# The position of the public diplomacy in Iran-Saudi Arabia relation (2007-2017)

**Abdolkarim Firouzkalaei[1], Madar Karami Chenesnejad[2]**

## Abstract

Iran-Saudi Arabia relation has undergone ups and downs following the Islamic revolution in Iran and several fundamental factors including identity and correlation with superpowers have remarkably influenced the two countries' relation. The influence was most significant in their public diplomacies affecting their relation. Thus, this research studies the role that public diplomacy plays in the Islamic republic of Iran-Saudi Arabia relation. The question, here, is "how public diplomacy influenced Iran-Saudi Arabia relationfrom2007 to 2017?" On the basis of the approach of the research, one could say that the scientific, cultural and media aspects of their diplomacies did not have a positive influence in their relation from 2007 through 2017 and were alongside regional rivalries and ideological challenges. Introducing some organizations related to each country's public diplomacy, the research describes how the organizations affected their relation. The research uses the descriptive-analytic methodology and is analyzed on a soft power frame.

**Keywords:**public diplomacy; the Islamic Republic of Iran; Saudi Arabia; media diplomacy; scientific diplomacy.

[1]. M.A Graduated inregional studies from Islamic Azad University, Chalous branch. Iran (Corresponding Author).  Email: Kalaie2015@yahoo.com
[2]. M.A Graduated of Islamic jurisprudence,Islamic Azad University , Chalous branch. Iran

**Introduction**

Iran-Saudi Arabia relation has undergone a number of ups and downs beyond the Islamic revolution in Iran. Despite geopolitical rivalries and ideological challenges, the two nations have usually had numerous co-operations andnever chosen the military option even in a worst relation looking for their interests via proxy wars and what is the most significant is that public diplomacy has played a vital role in their relation.

Although the Islamic Republic of Iran has constantly used a public diplomacy in unifying Iran and Arab states against Israel, Saudi Arabia's publicdiplomacy has included Iran-phobia and Shiite-phobia alongside the West's interests in the region. This is while both states have worked in various aspects of public diplomacy including the scientific, media and cultural aspects, but both states' public diplomacyhas played a minor role in settling their disputes and misunderstandings; instead, it has intensified them.

Several factors, indeed, come to mind which are closely related to the subject matter but this research tries to analyze the role of public diplomacy in their relation. The question that comes to mind about the issue is "what role did public diplomacy play in Iran-Saudi Arabia relation from 2007 through 2017?" The answer is that in its scientific, cultural and media aspects, it had a positive effect on the states' relation and their regional rivalries and ideological disputes.

In this respect, Karamreza Karamian Habili, and Hengameh Alborzi (2015: 189) considered both states' media diplomacy about the crisis in Bahrain in an article titled "Media way, the challenge of the political sample of Islam related to Iranian Shias and the Saudi Wahabis in Bahrain".

In the article "Education in Saudi Arabia's foreign policy in the Middle East", Morteza Noormohamadi, and Taybeh Mohamadipoor (2016: 139) discussed the position of Saudi Arabia foreign policy in the Middle East explaining how Saudi Arabia demonstrated its own identity via its educational diplomacy.

On this basis, this research focuses on Iran and Saudi Arabia's public diplomacy about their relation in 2007-2017 time span. After presenting the theoretical frame, it introduces the organizations

pertinent to both countries' public diplomacy in various aspects and goes on to the role those organizations play in the states' relation.

**1. Theoretical framework**

A proper theoretical frame for analyzing the role of public diplomacy in Iran-Saudi Arabia relation seems to be based on soft power theories and Joseph Nye's thoughts in this regard.

In this regard, Joseph Nye suggests that power has two-hard, and soft-layers. Military and economic powers as hard powers can force someone to change their positions. Based on reward (carrot) or threat (stick), this kind of power can sometimes be obtained without any tangible reward or threat; this indirect method in obtaining desirable results is known the second feature of power (Soleimani Poorlak, 2010: 24). Accordingly, soft power is versus hard or imperious power (Nye, 2008: 133), and public diplomacy is a means of gaining soft power.

Public diplomacy is not just a public relation but has the responsibility of transferring information and presenting a positive image in attempt for long-run relations to fulfill the objectives of the government's policies. Combining direct governmental information with long-term cultural relations depends on 3 uniform important circles or 3 public diplomacy arenas. The first and nearest circle is daily relations which includes the context and concept of domestic and foreign political decisions. Moreover, the first arena should have the ability to confront crises. In the current information arena, many actors highly hasten to fill information gaps likely following any events. The concept of quick reactivity in general diplomacy implies a quick reaction toward false accuses or falsifying information. This circle is measured per hour, day, and week.

The second uniform arena or circle is strategies relations, holding simple implication, and more like political or propagandistic plans. Such events as the 2010 Shanghai exhibit or the world cup in South Africa are to name a few. The third and most comprehensive arena or circle in public diplomacy, is expanding relations with key elements. For years or even decades, via stock exchanges, exchanging students, curricula, seminars, conferences, and media channels, some 700.000 people have participated in cultural and scientific exchanges in the USA;

exchanges resulting in training such leaders as Anwar alSadat, Helmot Schmitt, and Margaret Thatcher. Each of the three steps in public diplomacy plays a major pole in helping governments in presenting an impressive image of a country who is successful in optimization of hope and facilities for itself to gain desirable objectives (Nye, 2013: 148-150)

According, both states' general diplomacy in different cases influenced by ideological challenges and regional rivalries has numerous effects on their relation and it can also be seen as a means of promoting convergence or intensifying divergence between them in the future; according, a discussion of the role this means plays, follows.

## 2. Iran and Saudi Arabia's diplomacy

A modern sort of diplomacy under focus today is public diplomacy (Hadian, Ahadi, 2009: 90). In this respect, both states have an active public diplomacy in different aspects. Accordingly, several organizations are actively influencing Iran-Saudi Arabia relation.

## 1.2. Iran and Saudi Arabia's cultural diplomacy

Cultural diplomacy is exchanging ideas, information, art and other cultural aspects between nations to improve bilateral understanding and gaining national interests. Cultural diplomacy includes the principles of cultural instruction (Kashavarz, Iran and Saudi Arabia have active organizations that follow.

The fall of the OttomanEmpire made Middle East countries fill their identity and ideological gap with religion. That is why this element plays an important role in creating an identity for Saudi Arabia. What distinguishes Iran and especially its Shia government from the Middle East Arab states is their religious system based on the Wahhabi ideology. After separating itself from non-Arab states including Iran, Turkey and the Zionist regime by means of Arab ethnic identity, Saudi Arabia distinguished among Arabs by reinforcing religion as the main distinctive element (Ekhteyari' Amiri, 2015: 131). In this regard, Saudi Arabia's cultural diplomacy tends to improve the Aahhabi faith and "Rabet Al'alam Al'Islami" is the most important organization founded for the purpose.

This organization was founded due to the bill issued in the Islamic conference in Mecca (1962). The stature say that it is an

Islamic, universal, people –based and non-governmental organization based in Mecca. It is, in fact, one of the largest and most institute in the Islamic world one of the unwritten purposes of which at the time of its foundation was legalizing the Saudi regime by universalizing Wahhabism especially versus the Arabic nationalistic wave developed by Jamal Abdolnasir (SheikholIalami, Saradar, 2012: 118). A main function of the organization, after the Islamic revolution in Iran. Is fighting Shias to help Saudi Arabia control Iran's influence (Sheikh OlIslami, Saradar, 2012:124).

On the other hand, the Islamic revolution dialogue derived from Imam Khomeini's thoughts had a comprehensive reflections at an international level. In other words, the Islamic revolution as a cultural revolution considered in from of definitions suggested by such great theorists as Samuel Hantington and Teda Skachpul is among great revolutions (Ekhteyari Amiri, 2015: 137). The revolution that has a Shiite identity and its main principles and values are fighting imperialism and supporting the oppressed and stablishing the Muslim Ummah. Before the formation of the organization of Islamic culture and communication, about 12 various organizations and societies in abroad users doing cultural activities with the final formation of the Islamic culture and communication organization for centralizing propaganda outside Iran established in 1995 after the legal procedures and the confirmation of its statute by the supreme leader. Its budget and authority were provided in early 1996; it was decided that the cultural parts of departments of culture, Islamic teaching, state as well as the universal society of Ahlol'bait (P.B.U.H) and the taghrib organization (Islamic sects dialogue) be allocated to this organization (Yazdni, Farhang, 2015: 141).

The immense objective of the organization is developing the knowledge of and the belief in Islam, the Islamic revolution and its advantages, and the Iranian –Islamic civilization in other societies to expand and reinforce Islamic convergence. Its most significant mission is managing and guiding cultural relations in a universal span and supporting and handing the Islamic republic of Iran's cultural-propagandistic activities outside the country to fulfill the regime's related objectives (Ashna, Chaboki Darzaei, 2013: 6).

The organization had no role in improving or worsening Iran-Saudi Arabia relation and as usual, it tried to confronting Zionism and diffusing the Islamic revolution's values.

## 2.2. Iran and Saudi Arabia's scientific and technological diplomacy

The most important elements of scientific and technological diplomacy include: science in diplomacy, diplomacy for science and science for diplomacy. In the first stand, the scientific society lets politicians know the latest information about the total forces of social – economic, and natural systems. In this regard, science is used to form and reinforce foreign policy. In the second stand, it facilitates international-scientific cooperation and develops scientific and technological objectives. The next aspect of scientific diplomacy is science for diplomacy. In this regard, scientific and technological cooperation's improves international relation. Before it enters international science literature, science diplomacy was known as intelligent power or soft power (Ghadimi, 2017: 145).

Accordingly, all over the world, scientific diplomacy is known a means of improving foreign policy (Hajjar, 2016). Besides, scientific and technological diplomacy follows purposes of soft power in the frame of international-scientific cooperation's. This interaction provides people with the chance to known the special features of development in Iran. This knowledge results in a positive image and removing negative propaganda against Iran (Sadat Mohseni Sahi, Sadat Mohseni, Sahi, 2015: 111). In this regard, Jamiatolmostafa is a useful organization in the Iranian scientific field.

## 3.2. The two countries' media diplomacy

As mass media entered international relations in the 20th century, especially after world war 2, traditional diplomacy turned into a new phenomenon; something exceptional its kind because media especially satellite – video channels do what the department of state and diplomatic delegations traditionally do, and even in most cases, they act more successfully and efficiently than those organizations so much that today, many politicians believe that one reason for American's defeat in Vietnam was the negative TV cover (Ghavam, 2005:4). Iran and Saudi Arabia have used this tool in the same way.

Saudi Arabia's media diplomacy about Iran can be analyzed in forms of Iran-phobia and Shia-phobia. There are many antitypes of accusing Iran of interfering in Arab states especially in Bahrain.

Saudi Arabia's media dialogue, on the on hand, by accusing Bahraini Shias of cooperating with the so-called Iranian faction, considers Bahrain a scenery by which Iran intends to endanger the region's security and expend its dominance. On the other hand, it mentions Iran's attempt for overthrowing the Al-khalifeh's regime, and in fact, it induces that Iran is determined to over throw the Al-khalifeh's regime and replace it by its own dependent alternative in Bahrain. Moreover, Iran is introduced in Saudi medias as a state who tends to expand insecurity and destabilization in the member countries in the Persian Gulf cooperation council through Bahrain as a gate (Karamian Habili, Alborzi, 2015: 203). In other words, according to Saudi Arabia-sponsored Medias, Tehran seeks anarchy in the Persian Gulf region where most oil resources are and the region is highly important for the USA (Hagood, 2010: 12).

On this basis, Saudi authorities are looking for a brittle power balance with Iran with no desire to confront Iran, so they are trying to fight Iran by means of media in a soft frame a sample of which is the Saudi's revenge against Iran and the "Al'arrabian" Channel belonging to Saudi Arabia as a means of justifying its compromise with the USA and Israel as well as its anti-Iran policy. Being certain of its disability to politically confront Iran, Saudi Arabia is trying to confront it via the Alarabiah channel (Mah Pishanian, 2009).

Reverse Saudi Arabia's media propagations, Iran's media activity is always seeking unity among the region's states against the Zionist regime, a fact that can be traced in the Islamic Republic of Iran's constitution, looking through Iran's foreign strategy, one can see 3 principles:

First, fulfilling Islamic unity based on Islamic joints, and in economic, political, and cultural matters rather than sectarian unity (The Islamic Republic of Iran's constitution, article third, Palestine's phenomenon as the highest priority to the Islamic Republic of Iran (Sadat, 2015: 83).

The matter, after all, is that since the development af Arab nation movements especially the crisis in Bahrain, the Mena

disaster and the attack on Yemen by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition forces, the activity of some medias in Iran have been focused on Saudi Arabia's influential and anarchistic moves in Islam and in the region. "Alalam" is a Persian and Arabic channel in Iran.

Besides this channel, since the uprising in Bahrain, Iran has condemned violence against Bahrain citizens every minute and via its numerous channels and tried to cover the new very well in the whole world. Throughout the crisis, Iran has tried various tools and manners mostly soft ones-in support of opposition groups and for giving up the suppression strategy and the presence of Saudi and Emirati forces (Karamial Habili, Alborzi, 2015: 207).

"The effect of general diplomacy on the two states' relation

The matter is thatthey have fundamental disagreements which trend their general diplomacy finally affecting their relation. Accordingly, the concepts of identity, ideology, international system – structure and both states' structured strategy and their interactions with super powers are among the most important factors affecting their relation.

Concerning interaction with superpowers, Saudi Arabia's coalition with some Western countries including England, and especially the USA cannot be neglected. Besides the Saudi diplomacy is along with that of Western powers about Iran.

### 4.2. Iran-phobia and Shiia-phobia

The concept "Shia crescent" was first suggested by Malik Abdollah– the Jordanian King – in 2004 about the development of a pro-Iranian Shia regime in Iraq. He warned about the formation of a Shia crescent in case the regimes in Iran, Iraq and Syria unified with Hezbollah in Lebanon. After Malik Abdollah, the Saudi king talked of the shiiatizing process of sonnies by Iran. This implies that the west has been successful in developing Iran-phobia and Shia-phobia among Arab leaders and in some Arab societies as well. Meanwhile, Shimon Prezz – the Zionist regime made considerable announcements on Iran's grabbing the world sooner or later (Niakooei, Sotoodeh, 2015: 102).

4, 2 Samples of general diplomacy impacting both countries:

In many cases, general diplomacy has led to tensions in the two countries' relation i.e it impacted the remedy era in their cooperation    reinforcement    and    testified    their    relation    at

Ahmadinejad's administration. Despite Rowhani's trend toward Khatami, the existing situation testified Iran-Saudi Arabia relation.

After all, four periods of Iran-Saudi Arabia relation impacted by identity, and geopolitical developments of behavioral models follow:

1. The first period (the water period):

Domination of an invasive model: Identification of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the point where the Shia Islamic ideology enters Iran's foreign policy and Iraq's invasion against Iran.

2. The second period (Hashemi Rafsanjani's era): Domination of coexistence model: Iran's operationalization, and the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and its impacts.

3. The third period (Khatami's period): Domination of cooperation model: creation of trust at a regional and international levels and expansion of relations with neighbors.

4. The fourth period (Ahmadinejad's period): returning invasive pattern.

4-2-1 Invading Yemen Led by Saudi Arabia

Yemen seems to be among the most vital regional issues in the two countries' relation (Aljazeera, 2015:15). Saudi Arabia invaded Yemen in a coalition of Suni-majority states (Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan, and the UAE) all of whom are members of the Persian Gulf cooperation council except Oman (a major mediator, and the operations are done to reinforce the Saudi leadership, census against Iran and prevent Iran's influence in Yemen (Firoozkalaei, 2015: 171).

Saudi Arabia's best justification for the invasion is preventing Iran's influence in Yemen,and its threat to the Saudi administration, the region and Bab-ol-Mandab strait, In other words, the coalition is made to prevent an instant and vital threat (from the coalition member countries' view) i.e the expansionof Iran's influence (Nejat, Mowsavi, Saremi, 2016: 156).

- **Syria Crisis**

As the crisis in Syria grew up, the regional players picked up a strategy suitable for their own. National interests. Meanwhile, Iran-Saudi Arabia challenge was apparent the most, because despite the crisis subsided in 2014, both states Howe been looking for their own interests in Syria (Dehshiri, Hosseini, 2016: 122).

What Saudi Arabia has done in Syria including activating the Persian Gulf cooperation council and the Arab Union to suppress Asad and predispose the repetition of the events in Libya sponsoring the militias in and outside Syria, Riyadh's cooperation with the regional arrow i.e Qatar, Turkey and Israel, trying to help the Salafi and Wahabi movements in Syria, activating its mass medias including the Alarabiah Channel, and journals such as Ash-Shargh ol-usat, and Alhayat, Summong ; the Saudi ambassador, and the provocative role it played in summoning the Kuwaiti and Bahraini ambassadors to name a few (Dehshiri, Hoseini, 2017: 123).

- **The event in Mina happened in 2015 in Hajj rites**

According to the Saudi government's announcement, about 7500-8500 people died because of thirst, and lack of providences (Raei, 2015: 72). Reversely, Saudi officials accused Iran of arranging and performing the Mina event, and skewing their own official's announcement, they acquitted themselves, on the other hand, showing international hatred toward Iran, they demonstrated Iran tyrant (Farokhi, shahbazi, 2016: 122) while Iranian media accused Saudi Arabia in return.

- **Hanging Sheikh Nemer**

Executing Nemer – the Shia clergyman – by Saudi Arabia on January 2, 2016 had remarkable political and diplomatic consequences (Drum cassac, 2016: 3). In January 2016, Iran – Saudi Arabia relation stopped. Eight days before, Saudi Arabia had executed Sheikh Nemer together with 46 more inmates (Mostly Suni). This was followed by reactions from Iran and some other countries. Besides, there was a large protest around the Saudi embassy in Tehran in which some radicals set fire on the embassy (Ostovar, 2016). The events was testified by the media in both countries.

**Conclusion**

This research studies the role of public diplomacy in Iran – Saudi Arabia relation while has constantly been under tension.

The research suggests that both countries' public diplomacy has been full of tension rather than reducing tension. Their challenges have been more remarkable in the critical west Asia, and about such states as Bahrain, Syria and Yemen.

The truth is that both countries' general diplomacy is influenced by the west creating some crises for Islam and other religions.

Besides, Saudi Arabia's media diplomacy is along with the US general diplomacy in the Middle East including Iran-phobia and Shi-phobia which holds.

5 advantages for the USA and the west:

1. Entensifying Shiia-Sunni challenges.

2. Challenges among the great powers in the region.

3. Creating a rich US weapon market.

4. Preventing economic development in Iran and Saudi Arabia due to the challenges between them.

5. Harnessing Iran without a direct interference.

After all, the Islamic Republic of Iran's general diplomacy is quite reverse that of Saudi Arabia in scientific, and cultural aspects of diplomacy trying to unify Iran and Arab and Islamic countries against the USAand the occupying Zionist regime. In the media aspect, Iran played the same role although sometimes it acted against Saudi Arabia.

All together it can concluded that both countries' general diplomacy has always had negative impact on their relations or at least, it has not improved their relations.

**References**
**1) Persian**
-Ashena, H., Chaboki DarzEI (2013), cultural intelligence and general diplomats, "case study:

-The counsellors of the Islsmic culture and communication organization", the Iranian cultural study quarterly, circulation 6, No 2, p.p 1-22

- Ikhtiari Amiri (2015), "The negative impact of Saudi Wahabism with the dialogue of the Islamic revolution in Iran on the new geopolitics in the Middle East", political though in Islam" quarterly, No.6

-Alwahabiah (2016), please name universities serving Wahabian. Accessible at www.wahabiah. com

- Jamiat Olmostafa Al'alamiah (2017), about us, accessible at www.miu.ac.ir

- Dehshiri M., Hosseini M. (2016), "Regional geopolitics and Iran-Saudi Arabia relation". "foreign relations" quarterly, year 7, No. 1

-Saraei M. (2015), "The bases of supporting injured Hajj is covered by Saudi authorities, "Might Hajj" scientific-propagandic quarterly, year 24, No. 93, p.p 71-82.

-Saudi, I; AlijANI, m (2012), "studying the invasion cycle in Iran-Saudi Arabia relation with the focus on the 2005-2016 interval", the political science quarterly - year 9, No. 22, p.p. 103-129.

- Soleimani poorlak, f (2010), "soft power in the US strategy in the Middle East", Tehran, strategic studies.

- Sadat, I. (2015), "Iran's relation with the Islamic movements in Palestine with the focus on Islamic Jihad movement", year 4, No. 16.

- Sadat Mohseni, F; Sadat Mohseni, H (2015), "The impact of scientific and technological diplomacy on Iran's increasing soft power", Islamic Universitymanagement 9", Year 4, No. 1.

- Sheikol Islami, M.; Sardar, H. (2011), "Leadership model in the Saudi cultural diplomacy, the case study of Al'alam Al'Islami organization", The Islamic world political studies quarterly, year 2, No. 4, p.p. 103-128.

- Farokhi, M. Shahbazi, I. (2016), "Identify Saudi media's psychological operation technicsagainst Iran in Mina event" (The

case study of Al'arabiah, Kalimah, and Ash Sharghol Usat news sites), Basij strategic studies quarterly, year 19, No. 70

- ForghANI, m.M Nikkah Abianeh, I. (2013), "covering news from Bahrain and Syria in the Persian Al'alam Site", culture – communication studies, year 4, No. 22

- Firooz Kalaei, A. (2015), "A study of the main reasons of Saudi-dominated coalition's invasion in Yemen, Regional studies, No. 7.

- Ghavam. A. (2005), "from modern diplomacy to media diplomacy", Law and politics study, No.17, p.p. 7-18.

- Ghadimi, I, (2017), "The diplomatic function of science and technology in Iran and the USA, politics quarterly, circulation 47, No. 1, p.p. 139-157.

- Keshavarz Shokri, A., Bayat, M., Bakhshandeh, K. (2013), "Iran's cultural diplomacy in the Middle East, communication revolution and the necessity of using new tools", culture and communication studies, year 4, No. 23

- Mas'oudi, A. (2009), "T.V channels as a factor influencing a general culture" (The case study of CNN, Aljazirah, and Al'alam in the Persioan Gulf war2), cultural study quarterly, year 10, circulation 3, No. 7

- Morshedi, I. (2009) "A study of Al'arabiah channels' media functions", accessible at:
www1. jamejamonline. ir

- Mansoori Moghadam, m. (2012), "Identity factor and its impact on Saudi Arabia's foreign policy toward Iran", Majlis and strategy quarterly, year 19, No. 72.

- Mahpishanian, M. (2009), "The shadow of fighting Shia and Iranophobia in the war on Yemen part 1, accessible at: www. hawzah. net.

- Noormohamadi, M., Nohamadipoor, T. (2016), " The position of educational diplomacy in Saudi Arabia's foreign policy in the Middle East", Jihan Islam political study, year 5, No. 19

- Nye, J. (2011), "The future of power", translated by Ahmad Azizi (2013), Tehran, Ney publication

- Nejat, S. A., Mowsave, R., Saremi, M. (2016), "Saudi Arabia and Iran's strategies on the crisis in Yemen", International relation studies quarterly, year 9, No. 33

- Nye, J. (2018), "Power in the information age from realism to globalization", translated by Mirtorabi (2008), Tehran: Strategic studies center.

- Niakouei, A., Sotoodeh, A. A (2015), "The nature of Saudi Arabia's Strategy toward Iran in Syria, and Iraq's challenges", Inghilab Islami scientific and research quarterly, year 4, No. 17, p.p. 95-110.

- Wikipedia (Jan. 24, 20), Al'arabiah accessible at http://fa.wikipedia.org.

- Habili Karamian, K. Alborzi, H. (2015), " Media wars: The challenge of political Islam based on Shiism in Iran and the pattern based on the Saudi Wahabian in Bahrain", political and international studies quarterly, No. 24.

- Hadian, N., Ahadi (2009), "The conceptual position of general diplomacy", the international quarterly of foreign relations", year 1, No. 3, 85-117.

- Yazdani, A., Farhang, M. (2015), "The role of cultural organizations play in providing global peace: the case study of the Islamic culture and communication organization, cultural relation, the Islamic culture and communication organization, year 1, No.2, p.p. 133-151.

**2) English**

-AlJazeera. (2015). Power Imbalance: Iran's Gains, Saudi's Challenges.Retrieved fromhttp://www.studies.aljazeera.net/en/

-drum cussac. (2016).Saudi Arabia and iran-the escalation in tensions. Retrieved from http://www. drum-cussac.com

- hajjar.d. (2016).whant to ease tensions in the middle east?science diplomacy can help, retrieved from

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/06/27/want-to-ease-tensions-in-the-middle-east-science-diplomacy-can-help

-hagood.a.(2010).Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Tale of Two Media.Arab Media and Society. Issue 10.Retrieved from

http://www.arabmediasociety.com

-ostovar.a. (2016). Sectarian dilemmas in iranian foreign policy:when strategy and identity politics collide,retrieved from

http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/11/30/sectarian-dilemmas-in-iranian-foreign-policy-when-strategy-and-identity-politics-collide-pub-66288

-raza.f. (2016). Tensions in Iran-Saudi Relations and Future Prospects. Institiute of strategic studies. Retrieved from

http:// www.issi.org.pk