



Investigating the Evolution of the Political Theory of Imam Khomeini (R.A.) with the Lakatos Methodology Approach

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Abstract:

In this article, Imam Khomeini's political theory is investigated with the approach of the Lakatos methodology. His methodology confirms the distinction between a hard core or the original skeleton of investments and experimental propositions confirms as a protective belt for the research program. Regarding this, the claim from this article is that if we understand the system of religious knowledge of Imam Khomeini (R.A.) under the pattern of Lakatos, then the position of political wisdom in this system will be placed at the hard core or the original skeleton. The reason is that "There is a strong ratio of Imam Khomeini (R.A.), among the strains of religious knowledge in the practical system is established".

Keywords: Theory, Methodology, Religious knowledge, Hard core, Lakatos, Imam Khomeini (R. A.)

Introduction

The Imre Lakatos pattern, titled, «The scientific research methodology program» confirms the distinction between a hard core and the main skeleton of investments and the proposition as a protective belt for corroborated empirical research program. Indeed, the solidity of a scientific research program, is subject to the stability in the hard core of its

original packaging and the annulment of theories on the edge of this hard core, can cause the progress achieved in terms of their experimental program under certain circumstances. Lakatos's attempt was to somehow avoid the pluralism and relativism contained in the Thomas Cohen's theory of the structure of scientific revolutions. The claim from this article is that if we understand the system of

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religious knowledge under the pattern of Lakatos then, the status of political wisdom in this system was on the edge of that hard core or the main skeleton until votes were rising for Imam Khomeini (R.A.) but, Imam Khomeini's vote in political affair and eventually political knowledge, changed its position in the system of religious knowledge and made it part of the hard core religious knowledge. What so ever has been the foundation of this transformation, "There is a strong ratio of Imam Khomeini (R. A.), among the strains of religious knowledge in the practical system is established"? Indeed, the religious knowledge has a ratio with the religious acting from basis and hence, we cannot build a strong political act that must be the kind of concrete knowledge of religious knowledge within the political system, based on the marginal stem.

In this article, first a brief explanation of the Imre Lakatos's system in the case of scientific research programs and referring to the meaning of religious knowledge will get under concern and studied. Then, with deliberation on the Imam Khomeini's votes we will explain that how the political action and political knowledge were transferred to the core of religious knowledge in his opinions on religious jurisprudence and somehow it becomes its hard core. The next part of the application is components of the Lakatos's theory in Imam Khomeini's thoughts. The final section is the conclusion and considerations.

1. The Methodology of Lakatos's Scientific Research Programs

The main efforts of Lakatos on compilation of methodology of scientific research programs was a response to the theory of paradigm shifts of Thomas Kuhn in the book,

titled, "*The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*". Nickel's words, Lakatos focused venture to expand a kind of wise scientific knowledge theory and this effort kind of reveals that he was afraid of skepticism in this ground. (Nickels, 2000: 207) The central problem in philosophy of science is the knowledge of normative evaluation or recommendation. The main concern is to set an overall condition that a theory is considered "scientific" in it. (Lakatos, 1972: 168-169) Hence, the methodology can provide a systematic basis for rules of scientific progress, to show the excellence and thoughtfulness scientific theories compared to non-scientific ones. (Naji, 2009: 64) So, as Smith, says, Lakatos's effort is about separating and distinguishing between the reasonable one and the unreasonable one in the field of science. (Newton-Smith, 1981: 90) For Kuhn, the crisis in science has no reasonable cause, but rather a psychological event. Similarly, to compare scientific paradigms and assess the reliability of each of them, there is no criterion or rational value, and putting aside a paradigm in favor of another paradigm cannot be subject to rational rules. (Lakatos, 1968: 90)

Consequently, Lakatos believes that the view of the likes of Kuhn will ultimately lead us to a despair of relativism, for in their view, we cannot prove the superiority of a theory to the other theory by relying on a general and non-historical criterion. Lakatos, in any case, believes that there are general and non-scientific points of view (that is, in an objective sense) whose examples can be found in their own theories or research programs.

The rationale issue was highly regarded after the collapse of logical empiricism. The first manifestation of this issue is the distinc-

tion that Karl Popper made clear. His concern was "to find a benchmark or criterion" that "sets empirical sciences on one side and places mathematics and logic alongside metaphysical systems on the other side". (Popper, 1992: 34) This differentiation criterion, of course, by some commentators and Popper's emphasis in his recent writings, must ultimately lead to a rationale as a general and an objective principle for science. (Popper, 1989: 36) In Lakatos's words, it was Popper who began to develop the objective criteria of scientific progress. Lakatos tried to advance Popper's program to determine this general and objective principle. In the words of Chalmers, Lakatos, by accepting this Popper's default, becomes a rationalist, who believes that there is a single, eternal, and universal criterion through which one must evaluate the relative capabilities of competing theories. (Chalmers, 1982: 101-102) But, an epistemologist, like Kuhn, does not accept Popper's solution to the question of rationality (or tuning). In his opinion, there are no consistent methods in science. The great scientific revolutions that separate the periods of science bring new methods alongside with them. Most of his writings indicate that he does not recognize reasonableness apart from the decision of the scientific community; the only thing important is the scientific community, namely, what is reasonable in the scientific community is reasonable. In response to Kuhn's relativism, Lakatos states that "if there is no way but counting the number, faith, and authority of the superiors to assess the theories, then the truth will be subordinated to power." (Lakatos, 1968: 9-10)

Lakatos's general criterion for evaluating theories is the same as the "methodology of scientific research programs". Lakatos finds three types of falsification in Popper's works. He criticizes the first and the second types of

falsifications (dogmatic and superficial methodology), But, he maintains that scientific prudence is subject to the adoption of type III falsification (Complex methodology). (Naji, *ibid*: 65) In dogmatic falsification, reality-based propositions, immune to error and contrary evidence, are the only referees of theories. Thus, the advancement of science is possible by such frequent revocations and obvious facts. Since Lakatos knows all the observations in some way immersed in theory, he cannot accept this kind of falsification. Lakatos then criticizes superficial methodological falsification. The superficial methodological falsification is based on a kind of Conventionalism. In this type of falsification, there is a complete overhaul of the fact that, in experimental and observational techniques, theories in which phenomena are interpreted in their light are fatal, and therefore, we need to decide on the choice of observational propositions and the choice of the proposition of the acceptable ground. In superficial methodological falsification, the theory is immediately deleted after the falsification, while there is the risk that the theory would hold true Lakatos, with the design of these preconditions, puts forward a complex methodological falsification of Popper. In this falsification, having more empirical content, some of which is partly acquitted, is considered to be an advantage for any theory to overcome other theories. He argues, in the case of Type III falsification, that "if the history of science does not support our scientific rationale, ... we have two solutions: The first is to abandon any attempts on reaching a reasonable explanation of the successes of science, which is followed by scientific method (or the logic of discovery), which is considered a way of evaluating theories and the criterion of progress, is destroyed. Of course, we may still try to explain the

changes in terms of social psychology; this is the way Polanyi and Kuhn have gone. The other thing we can do is to try, to at least, reduce the conventionalist component of falsification (which we will probably not eliminate), and replace the complex version of the methodological falsification with its superficial version, to that end, and save methodology and the idea of scientific advances". (Naji, 2003: 101) Lakatos, who, more than all philosophers of his age insisted on the unit of evaluating in science to be historic, builds the methodology of its research program, in which the evaluated unit is a research program or a series of related theories. He calls his methodology a formidable methodological falsification that can save the idea of scientific progress. The unity of any research program is guaranteed by the skeleton or the hard core of the program, the very general theoretical hypotheses that exist in all theories of the chain.

An important point in understanding the Lakatos model is that we are confronted with other hypotheses that can be modified and act as a protective belt. Scientists who change the skeletal design of a research program will drop out of the research program and enter another research program but, the change in the protective belt to increase the experimental content is allowed. Indeed, "as a complex methodological falsifier, he believes that he must somehow overcome plural theories; therefore, anyone who does not provide any alternatives to critique and the elimination of any ideas, inevitably leads to irrationalism. This is the only way that one can make sense with fatalism. Fatalism leads to pluralism, and if we don't have the ability to correctly choose one of the theories, the anarchism of irrationality will be dominated." (Naji, 2009: 67)

In general, we can summarize the components of Lakatos's theory like this:

1. Attention to the rationality of scientific knowledge and opposition to skepticism and relativism.
2. Normative assessment of the philosophy of science.
3. Separation and differentiation between the scientific rationale and the non-scientific irrational.
4. Attention to the general and outward-mindedness of scientists (objective criteria) [which can be identified in their own ideas or research programs].
5. Attention to the unitary, eternal and universal criterion [by which it should assess the relative capabilities of competing theories].
6. Having more empirical content, some of which has been acquitted, is for every theory an advantage that can overcome other theories.
7. The unity of any research program is guaranteed by the skeleton or the hard core of the program, that is, the very general theoretical hypotheses that exist in all theories of the chain.
8. Consideration of floating/ modifiable hypotheses as a protective action belt of the action plan [Change in the protective belt to increase the experimental content is allowed].
9. Possesses Popper's complex methodological falsification in order to overcome the plurality of opinions and theories and to get rid of anarchism of irrationality.

In the next section of the theoretical framework, it is necessary to raise some

points about our understanding of religious knowledge. Here, are two key points to consider: First, the possibility of religious knowledge, meaning an area of fixed and untapped affairs, and second, the components of this knowledge and the position of each of them.

The possibility of religious knowledge

Some contemporary theories, such as the theoretical expansion of the Shari'a, essentially deny that religion can be attributed to epistemology, including political knowledge. Abdolkarim Soroush writes in the book, titled, *The Theory of Expansion and Contraction of Religion*: "Religion meaning religious texts and the history, life, traditions and principles of religionists are fixed but, proofs of jurisprudence and interpretation, and historical analysis, all evolve". (Soroush, 1991: 199) From this point of view, religious knowledge is "a modern knowledge with a collective identity, an inalienable, incomplete and error-prone knowledge". (Ibid: 106) Soroush states somewhere that "which understanding of the law is correct and which is incorrect correct and incorrect understanding of the law is not related to epistemology, and is an eternal struggle, and an unseen path. As long as there is a systematic understanding and the use of the rules of the scholars of science, in epistemology it is religious understanding. (Ibid: 342) But, in the words of some of the critics of this opinion, which ultimately leads to a kind of relativism and the elimination of the truth of nature, if the epistemologist from an epistemological point of view, "cannot comment on which point of view is the right and which point of view is wrong but, on the basis of the transformation of the collection and the elimination of contradictions, surely knows that both of the promises are opposite, one is correct, and the other is necessarily false; and so one is surely in accordance with

the truth, and the other is not in accordance with the truth". (Souzanchi, 2009: 137) Hence, if the very nature of religion is holy and definite, the epistemic verdict will be that, in short, one of these two contradictory words, because it is in accordance with religion, will have certainty and sincerity. The critique of Soroush's approach to rejecting the possibility of reaching definitive knowledge in religion will eventually lead us to a kind of relativism, which will also endanger the epistemologist's own opinion and the epistemologist's own position will also undergo through a storm of plurality and relativism. Thus, if we accept that religion contains a fixed truth then, we can claim that on the basis of that inherent truth, there will also be creations that will enjoy stability and immobility to a degree which is close to the true nature of religion. Accordingly, it can be argued that religious knowledge is not only possible but also as a religion is necessary.

The Theme of Religious Knowledge

Religious knowledge is a term composed of two terms of religion and knowledge. The word "religion" means subjugation, humility, obedience, punishment, account and surrender. This word has been used in many meanings in the Quran, including: obedience (Yusuf/76), punishment and reward (Hamd/4), property and monarchy (Baqara/193), Sharia and Law (Kaferun/6), and beliefs (Baqara/256). The word religion in the term of Islamic and Western scholars also has different meanings. By summarizing these definitions, it can be said that "religion is the collection of truths and values that comes from the revelation and through the book and tradition to direct human beings". (Fanaei Ashkevari, 1995: 41) This collection includes beliefs, ethics (values), and practical rules. But, the word of knowledge also means the

understanding and absolute awareness. This term has been interpreted in the term of Islamic thinkers as the absolute meaning of science and consciousness, whether this awareness is mediated or it is directly related to both sensible and insensible actions. (Hossein Zadeh, 2006: 22) Therefore, according to the meaning of religion and knowledge, the word religious knowledge can be defined as follows: "Religious knowledge is a collection of cognition about unrealized divine religions, which are in the fields of beliefs, ethics, and ordinances and that are, in the fields of virtues and dilemmas". (Ibid: 83) This collection of studies among Muslims has been characterized in numerous sciences such as philosophy, language, anthology, jurisprudence, principles, quantification, or interpretation, which is known as Islamic science. For instance, the answer to the question of whether God has sent successors to the Prophet or has given the people the choice of electing them is a religious knowledge whose authenticity should be examined on the basis of the knowledge of the word. Of course, it should be noted that, when it is said religious understanding or knowledge, we are not looking for each person's understanding religion or religious texts; instead, our aim is the scholars understanding of religion in a systematic, expert, and intuitive way. (Khosropanah, 2002: 95) Indeed, religious knowledge is the collection of achievements that religious scholars obtain by researching religious resources, namely, books, tradition and wisdom, and using religious (Islamic) sciences. Therefore, religious knowledge is an issue of humanity and of the mind of religious scholars, hence, it will be in error and ineffective, and will be contradictory. Unlike religion itself, there is no change in it, be-

cause this religion is the last religion, and thus, its principle cannot be converted into another religion, nor that its education and its rules will change with the passage of time, and it's only possible that the subject of the rules would get changed.

As we see, in this perspective religious knowledge is fundamentally different from religion. Now, if our knowledge of religion is complete so that in understanding it we are immune from any error, as in the case of the "Massumin", then our religious knowledge will be in accordance with the truth of religion and will have its properties. (Ibid: 42-43) The key point for our purpose in this article is that what should be considered as a political point in this distinction between religion itself and religious knowledge. Religious knowledge with the favor of the Lakatos model must definitely have a hard core or a skeletal nucleus, closely related to the true nature of religious knowledge, as understood by the Massumin. So, the religious knowledge of the Massumin is precisely in accordance with the principle of religion, and hence, the criterion for conforming or not conforming to our religious knowledge is their religious knowledge, that means, the closer our understanding of the religion is to the understanding of religion of Massumin, it is closer to the reality of religion.

2. The position of political affairs and political knowledge in the epicenter of Imam Khomeini (R. A.)-Theory of Velayat-e Faqih:

The early elements of the Velayat-e Faqih Theory, which were formulated by Imam Khomeini (R. A.) in an exquisite and jurisprudence form, were in some ways developed by several pre-constitutional scholars.

In the comments of the Muhaqqiq al-Karaki, from the Safavid scholars, streaks of government theory in Shia jurisprudence can be seen, streaks that are somewhat obscured by signs of the political province of jurists and Mujtahids. In the treatise on Friday Prayer, he writes: "Our companions agree that a just jurisprudence, a comprehensive Imam of the terms of the Fatwa, which he interprets as "Mujtahid" in religious law, in the absence of Imam, he is the deputy of the Imam and responsible for his duties... It is obligatory to plead justice from him and comply with his decree. He has the right to sell the property of a person who refuses to give the right in cases where it is needed. He holds on the property of the absent, the children, the retarded, and the bankrupt of the province and can seize the property of the banned...The essence of this, is the narration of Omar ibn Hanzalah, which Sheikh Tusi has quoted in a refrain with his documents". (Kadivar, 1997: 16) The key point is that, Karaki has never tried to bring it to a conclusion, despite the controversy in this way, in a way that paves the path for the formulation of a state-based theory based on the principle of Velayat-e Faqih.

Later, another jurisprudent during the Qajar period, Mulla Ahmad Naraghi (1248), tried to elaborate on the issue of Velayat-e Faqih and put it as a religious issue. This point is very important because Mulla Ahmad Naraghi's effort should be considered as the first serious work to pave the way that ultimately Imam Khomeini formulated in a new way and completed it. That Mulla Ahmad Naraghi provided the basis for joining the political system to the hard core of religious and jurisprudential knowledge for the first time, in understanding views of Imam Khomeini (R. A.) as the jurisprudent who has embraced it for the first time, it is considered

to be very important. Mulla Ahmad Naraghi regards the discipline of the people's worldly affairs as the duties of the jurists in the book, titled, *Avayed Al-Ayam*. (Naraghi, 1996: 365) What is very important here is an explicit reference to the discipline of the affairs of the world as one of the main duties of the comprehensive jurists. However, although he puts forward ten of the traditional jurisprudential duties that he has been dealt with in detail before him, he does not elaborate on the discipline of the world's affairs. However, according to Kadivar, it is a great step in this regard, since he has recognized all the authorities of a king in his affairs for jurists. (Kadivar, 1997: 18)

• **The Absolute Velayat-e Faqih; Imam Khomeini (R. A.) and the Original Reasoning of Religious Knowledge**

According to Imam Khomeini (R. A.), Velayat-e Faqih is the basis of the political order in the period of absence. He pointed to this in explaining his predecessor's theory that indeed the charter of political transition into the circle of religious knowledge and turning it into a hard core that should not be neglected. "In the absence of Imam Mahdi (AS), his successors, who are the full-fledged jurists for Fatwa's and judgments are succeeding him in the implementation of the political and governmental affairs and other matters related to the Imam (with the exception of primary Jihad)". (Ghazizadeh, 1998: 162) The key to understanding the great transformation that came with the theory of the Velayat-e Faqih of Imam Khomeini (R. A.), from the point of view of the political relation with religious knowledge, is to understand the fundamental distinction of this theory in terms of its particular conception of the 1-territory of the province and 2-the category of jurisprudence.

• **Establishment of Provincial Territory and Political Priority**

Imam Khomeini's theory of Velayat-e Faqih, in differentiating from the formulas that were later derived from this theory, expands the province of the leadership in such a way that it transforms knowledge of the political affairs into the core of the rigorous belief and expression of religious knowledge, and makes it necessary. In the theory of Velayat-e Faqih, the province of the leadership imposes two fundamental constitutions on the path to the realization of the dominant jurisprudence, in addition to public affairs, politics and government, as well as the lack of confidence in the affairs:

(A) **Non-persuasion in the framework of primary and secondary epistemological precepts:**

This means that the powers of the government are not enclosed within the framework of divine rules". The government can prevent anything, whether divinely or inanimate, which is contrary to the interests of the matter, as long as it is this way... This is the authority of the government..." (Imam Khomeini [Volume 20], 1987: 170) That is, the government and Velayat-e Faqih are one of the precepts and preceding all the precepts, even prayer, fasting and hajj. Thus, the thematic circle of the political affairs in the establishment of the territory being deployed is at the center of jurisprudential subjects.

(B) **Non-compliance with humanitarian law, including the constitution:**

The Supreme Leader has the right to violate the law, according to his own discretion (that is, according to his political knowledge), which is based on the rationale of Is-

lam and Muslims. But, this violation is apparent, because the true law is the law of Islam, which the supreme leader has not violated. (Khomeini [Volume 21], Ibid: 61) Thus, we are faced with priority of the supreme leader's commands to the humanitarian laws; a priority arisen from the knowledge of the political jurisprudence as a fundamental knowledge of the fulfillment of the religious situation.

• **A particular Notion of the Category of Jurisprudence**

However, the particular view of Imam Khomeini (R. A.) from the category of jurisprudence and exploring its various angles is one of the most important steps to understand what we are trying to explain in this article. Indeed, the jurisprudence, which includes a large part of religious knowledge, traditionally encompasses topics that its various aspects have been considered by many scholars of Shia history. But, the different and innovative conception of Imam Khomeini (R. A.) from the category of religious knowledge and jurisprudence created a fundamental change in the relation between politics and political knowledge on the one hand and the system of religious knowledge and jurisprudence on the other. One commentator summarizes the main features of this new understanding of the jurisprudence in the following five general titles:

- (A) To give enough attention to the interests of government and society;
- (B) Considering the role of time and place in Ijtihad;
- (C) The ability to solve all the political, economic, cultural, military and social problems of the world and thus,

the ability to leading the great Islamic and even non-Islamic society;

- (D) Jurisprudence as the theory of complete administration of man and community (jurisprudential management theory);
- (E) Politics is a part of religion and branches of jurisprudence (in this sense). (Kadivar, 1997: 110)

All of the above are fundamentally important in understanding this evolution. Imam Khomeini (R. A.) strongly emphasized the importance of paying sufficient attention to the interests of government and society and Ijtihad. He states in a very important phrase that indicates the transfer of political knowledge from an external and a secondary order to the system of religious and jurisprudential knowledge in Lakatos's expression: "If some of the issues have not existed or have not been raised in the past, then jurists must think for it today. Thus, the Islamic government should always be open to Ijtihad and the nature of the revolution of the system always requires that the ideas of Ijtihad jurisprudence be freely available in various fields, even if they are opposed to each other. And nobody has the right or the power to prevent it but, it is important to know the rule of the society and the society on which the Islamic system can plan for the benefit of the Muslims. It is essential that the unity of procedure and action are necessary and that there is not enough Ijtihad in the seminary. Rather, if a person knows all the knowledge taught in the seminary but, cannot identify the interests of the community, or he cannot identify the competent and useful people of the wrong people, and generally, in the social and political context, lacking the correct insight and decision-making power, this person is not a Mujtahid in social and governmental matters

and cannot take control of society". (Khomeini [Volume 21], 1987: 21)

The Importance of this item is significant in several ways

Imam Khomeini's first implicit reference to the innovative nature of the theory of the Velayat-e Faqih is in the sense we now refer to. He states that if this was not necessary in the past, this necessity has now emerged with the establishment of the Islamic system. That is, Imam Khomeini, changes the basis of the perception of the jurists and the person who owns the Ijtihad with the focus on political knowledge, namely, the power and the ability to recognize the social and political issues and the interests of Muslims, and to identify the competent people from the wrongdoers. Lack of Ijtihad in social and governmental issues, in this sense, is close to the sentence of lacking Ijtihad, in the most important part of jurisprudence and religious knowledge, namely, government and politics. Imam Khomeini (R. A.) elevates the position of political knowledge to the jurist to some extent, which can sometimes establish a sense of belonging between the jurist as the religious scholar and the jurist as the person possessing political knowledge for the realization of Islamic law in practice and at the present time and place. The circle of religious knowledge with Imam Khomeini (R. A.) is defined in such a way that the knowledge of politics and the practice of knowledge as a legitimate and religious political order is at the center and somehow brings about the authenticity of jurisprudence. Government, political affairs, knowledge and politics are the categories that represent the "practical philosophy of all jurisprudence throughout human life".

In the final part of this section, we will adapt the components of Imam's political theory to components of Lakatos's theory:

- "Velayat-e Faqih" is the basis of the political order of the period of absence; this component of Imam's political theory is in line with the fifth component of Lakatos's theory, entitled "Attention to a single, eternal, universal criterion", by which the relative capabilities of rival theories are evaluated. In fact, the Velayat-e Faqih is the charter of the transfer of political affairs into a circle of religious knowledge and turning it into a hard core that is regarded as a single, eternal, and universal criterion.
- "In the era of absenteeism, the comprehensive jurists are responsible for the implementation of government policies and other matters related to the Imams"; this component of Imam Khomeini (R. A.) has been acquitted in terms of empirical content, which Lakatos suggests as an advantage in overcoming other theories. Imam Khomeini (R. A.) actually wants to speak of exalted emancipator content, which is an advantage in overcoming other theories and the era of government in the realm of action, by connecting the time of absence with the era of the Massumin. Another important point is that the jurists are also appointed as executors of this state order during the righteous and imminent rule that it can be used to exonerate the attendants of the era of absenteeism and reject other government agents.
- "The component of the expansion of the Supreme Leader's territory"; This component of Imam Khomeini (R. A.), which includes the failure to subordinate to the primary and secondary divine laws and the non-fulfillment of human laws, including the constitution, can be matched with the component "Attention to Floating/Modifying Hypotheses as a Protective Belt of the Action Plan" of Lakatos. Based on this component, a change in the protective belt is allowed to increase the empirical content; thus, Imam Khomeini (R. A.), also changes and develops the domain of the supreme leader as a floating and changing hypotheses to increase the experimental content [that is, the Islamic system of governance]. Imam Khomeini (R. A.) also emphasized the "openness of the Ijtihad in the Islamic government and the free provision of jurisprudential Ijtihad views in various fields, subject to the unity of procedure and practice"; therefore, like Lakatos, Imam believed that the only way to escape from the plurality of theories and the anarchism of irrationality, is critique and the removal of some theories.
- "A particular view of the jurisprudence"; This component of Imam includes principles such as: paying enough attention to the interests of the state and the society; considering the role of time and place in Ijtihad; the ability to solve political, economic, cultural, military and social problems; jurisprudential management

theory; the policy of the same religion and religion as politics; Which indeed, corresponds to the component of "attention to the general and outward-mindedness of scientists (objective measures)" of Lakatos. Lakatos believes that the implications of these general and objective criteria are recognizable in theories or research programs themselves, we also claim, in support of Lakatos's claim, that such rules are more or less possible not only in Imam's theories but also in previous jurisprudential theories is tractable.

Conclusion

In this article, we tried to distinguish between the hard core or the skeletal (political knowledge) and the protective propositions in that system (political act) based on the methodology of the scientific research programs of Lakatos in the Imam Khomeini's religious system. Because, we believe that in the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, under the authority of Imam Khomeini's religious knowledge under the title "Velayat-e Faqih System", political knowledge is penetrated into the hard core of religious education and achieved a pivotal position there. In fact, what Imam Khomeini (R. A.) did in the theory of the Velayat-e Faqih was not maintaining the area of the hard core of religious knowledge and, by expelling some propositions, open a place for propositions of political knowledge but, he did two fundamental things:

First, he developed the area of the hard core of religious knowledge in such a way that political knowledge could easily be deployed without exhausting other propositions.

But the second attempt was somewhat more fundamental because it made a differ-

ence in the levels and positions within this hard core. By changing the hierarchy within this hard core, having faith and Islam were brought to a meaning in a serious and practical sense, in a political and social relationship, and in other words, with having sense of social and political justice, on two sides of a coin. Imam Khomeini (R. A.), conceptually and practically, transformed the traditional definition of religiosity, relying on the main essence of the religion of Islam and the Shia, in a radical way:" Islam and Shia religion should hence forth, be the religion of reforming social affairs according to their original essence, which has experienced some recessions throughout history, and the example of this mosque:" We sent our messengers with evidence, and brought down the book and the balance with them, so that the people would pay the ransom, and we would bring down the iron in it, and there would be great rewards for the people, and let Allah know those who help him and his messengers in the unseen." (Al-Hadid: 25)

In Imam Khomeini's views, religious knowledge is a system in which political knowledge as a backbone of a political act by believers is in the form of a hard nucleus or a scab that the deviation from it would be in the dismissal of the entire system of religious knowledge. In the thoughts of Imam Khomeini, there are floating / modified hypotheses as the protective belt of the action program. This is also natural because, as Lakatos suggests, the change in the protective belt (political knowledge) is permitted to increase the empirical content (political act). The Imam Khomeini's Velayat-e Faqih theory, in some way, coincides with the religious beliefs of the provinciate as a fundamental aspect of the faithful political action; this means converting political knowledge into a part of the hard core of the religious episte-

mology. Imam Khomeini believes that not only there is a "political affair" in the system of religious teachings but also one of the most important aspects of the whole of this system. Without considering politics as one of the intrinsic and independent aspects of the religious education system, the possibility of discussing the establishment of a religious government will be ruled out. Therefore, the term political thought, is a "political affair."

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