

A Study on Social Mobility in Post-Revolutionary Rural Iran

Ali Shakoori¹

Associate Professor in the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Tehran University, Iran

Received 11 January 2014

Revised 14 February 2014

Accepted 18 March 2014

Abstract: *Rural reforms have been an important part of the post-revolutionary government policy. The government implemented various rural development programs to develop rural areas – mostly with an ideologically populist and egalitarian-oriented character. Development policies in general and rural reforms in particular are considered as a major process towards weakening the rigidity of rural social structure and producing number of positions and openness circumstances. This paper intends to explore the impact of the post-revolutionary rural programs on the occupational mobility of rural people through using ex-post-facto comparative method in the selected villages. It concludes that the mobility tended to be higher in the villages that received the most rural programs than those which received fewer or no programs. There was a higher inclination to self-recruitment in intra-generational mobility compared with intra-generational mobility. Most of the observed mobility, both upward and downward, was short range and oriented towards the adjacent category.*

Keywords: *Social mobility, meritocracy, rural development, revolution, social class, equality.*

Introduction

Social mobility has become a central topic of sociological inquiry, actively pursued over the past three decades by those studying social change and developmental studies. The position of individuals within class structure does not remain constant overtime. Social mobility captures many aspects of individuals' life chances in society, having a significant effect on class formation, in terms of distinctive class substructures and class identification (Giddens 1974, 1993; Breen and Rottman 1995). An important concern in this regard is people's response to the experience of social mobility. Whether they are satisfied with the process or not, can have significant consequences for the stability of society. This is important politically due to the fact that a relatively high rate of upward mobility functions as a 'political safety value' in society. It provides opportunities for many able and ambitious members of lower classes to improve their situation (Parkin 1968; Haralambos and Holborn 1995). The central question in mobility debates has been mostly concerned with the availability and equality of opportunities that allow a great incidence of the fluidity of social positions. The examination of historical developments of various counties indicates that, a part from political events or rapid change like revolutions, at least two processes have played a prominent role in creating and fluid circumstances. The first process related to economic and social. In underdeveloped societies, the process is mainly promoted by development policies. The second process related basically to official ideology of governments emphasizing equality, ascribed norms, democracy, the right of man and so on.

After the revolution, Iranian society in general and rural Iran in particular has experienced various development agendas that require examination with respect of their influence on social stratification system and social mobility. First, the revolution and many politico-economic fluctuations should have brought about a fluid and mobile situation for people. Second, great ideological emphasis was placed on enhancing the status of the poor and reversing the plight of the lower stratum. In fact, the Islamic economic order was defined as "one in which the poor and deprived stood at the centre" (Amuzghar 1993: 17). Third, this revolutionary populist approach in policy area was particularly reflected in rural reform policy objectives so that its major aim was announced as "helping to diversify economic activities at villages on the basis of improving their physical structures" (Ministry of Jihad 1992) in order to upgrade "the living standards and welfare of villages and to bridge the gap between villages and cities" (ibid). For this purpose, the post-revolutionary government attempted to implement a series of rural reforms through reorganizing the pre-revolutionary agricultural administration and establishing new rural organizations, as a channel for the implementation of rural development programs (for more details see for example, Schirazi, 1993; Shakoori 2001). These measures are expected to have a notable effect on the mobility of rural people.

¹ E-mail: shakoori@ut.ac.ir

Exploring social mobility in rural areas can serve as a proxy for changes in the conditions of the lower stratum. Despite the existence of a number of studies on Iran's rural sector, the impact of the post-revolutionary rural development on social mobility have received little attention. This paper attempts to give a brief account of the subject by using field research data collected from the selective villages. Several dimensions are considered in this paper: the degree to which social positions of the villagers has been affected by rural development programs; how much this change has been influenced by the villagers' socio-economic background (previous socio-economic positions) and the developmental potential of the villages; and the extent to which people moved from their original class.

Theoretical Debates

Stratification system and social mobility within opportunity system is one of the important dimensions of social structure. The former refers to a relatively organized network of social positions in a given society or community. The latter is concerned with the temporal and fluid situation of class structure and of social positions constituting the place of possibilities and limitations in society's opportunity network (Chalabi, 1996). The major mobility debates in the literature have often focused on the following issues. First, they have been interested "in the extent to which modern stratification systems are 'open' in the sense that it allows a high incidence of social mobility" (Coxon & Jones 1975: 10). Second, a notable social researchers working on social mobility have underlined the fact that modern societies provide 'equal' conditions in the sense that positions are filled on the basis of merit and achievement rather than on the basis of background, social origin and ascribed criteria (Hmlton and Hirszowicz 1993). Third, others have been concerned to the processes influencing the openness of social structure and equality of opportunity. The first two areas are closely associated with the two more common sociologically theses in the literature, namely disadvantages/advantages and meritocracy. They address such questions as: to some extent the top positions are filled by the individuals from a particular social background? Why are those into lower class (e.g. working-class) homes less likely to achieve middle jobs than their contemporaries born to middle class parents?

The disadvantages/advantages thesis places emphasis on different class background. For example, it is argued that middle class children enjoy both material and cultural advantages (their homes, their schools, their peer groups etc.) which markedly (in an aspect unfairly) enhance their chances of educational and occupational success. As Heath states 'children from privileged backgrounds have substantial, indeed grotesque, advantages in the competition for elite positions, but when they take their place in the elite they may find that they are outnumbered by men from humbler origins' (1981, pp. 76-77). The meritocracy thesis underlines on differences in the aptitudes and characteristics of individuals achieving varying degrees of success. It is argued that compared with other systems of social stratification, class systems are relatively open and positions are in principle filled on merit by means of competition. To the extent that a given society really is meritocratic, the more able and hard-working individuals in each generation will come to fill the higher positions in the occupational hierarchy. These successful parents will then often produce children with the same qualities who go on to emulate or surpass the achievements of their parents in the next generation. Thus, in a meritocracy, we should expect to find that middle-class children tend to do better than working class children, because they are more likely to have inherited –genetically and through socialization—the kinds of talents and personal qualities which are required in order to achieve success and which their parents themselves exhibited. Ability and effort are the major elements of the meritocracy thesis, which involves both the desire to succeed and a commitment to behavior (e.g. hard work) that is thought likely to bring success. In a meritocratic society, bright individuals will only succeed if they are motivated to do so, and people of lesser ability may still achieve relatively high positions if they are committed, motivated and hard-working.

However, the meritocracy thesis has received little support from some sociologists working on social mobility. Finding a clear statistical association, researchers have tended to assume that this is the product of social advantage and disadvantage, and ruled out the possibility that it may rather be due to differences in average levels of ability and/or motivation among individuals born into different classes (Saunders 1997: 262-3). The complementary analysis of social mobility is oriented to explain the factors affecting on the availability and equality of positions, three of which have been emphasized. The first factor is relates to the process of structural changes resulting from shifts in social formation, which in turn have their roots in economic development and technological advancement. The latter results in a steady broadening of the opportunity for upward mobility, a change in the occupational structure and the growth of higher-level occupations. It is usually argued that modern and industrial societies have quite high rates of mobility compared to traditional and primary societies where the level of economic development is only at the substantial level, social positions are limited and ascribed features are dominant. This is a character of industrialized societies because they undergo continues and often rapid economic change which necessitates occupational, geographical and social mobility rates than other societies. This reflects their differing characteristics

in terms of class structure, degree of class division, level of class consciousness, etc. These societies are prone to the change of the relative size of classes over time. For example, it is argued that, during 20th century in Europe, where the class structures of many societies have changed markedly in significance, as has unskilled manual work, while white-collar jobs and skilled manual jobs have become more numerous (Breen and Rottman 1995). It is often thought that countries as a result of its history and experience of industrialization, its emphasis –at least at the level of official ideology—on equality, democracy and the rights of man, are far more open and offer greater equality of opportunity (Saunders 1997: 262-3). The second factor, which is based on Sorokin's thesis, relates to rapid changes such as revolution and war. According to this view, rapid changes break down the old system or deform the structure of society, and consequently provide mobile opportunities for different social stratum beyond "the conventional orderings of status". Rapid changes, for example those brought about by revolutions, as Sorokin (1967 234-5) argues, weaken or eliminate the existing ordering structure of status by deforming the structure of the social aggregate:

the structure of the social aggregate suddenly becomes weak, formless and crumbles to pieces, social borderlines suddenly disappear. The processes of change in the composition of social groups and of circulation of individuals... go on much quicker and affect a large number of people The amplitude of fluctuations in... social groups is much wider, old groups are extinguished and new ones formed.

During revolutionary periods both downward and upward mobility can be high, but it is often temporary. The foregoing two processes are referred by Coxon and Jones (1975) as 'historical' change in the sense that economic and demographic factors will always force a re-arrangement of social groups over the social structure in the long run. This re-arrangement may occur either gradually through recruitment to desirable positions or suddenly through revolution. The third factor influencing the enlargement of opportunities is referred to planned change. The main objective of development policies are to expand people's choices and improve their capabilities so that they can make a better life for themselves. This is made possible by eliminating such obstacles as differential knowledge and unequal opportunity structures, as well as distributing material resources (Olson 1963; Pye 1966; Sen 1977, 1983; Clements 1995). Major debates in development policy and practice have been between populist and egalitarian approaches. Populist place emphasis on making space for all strata of the people, particularly the poor, who have hitherto been excluded from development policies in the process of social change. Egalitarianism advances the idea that in the process of development "all should have equal access to the material benefits of life, or at least, that none should be handicapped by social background, or by such characteristics as sex or ethnicity" (Coxon and Jones 1975: 10).

This has been reflected in rural development literature. For instance, there is an agreement to define the concept of rural development as a process of "improving the living standards of the mass of the low-income population residing in rural areas and making the process of their development self-sustaining" (Lele 1975: 20). Obviously, the achievement of this objective depends on the application of policies which are aimed at: first, altering the predominantly agrarian structure of these economies; and second, empowering the living conditions of rural people by the implantation of rural policies such as land reform, education, health, employment and so on. However, these policies, whether government intends it or not, affect social mobility and class structure. Nevertheless, the degree of effectiveness of rural development policies depends on their ability to change the prevailing socio-economic structure of rural society. In other words, whether they are able to provide conditions of openness for the majority of people and most importantly whether they are capable of providing new opportunities to change people's status. The present paper is mostly concerned with the latter process.

Methodology

This section provides brief explanation of research method, measurement methods, sampling method etc. The aim of the empirical research is ascertain the effect of rural programs on the mobility of rural people. This was examined using an ex-post-facto comparative method in six villages in the township of Marand, Eastern Azerbaijan. The villages were selected in pairs from three distinct categories. The villages in each pair were similar from the perspective of developmental potential but differed in respect of the number of rural development programs they received, as indicated in Table 1. The data are based on interviews with 381 households, which were selected through random proportionate sampling.

Table (1): features of the villages under study in terms of development potential, program provision and sample size

villages	Development potential			Rural development provision			Sample size
	geographical	remoteness	population	Jihad	centers	Land reform	
Pair one:							
1							108
2				Maximum	Maximum	Yes	88
pair two:				Minimum	Minimum	No	
3							60
4				Maximum	Maximum	Yes	60
pair				Minimum	Minimum	No	
three:							30
5				Maximum	Maximum	Yes	35
6				Minimum	Minimum	No	381
Total							

Note 1: villages. Pair one: village 1= Duwlat Abad, village 2= Dizaj-e Hossein bayk; pair two: village 3= Gharajeh-Fayzullah, village 4= Livar-e-Paen. Pair three: village 5= ZGhermezi Gheslag, village 6= Babreh-e Sofla.

Note 2: The service center programs included the provision of agricultural machinery, the implementation of irrigation scheme and the provision of agricultural inputs such as pesticides, fertilizers, seed and water pumps. Jihad's programs consisted of building public baths, constructing schools, supplying piped drinking water, building graveled or asphalted roads and implementing physical upgrading projects.

Mobility, in a broad sense, is defined as movement towards or away from existing positions. It is "one type of a wide range of behavior" (Millar 1975). It is considered in different categories such as geographical, social etc. In this study social mobility was considered which refers to "the movement of individuals and groups between different socio-economic positions" (Giddens 1993, 229). Two forms of social mobility have been examined, namely inter-generational mobility and intra-generational mobility. The former involves a comparison between the position of an individual and that of his or her parent's position. In this study, it refers to comparing the status of the respondents with the status of their father. The latter compares the position of an individual at two or more points in his or her lifetime or career (Giddens 1993; Hamilton and Hirszowicz 1993). In this study it refers to comparing the status of the respondents with their status before the revolution. Various researchers have used different socio-economic indicators to identify social mobility, in this study occupational mobility of the respondents has been taken into account as the criteria to measure the occupational status of individuals for the following reasons, as noted by many scholars (e.g. Kelsall and Kelsall 1975; Miller 1975; Hamilton and Hirszowicz 1993). First, people are not reluctant to furnish information about their occupation for classification purposes. Second, such data are thought to be relatively objective for comparison with social position derived from the status-ranking of fellow citizens. Third, knowledge about person's precise occupation and his or her position within it represents some indication, though a rough one, of such matters as income, life style, level of formal education and the like.

The cross-classification tables have been used to examine occupational mobility, which is a common technique in mobility studies (Glass and Hall 1954; Pullum 1970; Hamilton and Hirszowicz 1993). The tables is constituted from two equal rows and columns which refer to the same variable at different times (before and after the revolution) or in different generations (the job status of the respondents and that of their fathers after the revolution). For instance, the items in a row refer to the children's job and the items in the column refer to parent's occupation (to show inter-generational mobility). The table is therefore in shape and if we wished to exchange the corresponding positions of two rows, it would be necessary to exchange the corresponding two columns. For the purpose of comparison, the row and column items (job categories) were perfectly ranked according to prestige after a pilot field study. The perception of the prestige of each category's occupation was based on the views of the villagers in the district under study. The main occupational titles according to their prestige were:

- 1) Professions such as doctors or engineers or well-paid civil servant jobs; occupations such as businessmen, or lorry or bus drivers. The occupants of these jobs were usually working in the urban areas and are classified as urban jobs for the purpose of this study;
- 2) lower ranking civil servants and teachers;
- 3) farmers;

- 4) cultivators and livestock breeders;
- 5) village petty traders and shopkeepers;
- 6) Artisans and landless laborers.

Due to space limitation, the findings are presented on the basis of proportions (rates) and of the indices of various aspects of the mobility, based on the following concepts. Absolute mobility or the total amount of mobility. This refers to the sum of the data of the cells of the top and bottom triangle (the total cells), implying the comparative chances of those from various backgrounds of reaching particular positions. Downward mobility refers to the movement of a person from a higher status background to a lower one. It is calculated by summing the data of the downward cells. Upward mobility refers to the movement of a person from a lower status background to a higher position. It is calculated through summing the data of the upward cells. Self-recruitment, in intergenerational mobility, refers to the process by which members of a stratum are recruited from the sons of those who already belong to that stratum; in intra-generational mobility, it refers to the engagement of members of a stratum in the same occupational category in two profile times. In both inter- and intra-generational mobility, higher self-recruitment means lower mobility. In general, proportions show the share of each item (up/down mobility, self-recruitment etc.) of the total amount in that item. For example, the proportion of relative mobility or absolute mobility was calculated through dividing the total figures of the top and bottom cells of the diagonal line by the total amount of mobility and multiplying by 100. The same procedure has been used for the proportions of the other foregoing concepts. In order to examine the degree of the effect of respondents' socio-economic background (features such as age, education, assets and so on) on their mobility correlation coefficients have used.

Research Findings

The findings indicated that occupational mobility, in general, tended to be higher in the villages that received the most rural development programs than in those which received fewer or no programs. In all villages the highest tendency was towards self-recruitment. A higher tendency observed for self-recruitment in intra-generational mobility as compared to inter-generational mobility, indicating a higher degree of mobility and availability of opportunities for the former. For example, 60 per cent of the respondents opted the same occupation as their fathers, and 71 per cent (or over two thirds) were in the same occupational category after the revolution as they had been before it, given an average score of 23 per cent (less than one third) for intra-generational mobility and 28 per cent for inter-generational mobility (Table 2 and see also tables 3-4). Given that mobility occurs over the long term and that the revolutions potentially provide a great chance for larger mobility, the higher figure for inter-generational mobility appears reasonable.

Of the different occupational categories scrutinized in this research, in general, the lowest of self-recruitment in intra- and inter-generational mobility were found in the laborer category. In other words, more respondents in this category had apparently moved away from their father's status/position or changed their pre-revolutionary status/position. This could mean that the labor class in the villages under study faced more openness in the social structure to change their previous circumstances.

However, the review of the direction of mobility, in general, signified that most movement, both upward and downward, tended to be to the adjacent category (occupational hierarchy) and much mobility is confined to a narrow band or zone, usually from laborer to farmer, or from farmer to farmer and livestock-breeder – and hence, greatest in the middle of the range and least towards the extremes at the top. This means that while there was some diversification of household activities, there was no real occupational mobility. Thus, despite the fact there was considerable upward mobility, a degree of closure existed in the class structure in particular zones. Findings indicate the tendency to be a 'farmer' or 'farmer and livestock breeder' in villages with a larger number of rural programs than in those with fewer programs. The higher degree of movement, both intra- and inter-generational between the 'farmer' and 'farmer and livestock breeder' categories, particularly in villages of a wider rural reforms, could be due to the land redistribution policy after the revolution, a scarcity of opportunities in the other categories, or the fact that these two groups were by far largest. The lesser degree of upward mobility is reflected in the lower and weak correlation coefficients (ibids). A comparison of the paired villages showed that in the prosperous villages, the tendency to move to the 'functionary' and 'urban job' category was greater than in the poorer villages. Data revealed no great difference between the villages in each pair concerning mobility towards the 'urban job' category, but the tendency was far less in the poorer villages than in the better-off and prosperous villages (Table 3-4). In general, the poorer the villages, the more lower the occupations. An examination of the effect of the respondents' socioeconomic characteristics on their intra-and inter-generational mobility showed that, apart from income variable in villages 1 and 3, none of the independent variables were significantly associated with mobility. The correlation coefficient for income was around 40 per cent (a moderate association), and for the rest of the

variables, it was below 25 per cent (a weak or very weak association). The data found no significant variations between villages, but income, wealth and literacy, were higher in the prosperous villages, particularly those with more rural programs than in the poorer villages (table 5).

From the data we may conclude that the respondents with higher levels of income and wealth in the villages had a better chance of changing their status. We may also conclude the following. First, most of the observed mobility was short range. Second, the background of the respondents – the status of their fathers and their own status before the revolution – played an important part in mobility. Although the higher upward mobility in villages with more rural programs concurs with the assumption that the higher the number of rural reforms the greater the mobility, the fact that a significant proportion of the villagers did not change their employment status and that mobility was largely concentrated in the farming categories shows that the rural programs did not have a significant effect on the occupational mobility of the respondents. The fewer occupational differences between the paired villages in most job categories confirms the notion that mobility was affected more by the developmental potential of the villages, particularly their geographical situation, than by the rural programs. These are observable from the figures of absolute and self-recruitment in tables 2 and 5.

Theoretically, one reason for this might be that mobility takes place over generations, and 25 yrs is too short time to detect an overall change in occupational mobility. However the main reason lies in the nature of the rural programs implemented in the post-revolutionary era. Firstly, employment creation was centered mainly on farming. For example, the land redistribution program encouraged the inhabitants of the target villages to engage in the categories ‘farmer’ or ‘farmer and livestock breeder’, with more encouragement being provided by the output delivery programs. While such programs as the provision of piped water, electrification, school construction and road building could create temporary jobs for the villagers, particularly for construction workers, they did not offer a sustained change in their employment status. Indeed measures to improve professional skills for project planning and implementation benefited urban citizens more than rural people. Given the limited employment opportunities in the rural economy, any quick and profound changes in people’s occupational status required investment in sectors other than purely agricultural ones, but one could find this rare in the villages under the study.

Apart from these factors, a main reason for the lower mobility in rural areas in general and the villages under study in particular is the historical powerlessness of the villagers, with respect of occupying better job status, and of villages with respect of number of job status. This is particularly related to the low literacy levels and few jobs positions in the village which prevents the villagers from gaining access to new opportunities in rural areas and from benefiting from opportunities in urban areas. It should be added that the physical upgrading projects (behsazi), were to provide the grounds for a better service distribution system in the villages, raising the employment rate by establishing industries and paving the way for investment and market expansion (Ministry of Jihad-e Sazandegi 1992: 29). In village 1 this project had not had a significant effect on job opportunities at the time of the field study (two years after the project’s completion), but it may have been too soon for the full benefits to have emerged. Our observation showed that some benefits were visible in the business sector of the village, but only for the few who could afford to invest. Even if the project proves a success, the trickle-down benefits will require a long time to materialize.

Conclusion

This paper provided the main results of the research conducted on the occupational mobility of rural people in the selected villages. It has first examined whether or not the post-revolutionary developments, particularly with respect of rural reforms, had influenced occupational positions of the rural people. The paper has also taken the next logical step by investigating whether change in the occupational status has been influenced by the respondents’ socio-economic background and developmental potentials of the villages. The findings reveal that most occupational mobility occurred in the villages that received the most rural development programs and had greater development potentials than in those which received fewer programs and had lower developmental potentials. The higher degree of mobility was observed in inter-generational mobility as compared to intra-generational mobility. Most movement occurred between categories close to one another in the occupational hierarchy and much mobility was confined to narrow band, often from ‘laborer’ to ‘farmer’, or from ‘farmer’ to ‘farmer and livestock-breeder’, was consequently the middle of the range and least towards the extremes and especially at the top. This confirms, despite considerable upward mobility, the closure thesis in the occupational structure at least in given zones. This could mean that, however, the data revealed the higher the number of rural programs the greater the mobility, but a significant the villagers did not change their job status. This was confirmed by fewer occupational differentials between the paired villages in most job categories.

The analysis of the data showed that, in general, the respondents' socio-economic background had positive but a weak association with their mobility. Only variables of income and wealth particularly in the prosperous villages revealed comparatively high and moderate association with the respondents' mobility. The lower level of mobility could be, to a great deal, related to the nature of rural programs and that of rural socio-economic structure not providing the state of enlarging and engendering job status both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Table (2): The main indices of the respondents' intra and inter-generational mobility (%)

villages no indices	one	two	three	four	five	six	Aggregate villages
intra-generational:							
upward mobility	21	12	20	15	16	9	23
self-recruitment	66	87	71	81	80	80	71
Downward mobility	13.2	2	9	4	4	10	6
inter-generational:							
upward mobility	36	31	32	28	32	34	28
self-recruitment	43	48	48	57	57	63	40
Downward mobility	21	21	20	15	11	2	32
N							

Source: Based on Shakoori, 1998, pp. 260-74 (Note: N refers to total numbers of the sample population)

Table (3): The comparison of the occupational status of the respondents with the status of their father in the selected villages (intra-generational mobility) (%)

mobility indices	labour	farmer	farmer & livestock breeding	shopkeeper	functionaries	others (urban jobs)
Village no. & mobility indices						
village one:						
1	1	9	49	1	10	20
2	-	10.5	21.7	3	19	46
3	5.6	11	82	-	-	-
4	37	42	19	23	-	-
5	-	-	17	71	11	-
6	18.7	15	20	17	28	-
village two:						
1	2	-	35	7	-	54
2	-	-	25	9	-	64
3	13	-	87	-	-	-
4	28	35	20	16	-	-
5	-	13	-	87	-	-
6	25	24	26	23	-	-
village three:						
1	7	18	48	-	1	22
2	-	-	67	2	-	30
3	29	71	-	-	-	-
4	30	48	11	11	-	-
5	-	16	54	10	-	-
6	14	15	19	22	28	-
village four:						
1	-	20	18	-	-	60
2	-	20	19	-	-	60
3	-	100	-	-	-	-
4	35	25	40	-	-	-
5	-	-	100	-	-	-
6	25	25	20	-	30	-
village five:						
1	16	3	32	-	-	17

2	-	37	41	-	-	21
3	66	-	44	-	-	-
4	58	33	8	-	-	-
5	-	-	100	-	-	-
6	18	24	24	33	-	-
village six:						
1	-	53	12	14	-	20
2	-	26	31	22	-	42
3	-	100	-	-	-	-
4	-	88	12	-	-	-
5	-	-	100	-	-	-
6	-	25	16	29	30	-
N	108	88	60	60	35	30

Note 1: absolute mobility rate for each category; 2) upward mobility rate for each category; 3) downward mobility rate for each category; 4) background of upward mobility rate for each category; 5) background of downward mobility rate for each category; 6) self-recruitment rate for each category.

Note 2: N refers to the total sample population.

Table (4): The comparison of the occupational status of the respondents with the status before the revolution in the selected villages (inter-generational mobility) (%)

mobility indices	labour	farmer	farmer & livestock breeding	shopkeeper	functionaries	others (urban jobs)
Village no. & mobility indices						
village one:						23
1	3	20	44	8	1	32
2	-	8.5	46	13	16	-
3	10	49	40	-	-	12
4	46	28	12	-	-	50
5	-	-	6	13	40	-
6	7	23	32	37	-	-
village two:						
1	2	-	57	13	16	11
2	-	13	27	21	15	24
3	4	-	15	51	31	-
4	35	39	25	-	-	-
5	-	-	6	-	63	30
6	-	38	37	-	24	-
village three:						
1	-	38	35	16	4	22
2	-	17	35	10	5	30
3	-	60	20	20	-	-
4	36	40	10	-	10	-
5	-	-	12	25	61	-
6	-	19	43	26	11	-
village four:						
1	-	34	36	-	18	19
2	-	25	29	-	16	29
3	-	17	83	-	11	20
4	44	24	30	-	-	-
5	-	-	17	83	-	-
6	-	32	24	44	-	-
village five:						
1	17	17	49	-	-	-
2	-	15	63	-	21	-

3	75	25	-	-	-	-
4	61	43	3	-	-	-
5	-	-	100	-	-	-
6	9	21	26	43	-	-
village six:						
1	-	27	46	16	2	7
2	-	24	49	17	2	7
3	-	100	-	-	-	-
4	60	24	14	-	-	-
5	-	-	100	-	-	-
6	-	26	29	43	-	-
N	108	88	60	60	35	30

Note 1: absolute mobility rate for each category; 2) upward mobility rate for each category; 3) downward mobility rate for each category; 4) background of upward mobility rate for each category; 5) background of downward mobility rate for each category; 6) self-recruitment rate for each category.

Note 2: N refers to the total sample population.

Table (5): Correlation coefficients of the intra- and inter-generational mobility index by the respondents characteristics

villages variables	One	Two	Three	Four	Five	six
a) the intra-generational						
income	.4605 Sig .000	.3220 Sig .001	.4470 Sig .000	.3106 Sig .009	.2296 Sig .111	.1952 Sig .131
wealth	.2135 Sig .051	.2447 Sig .006	.2471 Sig .028	.2099 Sig .133	.1571 Sig .072	.1446 Sig .204
education	.1805 Sig .032	.1125 Sig .148	.1087 Sig .204	.0976 Sig .229	.0813 Sig .335	.0823 Sig .317
family size	.0446 Sig .346	.0268 Sig .393	.1087 Sig .204	.0456 Sig .367	.0738 Sig .349	.0651 Sig .355
age	.0603 Sig .271	.0798 Sig .212	.0807 Sig .270	.0598 Sig .329	.0924 Sig .196	.0373 Sig .416
N	108	88	60	60	35	30
b) inter-generational						
income	.3774 Sig .000	.1619 Sig .066	.3916 Sig .001	.2990 Sig .011	.1982 Sig .147	.1652 Sig .168
wealth	.2200 Sig .012	.1972 Sig .067	.2152 Sig .049	.1525 Sig .124	.1296 Sig .226	.1050 Sig .290
education	.1069 Sig .210	.1345 Sig .106	.1485 Sig .129	.1192 Sig .269	.0881 Sig .325	.0743 Sig .333
family size	.0509 Sig .302	.1032 Sig .169	.0711 Sig .295	.0684 Sig .302	.0680 Sig .361	.0040 Sig .491
age	.0808 Sig .208	.1605 Sig .068	.2043 Sig .064	.0456 Sig .367	.0729 Sig .353	.0441 Sig .401
N	108	88	60	60	35	30

Note: N refers to to total sample population in each village

References

1. Amuzegar, J. (1993) *Iran's Economy under the Islamic Republic*, London: I. B. Tauris.
2. Breen, R. and D. B. Rottman (1995) *Class Stratification: A Comparative Perspective*, London: Harvester & Wheatsheaf.
3. Chalabi, M. (1375 [1996]) *Jameh Shenasiyeh Zazm* [Sociology of Order], Tehran: Neshr- e Ney.
4. Clements, P. (1993) 'An Approach to Poverty Alleviation for Large International Development Agencies', *World Development*, vol. 21, no. 10.
5. Coxon A. P. M. and C. L. Jones (1975) *Social Mobility*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
6. Devine F. (1998) Class Analysis and the Stability of Class Relations, *The Journal of the British Sociological Association*, vol. 32, and No. 1.
7. Giddens, A. (1993) *Sociology*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
8. Glass, D. V. and Hall, T. R. (1954) 'Social Mobility in Great Britain: A Study of Inter-generational Changes in Status' in A. P. M. Coxon and C. L. Jones, *Social Mobility*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
9. Hamilton and Hirszowicz (1993) *Class and Inequality: Comparative Perspectives*, London: Harvester & Wheatsheaf.
10. Heath, A. (1981) *Social Mobility*, London: Fontana.
11. Kelsall, R. K. and H. M. Kelsall (1972) *Stratification: An Essay on Class and Inequality*, London: Longman.
12. Lele, U. (1975) *The Design of Rural Development*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank.
13. Miller, S. M. (1975a) 'The Concept and Measurement of Mobility', in A. P. M. Coxon and C. L. Jones, *Social Mobility*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
14. Miller, S. M. (1975b) 'Comparative Social Mobility', in A. P. M. Coxon and C. L. Jones, *Social Mobility*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
15. Ministry of Jihad-e Sazandegi (1992) *Rural Construction*, Tehran: undersecretary of Rural Construction, Planning and Programming Bureau.
16. Olson, M. Jr (1963) 'Rapid Growth as a Destabilising Force' *Journal of Economic History*, vol. 23, no. 4.
17. Pullum, T. W. (1970) 'What Can Mathematical Models Tell Us about Occupational Mobility', in A. P. M. Coxon and C. L. Jones, *Social Mobility*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
18. Pye, L. W. (1966) *Aspects of Political Development*, Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
19. Saunders, P. (1997) 'Social Mobility in Britain: An Empirical Evaluation of Two Competing Explanations', *The Journal of the British Sociological Association*, vol. 31, no 2.
20. Schirazi, A. (1993) *Islamic Policy, The Agrarian Question in Iran*, translated by P. J. Ziess-Lawrence, London: Lynne Rienner Publisher.
21. Sen, A. (1977) 'Starvation and Exchange Entitlements: A General Approach and its Application to the Great Bangal Famine', *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, vol.1, no. 1.
22. Sen, A. (1983) 'Development: which way now?' *Economic Journal*, vol. 93.
23. Shakoori, A. (2001) *The State and Rural Development in the Post-revolutionary Iran*, London: Palgrave.