تاثیر نسبی سخت گیری قراردادهای سرمایه گذاری دوجانبه بر رابطه بین بی ثباتی سیاسی و انتخاب مالکیت وابسته

محورهای موضوعی : مالی بین‌المللی

مصطفی حیدری هراتمه ¹

1 - گروه اقتصاد و مدیریت، واحد نراق، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، نراق، ایران

تاریخ دریافت : 1400/05/01 تاریخ پذیرش : 1400/12/01 تاریخ انتشار : 1400/12/01

کلید واژه: سرمایه گذاری مستقیم خارجی, بی ثباتی سیاسی, قراردادهای سرمایه گذاری دو جانبه, انتخاب مالکیت وابسته, سخت گیری سرمایه گذاری مستقیم خارجی ",

چکیده مقاله :

کشورهای صنعتی توسعه‌یافته از معاهدات سرمایه‌گذاری دوجانبه برای حمایت از حقوق شرکت‌ها هنگام سرمایه‌گذاری در بازارهای نامشخص استفاده اما کشورهای درحال‌توسعه و نوظهور معاهدات سرمایه‌گذاری دوجانبه‌ای را منعقد می‌کنند تا بتوانند سرمایه‌گذاری مستقیم خارجی بیشتری جذب و جهت سهم بیشتر از سرمایه‌گذاری مستقیم خارجی رقابت کنند؛ لذا به دلیل اهمیت معاهدات سرمایه‌گذاری دوجانبه و سرمایه‌گذاری مستقیم خارجی، پژوهش حاضر با هدف بررسی تأثیر نسبی سخت‌گیری قرارداد سرمایه‌گذاری دوجانبه بر رابطه بین بی‌ثباتی سیاسی و انتخاب مالکیت وابسته در نظر گرفته شد. طیفی از کشورهای درحال‌توسعه و تازه صنعتی شده با نمونه‌ای ۱۵۶تایی در یک دوره زمانی ۱۵ساله از سال 1383 تا 1398 با متوسط 3 سرمایه‌گذاری خارجی جدید در سال انتخاب و با استفاده از رگرسیون لجستیک زوجی مورد تجزیه‌وتحلیل قرار گرفت. نتایج نشان داد: الف) تأثیر متغیرهای بی‌ثباتی سیاسی و سخت‌گیری معاهدات سرمایه‌گذاری دوجانبه به‌صورت غیرتعاملی معنی‌دار نبوده اما به‌صورت تعاملی با افزایش بی‌ثباتی سیاسی، معاهدات سرمایه‌گذاری دوجانبه‌ها اقدام به معکوس کردن اولویت‌های بنگاه‌های چندملیتی جهت انتخاب مالکیت اکثریت به‌جای مالکیت اقلیت می‌نماید. ب) در سطوح بالاتر بی‌ثباتی سیاسی، سخت‌گیری بیشتر معاهدات سرمایه‌گذاری دوجانبه احتمال افزایش انتخاب بنگاه‌های چندملیتی از سهام را افزایش می‌دهد. ج) سخت‌گیری معاهدات سرمایه‌گذاری دوجانبه برای تعدیل رابطه بین بی‌ثباتی سیاسی و انتخاب مالکیت وابسته در کشورهای میزبان عمل می‌کند و معاهدات سرمایه‌گذاری دوجانبه سختگیرانه‌تر با افزایش بی‌ثباتی سیاسی، بنگاه‌های چندملیتی را ترغیب می‌کند تا مالکیت اکثریت را به‌جای اقلیت انتخاب کند.

چکیده انگلیسی:

Developed industrialized countries use bilateral investment treaties to protect the rights of companies when investing in uncertain markets but developing and emerging countries are concluding BITs to attract more foreign direct investment and compete for a larger share of FDI. a range of developing and newly industrialized countries with a sample of 156 in a 15-year period from 2004 to 2019 with an average of 3 new foreign investments per year were selected and analyzed using binary logistic regression. The results showed: a) The effect of political instability variables and BIT stringency is not significant in non-interactively, but interactively with increasing political instability, BITs reverse the priorities of MNEs to choose majority ownership over minority ownership. b) At higher levels of political instability, greater BIT stringency increases the likelihood of increasing MNE selection from stocks. C) The stringency of BIT acts to moderate the relationship between political instability and the choice of sub-ownership in host countries. And more stringent BIT, as political instability increases, encourages the MNE to choose majority ownership over minority. Thus, more stringent bilateral investment treaties encourage multinational corporations to choose majority stocks as political instability increases.

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