimately disappointing (Unger, 2016, pp. 15-16).

Obama along with the exploitation of American superior power, in numerous global interventions creatively replaced soft power with hard power and tried to turn attention from the usual military interventionism of the United States to more soft-power involvement, such as trade and commerce and led structure of the international system towards more international cooperation. His attempts were to restore global confidence in US, both with partners as well as with adversaries. His main lines of action were "military reticence and improved burden sharing with allies", on the one hand, as well as "opening the dialogue with enemies" (Nunlist, 2016, p. 3). Based on the above, it can be concluded that Obama's foreign policy characterized by his smart leadership role, the

belief that the core values of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and free market economy have to be promoted, a tendency to act unilaterally when deemed necessary and also strategic use of multilateralism, and pragmatism (Maull, 2011, pp. 174-175).

#### **Obama and International System Structure**

Obama promoted a change towards the United States as the leader through diplomacy and multilateral decision-making. A grand strategy of hard-power was replaced with one largely based on soft-power, but also continued 'overseas contingency operations' with targeted killings through covert drone warfare. The 2010 United States National Security Strategy outlined the Obama administration's grand strategy of leadership through diplomacy and multilateralism and the decisions that was taken during the uprisings in Egypt and Syria showcase that their grand strategy remained stable. On October 9, 2009, Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for "his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples." Albeit early in his presidency, there is strong evidence that this statement of encouragement became exactly what Obama's presidency represented, and that he was, indeed, an agent of hope and change in U.S foreign policy (Josephsen, 2017, pp. 18-19). His administration identified a wider range of threat sources to U.S national security while providing less detailed solutions to them. Obama's National Security Strategy in 2015, perceives eight major sources of threat or "risks" to U.S. national security:

1. Catastrophic attack on the U.S. homeland or critical infrastructure;
2. Threats or attacks against U.S. citizens abroad and our allies;
3. Global economic crisis or widespread economic slowdown;

4. Proliferation and/or use of weapons of mass destruction;
5. Severe global infectious disease outbreaks;
6. Climate change;
7. Major energy market disruptions; and
8. Significant security consequences associated with weak or failing states (including mass atrocities, regional spillover, and transnational organized crime) (United States National Security Strategy, 2015).

Also during Obamas presidency, as democracy promotion abroad ceased to be a priority in 2015 (compared to 2002 and 2006), counterterrorism continued to be at the top of U.S. security agenda. Obama maintained that the United States was at war and wanted to defeat the "far-reaching network of hatred and violence" by military means. Although Obama abandoned Bush's language of the "global war on terror but preferred to operate under the "law of 9/11" rather than the rule of law in his use of targeted killings outside the battlefield." (Jamshidi and Noori, 2017, pp. 175-177). He made an initial attempt to infuse domestic values into foreign policy. Obama's personal popularity initially softened America's image abroad, but that new "soft power" has not been translated very easily into support for American foreign policy. He has begun to address a number of global common issues with new policy approaches—whether global financial reform, climate change, or nuclear nonproliferation (McCormick, 2011, pp. 260-261).

Obama's pragmatic internationalism stumbled through 2011. Though an internally consistent approach, its output remained irregular. Obama and his team sought to carefully measure a tailored solution to each crisis

and initiative. This might best be understood as a sensibility rather than a coherent strategy (Shively, 2016, p. 77) But Obama is no different from the other realist presidents in U.S. Every new president comes to office pledging to break with the past and to conduct international politics with principle and morality. Obama administration had its own grammar, which we expected continue to be often lofty and idealist, but its logic was realist. Even in the age of Obama, realism was the right tool for comprehending American foreign and defense policy (Bradley, 2010, pp. 1-4) but his approaches despite adhering realist principles and paying special attention to internal interests and military power, has fueled multilateralism, diplomacy and international cooperation, increased the role of international organizations like United Nations. increased the role of soft power and smart power along with U.S hard power and also increased United States positive and constructive role in international system structure.

### **Trump's foreign policy approach**

Donald Trump's accession to presidency and his more than controversial views of the foreign policy caused a rift within the U.S establishment as well as between the U.S and the its closest allies (Brandt. 2018, p. 160). Arguably more than for any new president in recent memory, Trump's foreign policy path is hard to predict. This is not just because the election campaign was largely devoid of any policy discussion, or because he has not been forthcoming about the details of how he intends to achieve his declared goals. It is also because he appears to be largely non-ideological and very willing to change his views over time. As someone without experience in any part of the government, he offers no political or legislative record to indi-

cate how he will adapt his style to the slow pace of governing, and to the need to build political support for his agenda.

Trump has nominated a cabinet whose members in many cases bring meaningful foreign policy experience with them. His lack of ideology means that he is more likely to be flexible and change his mind in response to events. And, through his cabinet choices, he has already shown an awareness of his political environment and the need to bring factions together. Moreover, while his rhetoric has at times been extreme, in truth his political path has not been atypical: he started at the extremes in the primaries, and shifted somewhat to the middle ground during the election. This presages the possibility that he might follow traditional patterns (again, as some of his appointments already suggest) and shift further to the center for governing. Thus, there are some grounds to believe that the presidency will be more orthodox and responsible than many observers expect. Trump's cabinet choices and more recent rhetoric, and the domestic and international constraints he will face, suggest that his foreign policy will track the tenets of traditional Republicanism (albeit at the more conservative end of the spectrum). Unless events dictate otherwise, Trump is likely to maintain Obama's move towards a less internationally engaged US. Trump's election rhetoric was not isolationist, but nationalist: focusing intensely on U.S national interests, with allies expected to bear a greater proportion of the burden for defending common interests and international public goods. (Wickett, 2017, pp. 56-57). He considers Islamic terrorism the chief threat to the US, and countering it entails cooperating with anybody willing to join the fight, notably Russia in the Syrian theatre. He rejects instead mobilizing the U.S military for regime change, nation-building

or stabilization purposes and has criticized previous administrations for wasting resources in such efforts. This appears to go together with an appreciation for authoritarian regimes, who are able to keep their countries under control (Grevi, 2016, pp. 7-8).

In a theoretical stance among in US, liberals believed that Trump challenged the assumptions of the liberal international order only partially, as the opponents of his policy were present on the level of both international system and domestic political system. At the same time, they indicated that the new president aimed at building an international order assuring the U.S freedom of decision and more accepting towards non-democratic entities but realists believe that also non-democratic states are able to solve contemporary problems and take care of economic development. They consider the liberal international order merely a form of the American sphere of influence, the extent of which is set by military and economic power of the United States. The increase of power of non-democratic states will lead to formation of their own zones of influence based on the rules of international order they push through (Mania and Pugacewicz, 2019, p. 26).

The core tenets of Trump's approach to foreign affairs are as following:

First of all, 'America First'. Trump's vision is a deeply nationalist one, where national interests are to be the sole guide of U. S action in the world, and those interests are narrowly defined. Second, the promotion of nationalism goes hand in hand with the drastic rejection of 'globalism' and the much despised elites who, in Trump's view, have constantly expanded American foreign commitments and agreed to international treaties that would profit themselves but harm the well-being of American workers. Whether on the commercial or security front, the U.S is the

victim of 'bad deals' with other countries, notably in terms of providing security to allies that do not invest sufficiently in their own, or of losing American jobs because of allegedly unfair competition. The solution would consist of re-opening those deals (NAFTA) or retreating from them (Trans-Pacific Partnership – TPP) and, where possible, negotiating new ones, which leads to an overtly protectionist agenda on economic matters.

Third, Trump has exposed a very transaction list view of foreign policy. One whereby relationships are judged based on what they deliver for the US. Whether relationships are grounded in common values and shared historical bonds appears a secondary consideration, if a relevant one at all, in this very business-like approach to international affairs. Donald Trump has been portraying himself as a very good and tough negotiator, bent on extracting the best deals for the U. S in a world where strength wins' respect. Fourth, the president-elect has put a lot of emphasis on the need to restore U.S military power after a few years of declining budgets, and to use it in a much more forceful way against America's enemies (Grevi, 2016, pp. 7-8).

Making an overall judgment on the quality of Trump's foreign policy is difficult for many reasons. It is impossible to know whether Trump policies today will be Trump policies tomorrow (Rachman, 2017). Trump's enduring lack of character, his refusal to learn, his uneducated biases, the chaotic and dysfunctional way that he runs the government, and the diminishing quality of his senior advisors, the president's foreign policy grade is unlikely to improve in the years ahead and could get much worse (Blackwill, 2019, pp. 65-68).



### **Trump and International System Structure**

When the regional and global policies of the U.S are compared, it is noteworthy that republicans prefer unilateral initiatives and refrain from multilateral cooperation. In this sense, it is seen in many examples that they do not comply with international institutional cooperation processes and commitments arising from bilateral and multilateral international agreements. In this context, Trump withdrew from the INF agreement unilaterally in 2019. In addition, Trump announced that he also withdrew from the Paris climate agreement. Trump also left the Iran Nuclear Treaty and Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement signed by Obama and the Euro Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations that began during Obama's time (Kemal and Yazıcı, 2020, pp. 68-69).

Trump wants to "make America great again" by rebuilding its economy and projecting military strength. In his first 18 months in office few policy decisions have exhibited either isolationism or a willingness to countenance American retreat from the world. Still, Trump is no internationalist, and has never expressed support for the institutions of global governance that emerged after 1945. Moreover, his long-standing impatience with alliances and hostility towards free trade and other multilateral approaches to international affairs have now found concrete, if inconsistent, expression in his presidency. Trump's America First impulses are hardening as he gains greater confidence on the world stage and reshapes his national security team. His stoking of the politics of grievance and resentment will, however, continue to corrode domestic support for a more ambitious U.S foreign policy, and in future allies will have to think about the nature of American power differently (Curran, 2018, p. 1).

Trump's style, erratic behavior, and impulsiveness ensure that doubts about the

United States will persist. As a result, close allies will need to think much differently about American staying power. Allies will need to be more finely attuned to the anger and frustration pouring out of Middle America, along with the repercussions they have on Washington's self-confidence and capacity. Right now, the United States has a president who brandishes the country's fatigue with both mythological and military overstretch (Curran, 2018, p. 18). His administration, considering Obama policies to cause chaos, would not avoid using force to prevent chaos and establish order. According to Trump, foreign policy should be based on national interests rather than ideology. For Trump, American interests are above all else and nothing can be sacrificed (Kemal and Yazıcı, 2020, p. 63). But New international structure is no longer either bipolar or unipolar. According to Fareed Zakaria "The emerging international system is likely to be quite different from those that have preceded it. The world will not stay unipolar for decades and become multipolar (Zakaria, 2008, p. 168). On every dimension other than military power (industrial, financial, social, cultural), the distribution of power is shifting, moving away from U.S. dominance. That does not mean we are entering an anti-American world. But we are moving into a post-American world." (Sarkar, 2020, p. 224).

On the other hand, according to some other writers such as Richard Haass, the new age could be called non-polarity instead of unipolarity or multi-polarity. "The principal characteristic of twenty-first-century international relations is turning out to be non-polarity: a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power. This represents a tecton-

ic shift from the past.” According to Richard Haas, because, globalization has increased the volume, velocity, and importance of cross-border flows of just about everything, from drugs, e-mails, greenhouse gases, manufactured goods, and people to television and radio signals, viruses (virtual and real), and weapons (Haass, 2008, pp. 44-56).

The global order was in flux well before the COVID19 crisis. Coronavirus has accelerated three of the key geopolitical trends that will shape our next world order. The first trend is deglobalization; the logistic difficulties brought to light by the current crisis are already pointing to a shift away from global Justin-time supply chains. Yet as economic difficulties mount, the inevitable growth of nationalism and “my nation first” politics will push companies to localize business operations that favor national and regional supply chains. The third trend, China’s geopolitical rise, has been more than three decades in the making. But while China has successfully transformed itself into an economic and technological superpower, no one expected it to become a “soft power” superpower. This crisis can change that, if China’s crisis diplomacy continues and the perception endures that Beijing has been far more effective than the rest of the world in its response to the outbreak. Of course, just because China appears to be faring better doesn’t mean it actually is. This general distrust was further fueled by the initial Chinese cover-up of the outbreak, which enabled its global spread. Trump and his administration by repeatedly accusing China for covid-19 pandemic, are leaning into this happening as an election strategy to deflect attention from their own handling of the pandemic. China won’t take this lying down, making it increasingly likely that once the world emerges from the current pandemic, we will be plunged into a new

cold war, this time between the United States and China (Bremmer, 2020, p. 29).

As a result, Trump's unilateralism and mercantilist approaches, Along with not accepting and strengthening the joint actions of other global players in struggle and cooperation with international challenges, have increased the role of aggressive unilateralism, reliance on militarism and support of hegemonic structures, boosted transition from uni-multipolar to multi-polar structure and caused more ambiguity in international system. He also increased pessimism to future security trends and caused new international and regional arm races and the level of disputes in the current international system structure. From another point of view, due to the strong dependence of the United States on international structures and international rules (as an institutional and liberal hegemony), By replacing Obama's multilateralism and internationalism with Trump's aggressive and unilateral policies, can cause dissatisfaction among U.S allies and other governments And by disrupting the fundamentals of international balance and order can lead international system structure to further conflicts and deconstructive processes.

### **Conclusion**

While Obama preferred a multilateral and soft policy and followed a different policy in terms of non-intervention and non-use of U.S military forces in overseas challenges and conflicts, Trump pursue an aggressive and interventionist policy on use of military forces in overseas conflicts and regional problems. It is clear that this difference stems from the different political and social characteristics of both presidents, because in United States the Democratic Party is based mostly on the lower and middle classes and the mi-

norities in the country, while the republicans are mostly supported by the upper class of society, big industries, businessmen and super-rich families. As a result, Democrats support liberal and democratic developments and social policies inside country and support from human rights and diplomatic methods in foreign policy while Republicans like Trump pursue aggressive and unilateral protective foreign trade policy and preferring an expansionist policy that provides security for the American companies worldwide.

In Obama's administration, despite adhering realist principles and paying special attention to internal interests and military power, Foreign policy with paying more attention to soft power was planned and directed on the basis of cooperation and partnership with the international community and emphasis on multilateralism, Increasing the efficiency of international organizations and international law, controlling the destructive forces of the new world in fight against terrorism, regulating new regional and international mechanisms in cooperation with U.S allies, Supporting from democracy, human rights, free trade, cyber security and human security, need to pay attention to environmental pollution and controlling the spread of infectious and pandemic diseases but Trump with an aggressive outlook to international community, sees the foreign policy of many countries even allied countries as very dangerous and threatening to U.S security and economy. Therefore, Trump's destructive foreign policy decisions to leave and withdraw from both the Paris Climate Change Agreement and UN Human Rights Council, Irresponsible interventionism with priority of American welfare and seeing other foreign

economies as competitors rather than partners, along with his other unilateral and aggressive foreign policies, have occurred alongside the growth of populism, isolationism, and anti-globalist political sentiment like Brexit, deglobalization, dissatisfaction of some countries from international institutions and current international system structure from many quarters across the globe.

All of this new global challenges, along with Trump's recent actions, has created two global perspectives on the future of international system structure. The first one is about the need of further global cooperation to combat common global challenges and the second one emphasizes the need for more separation among countries in order to avoid the destructive international actions of each other. But what is clear is this that while Trump's foreign policy increased the importance of hard power, tendency towards the national economy and more global economic tensions, transitioning from monopole to multipolar order, new international and regional arms races, instability in the current international system structure but at the same time, diminished the Importance of diplomacy and negotiation, decreased the role of international law and international institutions, Seriously weakened processes associated with collective security and led the international system to more instability and pessimism to other international players. As a final result of Trump's foreign policy in international system structure, it could lead to spheres-of-influence world which refers to a world that, in its structure, international relations is divided into multiple regions, each with its own hegemon on its structure.

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