

# Investigating Iranian Industry of Publishing Translated Works Based on Agency Theory

## Abstract

This study examines the Iranian publishing industry of translated works through the analytical framework of agency theory in order to illuminate the structural dynamics governing relationships among publishers, translators, distributors, and booksellers. Drawing on in-depth qualitative evidence from an industry expert, the analysis demonstrates that the publisher occupies a dominant principal position within a hierarchically organized network of agents whose degrees of autonomy diminish with increased distance from this central authority. Core agency-theoretical constructs—information asymmetry, adverse selection, moral hazard, goal conflict, risk sharing, and agency costs—are shown to systematically shape contractual practices across the translation production chain. The findings reveal the predominance of behavior-based and wage-oriented contracts as risk-minimizing responses to high levels of outcome uncertainty, weak outcome measurability, and unstable external conditions. Beyond intra-organizational dynamics, the study shows that the absence of effective copyright enforcement, volatile cultural policies, and declining reading culture function as powerful exogenous constraints that intensify agency problems and concentrate financial and legal risks disproportionately on publishers. These structural conditions generate a self-reinforcing cycle of conservative contracting, elevated monitoring costs, weakened incentive alignment, and declining translation quality. The study argues that without institutional reform in copyright protection, contractual standardization, and cultural governance, principal–agent relations in the Iranian translated publishing sector will remain locked in a “lose–lose” equilibrium. By extending agency theory into the sociocultural economy of translation, the study contributes to both Translation Studies and organizational analysis by offering a theoretically grounded account of how market, legal, and policy conditions reshape governance, risk distribution, and professional practice in non-Western publishing environments.

**Keywords:** Agency Theory, Iranian Publishing Industry, Translation, Principal-Agent Relationship, Contractual Dynamics, Information Asymmetry, Risk Management

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## INTRODUCTION

“Translation is a phenomenon that has a huge effect on everyday life”(Hatim & Munday, 2019, p. 3). As articulated by Benmessaoud and Buzelin (2018), translation enables the acquisition of symbolic capital, the transfer of literary prestige, the negotiation of national identities, and the establishment of various hegemonies. They conceptualize translation as an activity embedded within an international domain marked by structural inequalities and asymmetric power relations. Notably, a translated work accrues formal value and prestige upon publication by a recognized publisher. Indeed, the process of bridging the act of writing in one language and the subsequent dissemination of its translation in another encompasses a prolonged sequence of steps, tasks, and the involvement of multiple stakeholders and institutions, both governmental and non-governmental.

Whenever a targeted action is required, responsibility for executing it rests with an individual or a group, who may either perform the task themselves or delegate it to others. This delegation encapsulates the notion of agency within any organizational process. “The economic theory of agency provides a framework for studying situations in which a person or a group of people delegates the selection of an

action to another individual”(Lambert, 1983, p. 441). Fundamentally, principal-agent theory posits that one party (the principal) engages another (the agent) to complete a specific task but is disadvantaged by information asymmetry, creating challenges in incentivizing the agent appropriately(Broadbent et al., 1996). Core concepts of this theory include contract formation, adverse selection, moral hazard, goal conflicts, information asymmetry, risk sharing, outcome uncertainty, hidden actions, hidden information, agency costs, and agency variables.

### **Statement of the Problem**

Translation Studies (TS) is an emergent field focused on investigating the multifaceted dimensions, typologies, dichotomies, and characteristics of translation. A subdomain within TS concerns the publishing of originally authored works and their subsequent translations. The disciplinary scope may be delimited by geographic contexts; TS is inherently interdisciplinary, intersecting with fields such as sociology and economics. Agency theory, foundational to both these disciplines, is integrated within this research, which is situated within the Iranian context. The principal research issue is therefore identified as the evaluation of the Iranian publishing industry, specifically regarding translated works, through the analytical lens of agency theory.

### **Research Significance**

Agency theory advances organizational analysis through two principal avenues. The first involves the conceptualization of information as a tradable commodity—organizations may invest in information systems to better manage agent opportunism. The second concerns the theory’s implications for risk: organizations operate amidst uncertain futures that may yield prosperity, bankruptcy, or outcomes in between. Organization members (agents) hold partial control over such outcomes. Agency theory thus extends organizational frameworks by highlighting how outcome uncertainty engenders unique risk considerations. The combined impact of outcome uncertainty and differing tolerances for risk should, consequently, inform the construction of agent-principal contracts(Eisenhardt, 1989). The current research applies agency theory to organizational aspects of translated works publishing, thereby extending its relevance to a new domain.

### **Research Questions**

The central research question of the present study is:

***RQ.** Which core concepts of agency theory are most prominently reflected in the professional practices of agents operating within the Iranian publishing industry of translated works?*

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

Translation has long functioned as a fundamental cross-linguistic and cross-cultural practice shaping human communication and intellectual exchange across historical periods (House, 2015). Over time, societies have developed diverse conceptualizations of translation shaped by shifting cultural, political, and epistemological conditions (Gambier, 2018). As an academic field, Translation Studies (TS) emerged as an autonomous discipline initially grounded in applied linguistics and literary criticism, but has since expanded to examine translation simultaneously as a process, a product, and a socio-cultural force (Tyulenev, 2009). Since the 1980s, TS has increasingly incorporated theoretical frameworks from sociology, cultural studies, economics, and political theory, resulting in a markedly interdisciplinary orientation that demands broad

methodological and conceptual competence (Chesterman, 2017). Once regarded as a merely technical skill, translation has now acquired full scholarly legitimacy and epistemic independence, positioning itself as a critical mode of interpreting modern societies and mediating symbolic value across cultures (Buzelin & Baraldi, 2016). Through this mediating function, translation inevitably refracts cultural norms and ideological perspectives of the receiving context, inscribing interpretation even when semantic fidelity is strictly observed (Venuti, 2012).

Agency theory, originating in economic analyses of risk and delegation, provides a powerful framework for examining organizational relationships in which a principal assigns tasks to an agent under conditions of uncertainty (Eisenhardt, 1989; Shaw et al., 2000). The theory assumes rational, self-interested actors characterized by divergent goals, bounded monitoring capacity, and asymmetric access to information, all of which generate what are commonly referred to as agency problems. Agents act on behalf of principals primarily because principals lack sufficient time, expertise, or operational capacity to perform all tasks independently (Dalmácio & Nossa, 2004), yet this delegation simultaneously creates structural vulnerability, as agents may not always act in the principal's best interest (Soudijn & Zhang, 2016). This inherent tension underlies the ubiquity of principal-agent relationships across economic and social life, including employment relations, insurance arrangements, and service provision networks (Barbagallo & Comuzzi, 2008). Central to managing this tension is the contractual form through which control and incentives are aligned. When principals can reliably observe agent behavior, behavior-based contracts predominate; when behavior is difficult to monitor but outcomes are measurable, outcome-based contracts shift performance incentives directly onto agents, albeit at the cost of heightened risk exposure for typically risk-averse agents (Eisenhardt, 1989; Douma & Schreuder, 2017).

Information asymmetry is the foundational condition from which most agency problems arise, manifesting both before and after contractual engagement. Adverse selection occurs prior to contracting when principals cannot adequately verify agents' true competencies or intentions, while moral hazard emerges after contracting when agents exploit monitoring gaps to engage in opportunistic behavior (Barbagallo & Comuzzi, 2008). These dynamics are structurally reinforced by hidden information and hidden action, whereby principals are unable to directly observe critical knowledge or behaviors that shape outcomes (Broadbent et al., 1996). Since principals tend to be relatively risk-neutral while agents are constrained by their limited ability to diversify risk, effective governance requires careful risk-sharing arrangements that balance incentive alignment against outcome uncertainty (Kivistö, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989). As uncertainty intensifies—through market fluctuations, policy interventions, or institutional instability—agency costs inevitably rise, reflecting the increasing expenditure required to monitor performance, enforce contracts, and mitigate opportunism. These agency costs, together with key agency variables such as outcome measurability, task programmability, environmental uncertainty, goal divergence, and relationship duration, ultimately shape the architecture of optimal contracting and the long-term stability of principal-agent relations (Kivistö, 2007).

## **METHODOLOGY**

This section presents a detailed account of the methodological framework adopted for the present study. It begins with a description and justification of the research instrument, followed by a comprehensive profile of the research participant, and concludes with an explanation of the procedures used for data collection

and analytical interpretation. Given the exploratory and theory-driven nature of the study, the methodology is designed to capture in-depth, experience-based insights into the principal–agent dynamics governing the Iranian publishing industry of translated works. The qualitative design allows for analytical depth, contextual sensitivity, and theoretical integration, all of which are essential for examining complex organizational relationships shaped by institutional, cultural, and legal constraints.

## **Instruments**

The study adopts a qualitative, interview-based research design, with data elicited through a structured, theory-informed interview protocol. The interview instrument consists of a carefully reformulated set of questions derived directly from the conceptual architecture of agency theory, including constructs such as principal–agent hierarchy, contract type, adverse selection, moral hazard, information asymmetry, risk sharing, agency costs, hidden action, hidden information, and environmental agency variables. This theoretical anchoring ensures that the interview instrument functions not merely as a descriptive tool but as an analytical probe for testing the explanatory power of agency theory within a real publishing context.

The questions were designed to elicit reflective, experience-based, and decision-oriented responses rather than abstract opinions. The participant was encouraged to ground all responses in concrete professional practice, institutional procedures, and industry-specific realities. This approach enhances the credibility and ecological validity of the findings by linking theoretical constructs directly to lived organizational experience.

All interview sessions were audio-recorded with informed consent to ensure accuracy, completeness, and fidelity to the participant’s exact phrasing. Audio recording also enabled repeated listening during the analytical phase, facilitating deeper interpretive engagement with the data. The recordings were subsequently transcribed verbatim and prepared for systematic theory-driven analysis.

## **Participants**

The study is based on in-depth expert sampling, with the participant selected through purposeful, information-rich case selection. The participant is the chief executive officer of a major Iranian publishing house established in 1976, one of the longest continuously operating publishers in the country. This institution has played a sustained and influential role in the publication of translated literary and non-literary works over several decades.

Academically, the participant holds a Bachelor’s degree in Persian Literature, providing a strong disciplinary foundation in textual, literary, and linguistic domains. Professionally, the participant has accumulated decades of direct managerial, editorial, and contractual experience in the Iranian publishing market. This dual academic–professional positioning grants the participant both insider knowledge of institutional processes and sustained exposure to the structural challenges of translation publishing under Iranian socio-political and legal conditions.

The participant was therefore selected not as a statistically representative case but as an authoritative industry informant, capable of offering high-level insights into contract formation, risk management,

regulatory constraints, agency conflicts, and production–distribution complexities. This mode of elite expert sampling is particularly appropriate for organizational and institutional analysis where depth of insight outweighs breadth of coverage.

### **Data Collection and Analysis**

The data corpus for the present study consists of two complementary sources:

- (1) theoretical data derived from an extensive, critical review of agency theory and its applications in organizational, economic, and governance research; and

- (2) empirical data obtained through the structured expert interview.

The interview was conducted in a controlled professional setting to ensure minimal disruption, maximum concentration, and ethical compliance. The participant responded to each question sequentially, with opportunities provided for elaboration, clarification, and contextual illustration. Follow-up probes were used selectively when conceptual precision or practical detail required further explication.

The analytical process followed a deductive, theory-driven qualitative strategy. The transcribed interview data were systematically examined using the full analytical spectrum of agency theory concepts, including principal–agent relations, contract type, adverse selection, moral hazard, hidden action, hidden information, goal conflict, outcome uncertainty, risk sharing, agency costs, and institutional agency variables. Each segment of the participant’s response was analytically mapped onto one or more of these conceptual categories.

Rather than imposing predetermined judgments, the analysis proceeded through iterative theoretical matching, whereby empirical statements were continuously compared against established agency-theoretical constructs. This process enabled the identification of both direct correspondences and context-specific deviations from classical agency assumptions. The findings generated from this analytical phase were then systematically integrated with the theoretical discussion in the final chapter, allowing for a conceptually grounded interpretation of the Iranian translated publishing industry as a multi-layered agency system.

Ultimately, the dual integration of theoretical literature and expert empirical insight allows the study to move beyond descriptive reporting and toward explanatory institutional analysis, revealing how agency mechanisms are both structurally embedded and contextually transformed within the Iranian publishing environment.

### **DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS**

Analysis of the interview data reveals a clearly hierarchical structure within the Iranian publishing industry of translated works, one that closely corresponds to the core assumptions of agency theory. The participant’s explicit use of the term “respectively” when ranking the actors involved in the publishing process establishes the publisher as the supreme principal, followed sequentially by the translator, author, distributor, and bookseller as agents. This ranking confirms that authority, control, and decision-making power decrease as actors move farther away from the principal. The participant further reinforced this

hierarchical logic by emphasizing the notion of “degree of agency,” explicitly acknowledging that agents positioned closer to the publisher enjoy greater discretion and influence, whereas peripheral agents, particularly those within distribution and retail, operate with limited autonomy.

The contractual structure governing translation production was consistently described as behavior-based and wage-oriented. The participant identified several essential contractual components involving the publisher, translator, and author, all of which are regulated through predefined obligations and monitored performance. The contract type regarded as most appropriate for translation work was identified as a fixed wage contract, confirming that translators are compensated through predetermined payments rather than through revenue sharing. This contractual preference reflects the high level of uncertainty associated with translation quality, market reception, and external regulatory risks.

With regard to adverse selection, the findings show that publishers rely primarily on translators’ professional résumés, previous publications, and reputational standing to assess competence prior to engagement. The participant presented professional background as the principal indicator of credibility and reliability, thereby functioning as the main screening mechanism against incompetence or misrepresentation. However, despite this precaution, the participant acknowledged that risks of misjudgment remain unavoidable.

Issues of moral hazard emerged as a central concern within contractual relationships. The participant emphasized that contracts must explicitly include provisions for handling breaches of obligation, underperformance, or deception on the part of any agent. Both hidden action and hidden information were identified as persistent threats, particularly in the absence of stringent monitoring mechanisms. These risks were further intensified by the structural absence of copyright protection in Iran. The participant explained that in cases of unauthorized reproduction, multiple contracting, or plagiarism, publishers possess virtually no effective legal recourse, thereby creating an environment in which hidden action can occur with minimal institutional deterrence.

The participant also outlined four essential categories of information that must be shared among actors to prevent misconduct and reduce opportunism. These include strategic publishing policies, project-specific characteristics of the work, the general organizational climate of the publishing institution, and the professional norms governing the industry. Each of these informational domains reflects different dimensions of information asymmetry, with deficiencies in any one category increasing the probability of opportunistic behavior and contractual breakdown.

Goal conflict was identified as a structurally embedded feature of the publishing process rather than an exceptional disruption. While divergent objectives among translators, distributors, and financial investors are not inherently destructive, the participant stressed that when such conflicts threaten the publisher’s central objective—namely the successful production and circulation of the book—the process must either be forcibly realigned or terminated entirely. This finding highlights the residual control rights of the principal and confirms the asymmetrical nature of decision authority within the industry.

Risk analysis revealed four major clusters that significantly shape publishers’ decision-making: financial non-return on investment, licensing and distribution permission failures, non-cooperation within

distribution networks, and weak consumer reception. Each risk category corresponds directly to major agency theory constructs, including outcome uncertainty, risk sharing, risk aversion, agency costs, and moral hazard. The heavy concentration of financial and legal risks on publishers was particularly evident, reinforcing their propensity toward conservative, wage-based contracting arrangements.

Four primary factors affecting the final outcome of the publishing process were also identified: the intrinsic quality of the translated work, the effectiveness of distribution, the pricing strategy, and the quality of marketing and promotion. Each factor was theoretically linked to distinct agency mechanisms. For instance, translation quality aligns with outcome uncertainty and moral hazard; distribution quality reflects behavior-based contracting and hidden action; pricing decisions are shaped by agency costs and contractual structure; and marketing effectiveness operates as a risk-reduction mechanism under outcome uncertainty.

Agency costs were shown to permeate all stages of the publishing process. These costs include translator remuneration, editorial and technical production labor, printing and material expenses, and promotional expenditures. The participant explicitly emphasized that excessive agency costs severely constrain task programmability and restrict publishers' capacity for long-term strategic planning, particularly under unstable market conditions.

The participant further identified four critical agency variables shaping the industry's overall functionality: governmental publishing policies, market vitality, publisher professionalism, and reading rates within society. Government policy directly conditions the principal-agent relationship; market growth reduces outcome uncertainty and encourages investment; publisher professionalism increases confidence in success; and societal reading levels shape both demand and risk distribution.

The participant's overall evaluation of the industry's current state was highly pessimistic. The translated publishing sector was described as a structural "lose-lose" system, in which none of the actors—publishers, translators, booksellers, or readers—achieve equitable returns on their investments of labor, capital, or time. This structural deterioration was attributed directly to rising agency problems, weak institutional enforcement, declining public reading culture, and increasing ethical violations driven by opportunism.

Finally, the dominance of governmental cultural policy was identified as an overarching meta-principal force shaping the entire publishing ecosystem. Dependence on state policy orientation, licensing authorities, and shifting cultural agendas substantially amplifies outcome uncertainty and destabilizes long-term agency relationships. The participant stressed that without systemic reinforcement of reading culture and coherent cultural governance, the sustainability of the Iranian translated publishing industry remains profoundly threatened.

## **DISCUSSION**

The present study set out to investigate the Iranian publishing industry of translated works through the conceptual lens of agency theory, with the primary aim of identifying which agency concepts are most prominently manifested in professional practice. The findings provide strong empirical confirmation that the Iranian translated publishing field operates through a dense web of principal–agent relationships in which the publisher clearly occupies the dominant principal position, while translators, distributors, and booksellers function as agents with varying degrees of autonomy. This hierarchical configuration reflects classical assumptions of agency theory regarding authority, delegation, and control (Eisenhardt, 1989; Kivistö, 2007), yet it acquires distinctive features under Iran’s unique legal, cultural, and economic constraints.

A central outcome of the study is the predominance of behavior-based and wage-oriented contracts in the Iranian translated publishing industry. This contractual preference indicates a structural response to severe information asymmetry and monitoring difficulties, particularly in relation to translation quality, originality of texts, and distribution practices. Agency theory predicts that behavior-based contracts emerge when principals believe that outcomes are too uncertain or difficult to measure objectively (Eisenhardt, 1989). The publisher’s emphasis on fixed wage contracts for translators reflects this logic: since translation quality is not perfectly observable *ex ante* and commercial success is unpredictable, publishers seek to minimize exposure to financial risk by fixing remuneration rather than sharing profits. However, this structure also reduces translators’ performance incentives, potentially reinforcing the very quality uncertainties that publishers fear. This dynamic exemplifies the self-reinforcing nature of agency problems within weak institutional environments.

The findings further illustrate that adverse selection is managed primarily through reliance on professional reputation and prior work history rather than through formal certification or standardized evaluation systems. This reliance signals a market in which formal signaling mechanisms remain underdeveloped, compelling publishers to depend on informal networks and accumulated symbolic capital, echoing sociological accounts of cultural production (Bourdieu, 1993; Benmessaoud & Buzelin, 2018). While reputation-based screening may reduce some risks of adverse selection, it simultaneously restricts access for new translators and contributes to partial market closure. Thus, agency theory here intersects with sociological power structures in shaping labor access.

The study also demonstrates that moral hazard and hidden action are persistent and structurally enabled, especially in the areas of unauthorized reproduction, parallel contracting with multiple publishers, and informal subcontracting of translation tasks. These findings are particularly significant in the Iranian context due to the absence of effective copyright enforcement, which fundamentally alters the risk landscape of principal–agent relations. In classical agency environments, legal sanctions constitute a major deterrent to opportunism; however, in the Iranian publishing market, the structural weakness of copyright law removes a critical external governance mechanism, thereby forcing publishers to internalize all monitoring and enforcement costs. This condition substantially inflates agency costs, confirming Eisenhardt’s (1989) proposition that weak monitoring environments lead to escalating transaction expenses and inefficient governance structures.

Goal conflict also emerged as a decisive force shaping publishing dynamics. While publishers prioritize financial sustainability and regulatory compliance, translators often pursue symbolic recognition,



rapid publication, or financial survival, and distributors prioritize turnover speed over cultural value. These misaligned incentives generate constant friction across the production chain. The publisher's authority to suspend or terminate projects in cases of severe goal conflict reinforces the asymmetrical power distribution inherent in the system. From an agency-theoretical perspective, this confirms that principals retain ultimate residual control rights, particularly under conditions of heightened uncertainty.

Risk distribution patterns revealed by the data further underscore the deep vulnerability of risk-averse principals operating under unstable external conditions. The four major risk clusters identified—financial non-return, licensing failure, distribution non-cooperation, and weak market reception—are directly aligned with the agency theory constructs of outcome uncertainty and risk sharing. Publishers, as principals, shoulder disproportionate exposure to these risks, while agents are largely compensated through fixed wages. This asymmetrical risk allocation contradicts the theoretical expectation that risk should be borne by the least risk-averse party (Kivistö, 2007) and instead reflects structural market distortions produced by policy instability, weak consumer demand, and censorship regimes.

Another significant theoretical contribution of the findings concerns agency variables. The participant's classification of publishing policy, market vitality, publisher professionalism, and per capita reading rate directly maps onto the agency variables of environmental uncertainty, task programmability, outcome measurability, and relationship stability. Notably, the extremely low reading rate and market stagnation drastically reduce outcome predictability, intensifying publishers' risk aversion and discouraging long-term relational contracting. Consequently, agency relationships become short-term, defensive, and cost-oriented, which further weakens investment in quality, innovation, and professional development within the translation sector.

The bleak evaluation of the industry as a "lose-lose game" powerfully encapsulates the cumulative effect of interlocking agency failures. From an agency-theoretical standpoint, this diagnosis reflects a systemic breakdown of trust, incentive alignment, and institutional support, where neither principals nor agents can sustainably maximize utility. The prevalence of unethical practices, hidden actions, and hidden information is not merely a matter of individual moral failure but a rational adaptation to structurally defective governance conditions. This finding strongly supports contemporary critiques of agency theory that emphasize the importance of contextual and institutional constraints in shaping agent behavior (Shaw et al., 2000; Soudijn & Zhang, 2016).

Importantly, the study also reveals the expanded role of government as a meta-principal in the Iranian publishing industry. Publishing policies, licensing regimes, and cultural agendas function as external principal forces that impose additional layers of constraint on publishers, who themselves operate as principals toward translators and distributors. This nested agency structure complicates classical principal-agent models by introducing multiple, vertically stacked principals with competing priorities, thereby intensifying monitoring burdens, regulatory uncertainty, and goal conflict across the entire production chain.

Theoretically, this study contributes to Translation Studies by demonstrating how agency theory offers a powerful explanatory framework for understanding translation not merely as a linguistic act, but as an economically embedded organizational practice. By operationalizing agency constructs such as moral

hazard, adverse selection, and risk sharing within the translated publishing field, the study extends sociological approaches to translation (e.g., Buzelin & Baraldi, 2016; Chesterman, 2017) with a robust economic-organizational dimension. Methodologically, the in-depth industry-expert perspective enables a rare insider view of contractual logic, risk distribution, and power asymmetries that remain inaccessible through purely textual or bibliometric approaches.

From a practical standpoint, the findings underscore the urgent necessity for formalized contract standardization, transparent information-sharing protocols, and legal reform—particularly in copyright protection—as structural prerequisites for mitigating agency problems. Without such reforms, publishers will remain locked in defensive governance postures that suppress innovation, weaken translator motivation, and perpetuate low-trust market conditions.

## CONCLUSION

This study demonstrates that agency theory provides a robust framework for understanding the dynamics within the Iranian publishing sector, particularly in relation to translated works. The publisher clearly emerges as the principal figure who orchestrates complex interactions with various agents, including translators, distributors, and booksellers. The degree of agency exercised by these actors correlates positively with their proximity to the principal, emphasizing hierarchical decision-making within the publishing process.

Key concepts such as information asymmetry, moral hazard, adverse selection, and goal conflict critically shape contractual relationships and operational outcomes. The analysis reveals that behavior-based contracts predominate, with wage contracts being the preferred form for translation agreements. However, risks associated with uncertain outcomes, agency costs, and information disparities persist, necessitating active monitoring and strategic management by principals to mitigate opportunism and enhance performance.

Furthermore, external environmental factors, such as inadequate copyright enforcement and cultural policy dependencies, exacerbate agency challenges, heightening risks for risk-averse publishers and threatening the sustainability of agency relationships. The findings underline the importance of explicit contract provisions, transparent communication, and effective risk-sharing arrangements to optimize organizational efficiency and project success in this context.

In conclusion, the integration of agency theory into the analysis of the Iranian translated publishing industry not only elucidates the power asymmetries and contractual complexities inherent in this sector but also offers practical insights for publishers aiming to enhance governance, reduce transaction costs, and ultimately improve the quality and dissemination of translated literary works. Future research may expand upon these insights by exploring genre-specific dynamics and the role of emerging nonhuman agents such as machine translation.

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## Appendices

- افراد دخیل در فرایند انتشار آثار ترجمه‌شده، از جمله نویسنده، مترجم، ویراستار، ویراستار فنی، ویراستار تصویر، ناشر، پخش‌کننده و خواننده را چگونه بر اساس رابطه‌ی کارفرما و کارگزار و به‌صورت از بالا به پایین طبقه‌بندی می‌کنید؟
- چه معیارهایی برای تعیین نقش هر یک از افراد دخیل در فرایند انتشار آثار ترجمه‌شده به‌عنوان کارفرما یا کارگزار در نظر می‌گیرید؟
- از دیدگاه شما، اجزای اصلی یک قرارداد برای انتشار اثر ترجمه‌شده چیست؟
- به نظر شما، چه نوع قراردادی مناسب‌ترین نوع قرارداد برای انتشار اثر ترجمه‌شده است؟
- چگونه اطمینان حاصل می‌کنید افراد دخیل در فرایند انتشار آثار ترجمه‌شده در خصوص ویژگی‌ها، دانش، مهارت‌ها، توانایی‌ها و صلاحیت‌هایی که ادعا می‌کنند، صادق هستند؟
- واکنش شما زمانی که متوجه می‌شوید یکی چند نفر از افراد دخیل در فرایند انتشار آثار ترجمه‌شده برخی از صلاحیت‌های الزامات مورد انتظار را ندارند، چیست؟
- چه نوع اطلاعاتی را لازم می‌دانید میان افراد دخیل در فرایند انتشار آثار ترجمه‌شده به اشتراک گذاشته شود و چه نوع اطلاعاتی را لازم نمی‌دانید؟

□. در صورت وجود تضاد هدف میان افراد دخیل در فرایند انتشار آثار ترجمه‌شده، این تضاد چه تأثیری می‌تواند بر روند کار و محصول نهایی داشته باشد؟

- . چه ریسک‌هایی در فرایند انتشار آثار ترجمه‌شده وجود دارد؟
- . چه عواملی بر نتیجه نهایی فرایند انتشار اثر ترجمه‌شده تأثیر می‌گذارند؟
- . تأثیر اقدام پنهانی بر نتیجه نهایی فرایند انتشار اثر ترجمه‌شده چیست؟
- . تأثیر اطلاعات پنهانی بر نتیجه نهایی فرایند انتشار اثر ترجمه‌شده چیست؟
- . طبقه‌بندی پیشنهادی شما برای هزینه‌های دخیل در فرایند انتشار آثار ترجمه‌شده چیست؟
- . طبقه‌بندی پیشنهادی شما برای متغیرهای عوامل مؤثر بر فرایند انتشار آثار ترجمه‌شده چیست؟
- . با توجه به موارد فوق، وضعیت کنونی صنعت انتشار آثار ترجمه‌شده را چگونه ارزیابی می‌کنید؟
- . چه چشم‌اندازی برای آینده صنعت انتشار آثار ترجمه‌شده متصور هستید؟

۱. به‌ترتیب، ناشر، مترجم، نویسنده، عوامل توزیع مانند پخش و کتاب‌فروشی.
۲. امکانات و سطح عاملیت و تعیین‌کنندگی فرد در جریان انتخاب اثر، ترجمه و نشر و پخش آن.
۳. الف) ناشر.  
ب) مترجم.  
ج) نویسنده.  
د) موارد فیزیکی و مادی مانند کیفیت کتاب، زمان ترجمه و نشر به‌علاوه مبالغ.
۴. قرارداد خرید قطعی اثر ترجمه‌شده.
۵. با مراجعه به سوابق حرفه‌ای ایشان در عرصه‌ای که ادعای توانمندی می‌کند.
۶. مطابق با مفاد مرتبط با تعهدات طرفین مندرج در قرارداد همکاری و عمل می‌کنیم.
۷. الف) سیاست‌های راهبردی مؤسسه انتشاراتی.  
ب) ویژگی‌های اختصاصی اثری که در حال انتشار است.  
ج) اتمسفر عمومی فعالیت‌های انتشاراتی.  
د) قواعد حرفه‌ای صنعت نشر.
۸. تفاوت اهداف دخیل در فرایند انتشار فی‌النفسه تهدید نیست، مگر این که به هدف محوری انتشار اثر آسیب وارد کند که در این صورت باید با مدیریت ناشر رفع، وگرنه جریان انتشار متوقف شود.
۹. الف) بی‌پاسخ ماندن سرمایه‌گذار مالی روی انتشار اثر.  
ب) عدم توفیق ناشر در دریافت مجوزهای متعارف نشر و توزیع.  
ج) عدم همکاری عناصر صنعت پخش و توزیع کتاب.  
د) پاسخ سرد کتاب‌خوان‌ها به اثر پخش‌شده.
۱۰. الف) کیفیت اثر منتشرشده به‌لحاظ رعایت استانداردهای کتاب خوب.  
ب) کیفیت توزیع اثر چاپ‌شده.  
ج) نحوه قیمت‌گذاری کتاب چاپ‌شده.  
د) کیفیت معرفی و تبلیغات کتاب چاپ‌شده.
- ۱۱-۱۲. معمولاً ناشران یا شرکت‌های بزرگ نشر (چه در ایران و چه در خارج از کشور)، یکی از مفاد قراردادهایشان با مؤلف، ویراستار، و مترجم این می‌باشد که متن یا تصویر ارائه‌شده متعلق به او می‌باشد. در صورتی که مشخص شود این متن متعلق به دیگری می‌باشد و یا احیاناً با ناشر و یا شرکت دیگر قراردادی بسته است، کلیه خسارت‌های انجام‌شده را یا هر گونه مجازاتی را باید به عهده بگیرد، سپس ناشر اقدام به چاپ آن متن یا هر کار ارائه‌شده خواهد نمود. در مؤسسه ما هم این ماده از قرارداد انجام خواهد شد. یکی از معضلات به‌وجودآمده در کشور ما نبود قانون کپی‌رایت است که در بعضی از مواقع که این گونه رفتار می‌شود (مخصوصاً در کار ترجمه)، درحال حاضر هیچ‌گونه اقدامی نمی‌توان انجام داد و فکر می‌کنم کلاً این موضوع در هر دو سؤال شما پاسخگو خواهد بود.
۱۳. به ترتیب اولویت به شرح ذیل خواهد بود: حق التالیف نویسنده و ناشر اصلی؛ دستمزد مترجم؛ دستمزد سایر عوامل تولید محتوا، شامل ویراستار، حروفچین، نمونه‌خوان، صفحه‌بند و طراح جلد؛ هزینه‌های فیزیکی کتاب، شامل لیتوگرافی، کاغذ، چاپ، صحافی، بسته‌بندی؛ هزینه تبلیغات و معرفی اثر چاپ‌شده.

۱۴. به ترتیب اولویت به شرح ذیل می‌باشد:

الف) سیاست‌های حاکمیتی نشر کتاب.

ب) رونق بازار نشر و کتاب‌فروشی.

ج) میزان حرفه‌گری ناشر در جریان تولید کتاب ترجمه‌شده.

د) سرانۀ مطالعات جامعۀ هدف.

۱۵. اقتضاح است. یک بازی باخت‌باخت واقعی که در آن، هم نویسنده، هم مترجم، هم کتاب‌فروشی، و هم خواننده نتایج منصفانه‌ای از تلاش خود دریافت نمی‌کنند.

۱۶. دورنمای صنعت نشر آثار ترجمه وابسته به دورنمای فرهنگ عمومی و سیاست‌گذاری فرهنگی دولت‌ها است که در آن، افق روشنی به چشم نمی‌خورد.