



Political Developments in Iraq, from the Second Persian Gulf War to the Fall of Saddam

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Abstract:

In July 1990, Iraq's all-out attack to Kuwait and occupation of this oil-rich emirate not only surprised the analysis's and observers of international issues especially after the failure of Saddam's regime in long-lasting war with Iran, but also forced the states of the world and international community to show direct interference and reaction in this crisis. The battle that is undoubtedly the biggest battle of the twentieth century after the Second World War in terms of equipment and allies. Why Saddam Hussain took such insane action after the failure in war with Iran is the question still discussed and analyzed by the thinkers of international political studies. Some believe that the green light from the US government to Saddam's regime, like the green light of the US to attack against Iran, encourage him to take this action so that the US could intervene more in the region and especially in the Persian Gulf under the excuse of supporting the dependent and dominated states, and make this intervention legally and definitive. It is while there is another theory with a stronger argument. Therefore, in this article we intend to investigate the political developments in Iraq, from the Second Persian Gulf War to the fall of Saddam.

Keywords: Saddam, The Second Persian Gulf war, Political developments, Resolution, America

Introduction

In the wake of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran in 1980, the United Nations and the Western Government, particularly the United States of America, not only did not oppose it, but also supported the regime by providing a

variety of equipment and advanced military weapons to Saddam. Because the Western, like Saddam, considered the theocracy emerged in Iran as a serious threat. However, in 1990 when Saddam Hussein invaded Ku-

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wait to achieve his development goals, America and the Western Governments did not welcome this action. Therefore, they immediately announced their opposition by condemning Saddam and issuing a resolution against the Baath regime, then responded to the Saddam's arbitrary action by their military operation.

After the September 11th, the United States considered Saddam as a potential risk. Since Saddam's had not acted according to the principles considered by the US authorities, the US decided to dominate Iraq by all means, especially through force and violence and thereby change the behavior of the Iraqi government in international arena. On the other hand, Saddam Hussein was ruling in Iraq by force and violence and he was an authoritarian ruler, so his opponents at Iraq and especially abroad, knew the Baath regime lacks political legitimacy and trying to overthrow it. The Iraqi rebels always asked other countries, particularly Western governments, not to consider Saddam Hussein's regime as the representative of the Iraqi people and thus helped the opposition groups to overthrow the regime.

Finally, when America and the Western Governments found that inspecting the mass destruction weapons and similar politics in Iraq has not necessary efficiency and deterrence, they considered changing the regime in Iraq as a strategic necessity.

At the beginning of this chapter, the events in Iraq since the invasion of Kuwait until the military attack of America and its allies to Iraq and the fall of the Baath regime are discussed. In the meantime, the role of Iraqi rebels and their activities, particularly Shia groups, to overthrow Saddam Hussein are explained. In the end, the reasons for the invasion of coalition forces to Iraq and internal factors of Saddam's overthrow have been examined.

The Second Persian Gulf War

As mentioned in the previous section, the main political activity of the Shiites in Iraq gained momentum and more mobility after Iran's Islamic Revolution. At the same time, Saddam Hussein expelled many Iraqi Shiites from Iraq. However, due to the special circumstances of Iran's Islamic Revolution and its place in the global and regional order, the immigrant Shiite Iraqi were in minority and exile and found Iran as their only patron. In other words, the supports of regional and international powers from Saddam, the regional Sunnis' confrontation with the Shiites protected by regional and international powers, and finally the position of Saddam at the Arabs' spearhead of coping with the Persians led the immigrant Shiites in Iran to feel lonely and consider Iran as their only patron. Nevertheless, Iraq's military invasion of Kuwait has changed the international community's insight toward Saddam and the Baath regime. (Interview with Noorian, 2007)

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait by Saddam or the Second Persian Gulf War began with Iraqi troops' attack to Kuwait in August 2, 1990 due to territorial disputes between Kuwait and Iraq based on the Iraqi authorities' historical claims and rejecting it by the rulers of Kuwait. (Jafari Valdani & Haghshenas Kashani, 1993) One of the most important reasons for the invasion of Kuwait by the Baath regime is the participation of the United States in the Iraqi imposed war against Iran in order to undermine Iran's military power and arming Iraq with the most advanced weapons and facilities. Because this action of America formed the unbridled, power of Iraq in the region and would end the rule of the regional balance of power strategy in the Persian Gulf. (Sadeghi, 2001, p. 130) According to the Saddam Hussein's performance, the United States government had come to be-

lieve that with advanced military weapon and facilities and keeping the claim to leadership of the Arab world in his mind, he has undoubtedly more development plans and will not suffice to Kuwait, but also seeks to achieve oil-rich resources by invading other countries in the region. (Valizadeh, 2004, p. 15)

Operation Desert Storm

Immediately after the occupation of Kuwait by the Baath regime, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 660, condemned this action, and called for full withdrawal of Iraq. Disregarding the resolution, Saddam continued the occupation of Kuwait. In contrast, UN Security Council Resolution began economic sanctions against Iraq on the sixth August 1990 through the Resolution 661 (www.did.tisri.ir). In addition to extensive diplomatic efforts and gaining the support and cooperation of the UN Security Council to pass multiple resolutions such as Resolution 678, known as "the last chance resolution", under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in the form of a grand coalition of thirty-two countries, the government of George Bush Sr. on January 17, 1991 started air, sea and land widespread attacks against the occupying regime of Iraq called "Operation Desert Storm" (Emami, 1993, p. 109). Finally, the operation has no result but Saddam's defeat of the allies and the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. (28 February 1991) (Karimi, 2003). By the end of Operation Desert Storm and Baathist regime 'defeat, America cut off diplomatic relations with Iraq and shut down its embassy in this country. (Kayhan newspaper, July 9, 2004)

Several goals can be noted for Operation Desert Storm by the United States, including the following:

- Liberation of Kuwait and declaring the commitment of the United

States to maintaining the integrity and security of friend countries in the region

- Supporting the stability and peace in the region and contribution to the peaceful settlement of disputes between countries in the region
- Bringing an end to the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad and setting up a moderate, peaceful government instead. However, this goal was not followed by the Americans according to the following considerations.

US government and President George Bush (father) have repeatedly called for the Iraqi people's uprising against the Baathist regime and its overthrow and provoked the opposition groups and the people of this country regarding to (Hayat-e-no Newspaper, 21/4/2002). On the other hand, the Iraqi army had been severely defeated and weakened in the Operation Desert Storm. In such circumstances and given the promise of America to support the popular uprising against the Baathist, the Iraqi people found the opportunity and believed that they can use it to overthrow Saddam. Therefore, they launched a nationwide uprising held by Kurds in the north and by Shiites from the south. The Shiites and Kurds, who were fired from Iraq by Saddam after the Islamic Revolution, immediately returned to Iraq and joined the Iraqi people. (Interview with Noorian, 24/4/2007)

This movement, which was quite popular and spontaneous, started from Basra, and could capture 14 provinces in a short time. The Kurds could get the right to establish an autonomous Kurdish government of Saddam under the support of America and Britain. As a result, they refused continuing armed insur-

rection and cooperation with the Shias (Gunter, 2003, p. 9). Nevertheless, the Shiites continue to fight until they could advance to thirty kilometers of Baghdad. However, this uprising, known as the "Intifada Shabania", ended with the massacre of hundreds of thousands and eventually defeat of the militants. As a result, again many Kurds and Shiites flooded to Iran.

It was occurred while America left the rebels despite its indirect support of the uprising, and gave the failed army of Saddam the opportunity to suppress the uprising by a variety of weapons and massacred the Shia (www. Aftabnews.ir). Because the Bush administration had concluded that, there would be no alternative for Saddam in case of the Baath regime's collapse. At the same time, supporting the Shiites in such circumstances may lead to form a government with the Shiite leadership. America feared that the religious extremist groups can gain power in Iraq and the experience of Iran's Islamic Revolution might be repeated in Iraq that could strengthen Iran's position in the region and especially toward America (East newspaper, 14/2/2004). Meanwhile, some Arab countries that were terrified of the Shiites' power resorted to America and wanted George Bush to keep Iraqi Shiites away from power. Overall, the Iraqi Shiites' power was unpleasant for the US and its allies in the region and that is why they found a weak Baathist regime better than the Shiite government. They also let Saddam Hussein suppress the Shia in south of the country under the pretext of a lack of intervention in the internal affairs of Iraq. (Blackwell, 2009, pp. 376-380)

America's decision for leaving and abandoning the Shiites causes public resentment and distrust toward George HW Bush, and US because they felt betrayed by that Americans during the 1991 uprising. In contrast,

due to the intimate relations between the Shiites of Iran and Iraq since ancient times, many Shiites have the religious feeling that Iran always takes care, protects Iraq, and helps the Shiites in the crisis (Matin, 2004, François, 2000: p. 94). Before the start of the intifada, by the defeat of Saddam Hussein in Operation Desert Storm and the supposed overthrow of the Baathist regime by US forces and English, the Islamic Republic of Iran took the opportunity and sent the Iraqi Kurds and Shiites in Iran to their country in order to finally reach the intifada together with other people and thus provided military equipment. As mentioned, the intifada was crushed by the policy change of the Western countries and unleashing Saddam to use weapons. After the failure of the Iraqi people, Iran tried to condemn Saddam's crimes through its positions against the Iraqis massacres. In addition, the Iraqi displaced Kurds and Shiites returned to Iran and the Islamic Republic welcomed them. (Interview with Noorian, 24/4/2007)

Activity of Iraqi Opposition Groups

Authoritarian and repressive policies of Saddam Hussein during the rule of Baath Party in Iraq always made Iraqi opposition groups both inside and outside the country; makes try to as much as possible for the overthrow of the Baathist regime. This group included the Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds and small groups such as Turkmen and Assyrian, and each made their efforts in this regard. Among them, the Shiites were the greatest and most powerful Iraq's opposition group living inside Iraq and in other countries such as Iran, America, Britain and some Arabic countries.

After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait that was as an important factor in the development of a gap between the two longtime allies, Saddam and the Baath party with the

United States (Kazemi, 2004, p. 62) the international community's insight toward Saddam was changed to the anti-Iraqi. So on the one hand the conditions were provided for non-Shiite rebels in Iraq (it means their Shia religion was not the basis of their movement, like Chalabi and Allawi and the Kurds) so that they could step in line with the global movement against Saddam and the new order being formed by the US after the collapse of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, America also tried to establish a relationship with the Iraqi opposition to limit to the maneuverability Saddam Hussein. But the Shiites initially failed to be aligned with Europe and America and other countries standing against Iraq because of their special features and dependence or adhesion to the Islamic Republic of Iran. They even failed to have a close relationship with Arabic countries opposed to Saddam like Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Kuwait. This situation continued until the Americans found that the power and influence of the Shiite groups like SCIRI in Iraq is very impressive and so they tend to be associated with them. (Interview with Noorian, 24/4/2007)

Initially, the focus of America's engagement with opposition groups in the period before the fall of Saddam Hussein was Ahmed Chalabi as one of political figures in Iraq. He had a liberal-democratic tendency and he was a technocrat (Baladaji, 2004, p. 47) and formed Iraqi National Congress in 1992 in London funded by the CIA, in order to establish a relationship between opposition groups and the government of America aiming to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein. Trust and reliance of America on Chalabi was as far as many pundits consider him as the main option of America as an alternative to Saddam in Iraq, and called him "Iraqi Karzai". The congress that the Americans are

optimistic for its performance to create the necessary coordination between the opposition groups in order to overthrow Saddam Hussein had gradually lost its efficiency and prosperity. (Baladaji, 2004, p. 47)

In addition to establishing the National Congress, providing End Game scenario to the Clinton's administration was another action of Ahmad Chalabi launched in November 1993 on how to overthrow Saddam's regime. In this plan, the limited uprising of Kurd and Shiite forces in the oil-rich regions around Basra in the south, and Mosul and Kirkuk in the north had been predicted, so that military commanders would begin widespread riots with initial looking at the uprising against Saddam and they would sweep away Saddam's regime and bring a government to power in Baghdad under the control of the Iraqi National Congress which is a friend of Washington and the Tel Aviv. The plan is based on the belief that Iraq is ready to revolt and no unit of the Iraqi armed forces would not fight to preserve the regime. Limited efforts to implement the "End game" scenario in 1995 ended catastrophically with the massacre of one hundred fighters of the Iraqi National Congress. Since that time, the CIA and the Intelligence Agency considered Chalabi as a "persona non grata". (Long, 2004). Therefore, America tried to start negotiation and communication with the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq as one of the two major groups representing Islam in the context of Preliminary meetings of London Conference in order to create unity and integration among the opposition. (Kazemi, 2004, p. 62) The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, especially since 1998, dispatched its delegations to different parts of the world in various periods for negotiations and talking to US officials. Interactive policies of the Shiites with American

government will be discussed in detail in the fifth chapter. (Interview with Noorian, 24/4/2007)

Apart from the efforts of Chalabi and his Western supporters to overthrow Saddam Hussein, other group and meta-group activities and actions of the opposition in different conferences, especially over the past decade, were needed to provide a good context for the fall of the Baathist regime and the formation of new government. In this regard, the turning point of interaction between Islamic opposition, particularly the Shiites, with other groups is after the Islamic Revolution. After the Islamic Revolution and increased pressure of the Baathist regime on the rebels and their departure from Iraq and also increased level of their activity, these groups held several conferences that the most important ones are: The conference on assisting the people of Iraq (1986), the formation of the Supreme Council in the Islamic Republic and its declaration as the self-styled and exiled state (Tehran, 1982), establishment of the joint action committee of Iraqi forces in Damascus (December, 1990), Beirut general preliminary Congress after the 1991 uprising of the Iraqi people (March 1991), the Congress on assisting the people of Iraq (Tehran, 1991), the Congress of rebels in Vienna (June 1992), the Congress of Shaqlavieh and Salah al-Din that was the Prologue of the Iraqi National Congress (September, 1992), formation of the Iraqi National Congress (October 1992), formation of the Coordinating Committee of two Islamic and National Arabic movements in Damascus (December 1992), meeting in Washington that took place with a smaller number of groups (2002), London Conference (December 2002), Erbil meeting (January 2003). These conferences were held mainly with the cooperation of countries such as America, Syria, Britain, Iran and Kurdis-

tan Regional Government during the last two decades.

Overall, despite all the moves carried out by the Iraqi opposition groups, neither the regional nor the internal forces could not overthrow the dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein. Finally, they were successful with the involvement of other international actors, under the pretext of fighting terrorism. The major grounds of the Iraqi opposition groups' inability in toppling Saddam's regime can be summarized as 4 following items:

1. Weaknesses within the structure of the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Shiites
2. Structural features of the former regime based on Baathist ideology and special culture of the Iraqi elites
3. Requirements of national interests of the countries in the region and the concerns of some of them about an insecure Iraq without Saddam
4. Changing conditions of the International system with a focus on strategic imperatives and the hegemony of America. (Baladaji, 2004, pp. 177-186)

UN special inspectors

With the defeat of Saddam Hussein in Operation Desert Storm and withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, America signed a series of bilateral military treaties with each of the Persian Gulf basin countries and officially declared that US policy in the Persian Gulf will be pursued based on the strategy of "Dual containment". Thus, the US government would reduce the power of Iran and Iraq in the region through the control and containment of these two countries and make their threats to its interests ineffective. (Pour-

saed, 2004) The basic elements of this policy included that firstly, both Iraq and Iran had come out of war and both were extremely weak, so there was no need for each other to be contained by another, but America could contain both easily. Secondly, America's previous policy was maintaining the balance of power that led to an increase in the strength of both or one of the two countries that took the authority and monopoly of the Control of weapons of mass destruction from America and relevant international organizations, while America could contain both Iran and Iraq through the policy of dual containment using existing legal regimes or setting new monitor and control systems on the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Thirdly, in the theory of maintaining balance of power between Iraq and Iran, other powers and regional and international unions, including the power of Arabic countries of the Persian Gulf or the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, were less manageable. However, in the strategy of dual containment, all these elements were coordinated under a US administration alongside US forces in the region. America also would reduce the reliance and pressure on its military and political forces. (Soleymani, 2003)

Following the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution and the policies of George Bush (father) in the case of Saddam Hussein's regime, special inspectors were sent to monitor economic sanctions and disarmament of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Also, the Saddam regime was seriously weakened with the formation of the special protected area for the support of the Kurds in northern Iraq (who had collaborated with US forces against the Baath regime during the war in Kuwait) and with the creation of no-fly zone in southern Iraq, and also strict controls on the movement of Baathist regime

troops inside Iraq. So the main element in the policy of sanctions against Iraq was Oil-for-Food Program, the continuing process of investigation and disabling the WMD in Iraq by UN inspectors and establishing two no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq in order to prevent from killings the Shiites and Kurds. In addition, the sanctions of United Nations against Iraq were the key factor for the oil industry downturn. Iraq's proven oil reserves was estimated 112 billion barrels and its potential reserves was about 220 billion barrels that would compete with Saudi Arabia reserves in case of exploration. (Pour-saed, 2003)

However, this regime disrupted has the inspections under difference excuses, called for the removal of sanctions to cooperate with the inspectors, and made any cooperation conditional on the removal of economic sanctions. (Emami, 1993, pp. 71-72) It was continued until 31 October 1998 when Iraq ended all cooperation with the UN special commission (UNSCOM) to monitor weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and refused to cooperate with the United Nations inspectors. As a result, the United Nations inspectors withdrew from Baghdad. When the UNSCOM inspectors withdrew from Iraq, the United States and Great Britain forces started the operation "Desert Fox" from 16 to 19 December 1998 in order to destroy nuclear, chemical and biological weapons development program in Iraq, and thus bombed some areas. (Hamshahri Diplomatic, 2004) Although the operation heavily damaged the Iraqi military and intelligence system, in practice, Iraq, or in other words Saddam Hussein, showed off his power in the face of US containment plan. With the failure of Operation Desert Fox in achieving its military goals in 1998, the policy of dual containment was questioned at the end of the administration of

Clinton, because at this year, the Iraqi regime prevented from continued monitoring of the United Nation and stood against the military threats of America. (Soleymani, 2003) In November 2000, Tariq Aziz, Saddam's deputy, also still rejected fresh proposals for UN weapons inspection. In contrast, the United States and Britain bombed Iraq in February 2001 to disable Iraq's air defense network.

After 11 years of sanctions against Iraq by the United Nations, the Organization replaced smart sanctions on the May 14, 2002. Accordingly, more civilian goods were allowed to be imported to Iraq, but more limitation were applied on the goods with dual use.

Finally, in August 2002, Iraq invited the UN chief weapons inspector to restart negotiations on the resumption of weapons inspection. It was occurred just weeks after the failure of United Nations' negotiations to convince Iraq to return the weapons inspectors. Because of negotiations, the UN weapons inspectors to the returned to Iraq after a long time in January 1998. The inspections that were performed by the "United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission" headed by Hans Blix and supported by the United Nations Security Council resolutions were considered as the last chance Iraq should prove the lack of weapons of mass destruction or disarm itself. Hans Blix negotiated for two days with Iraqi officials. The first group that arrived in Iraq first established the offices and residence of inspectors and the number of inspectors reached to 80 people gradually. Inspectors were set up for the first time in the cities of Mosul and Basra.

In November 2002, the United Nations Security Council issued the resolution 1441, warned the Iraqi government to cooperate with international inspection commission led by Hans Blix, and publishes the list of all weapons of mass destruction; otherwise, se-

rious consequences will be followed. Iraq immediately accepted the terms of resolution and the international inspectors resumed their work in Iraq.

During the eight years of inspections by the United Nations between the years 1991 to 1998, Iraq clearly deceived the inspectors and disrupted their work. On the contrary, the inspector has been benefited from the firm and unanimous support of the UN Security Council and got quite fresh authorities. For example, they could "immediately, unrestrictedly and unconditionally" inspect any place, including all palaces of Saddam Hussein. The inspectors for the first time were allowed to send out the witnesses and their family so that they can present their evidence without fear of reprisal.

(<http://71.18.210.116/matn/matn000751.htm>)

During the 13 years of economic sanctions on Iraq, more than one million Iraqis babies were died due to the lack of access to medicines, sanitary materials and equipment and many died from starvation. The sanction, the destruction of economic infrastructures in the air attacks of US and its European allies, and cutting off oil exports except for a limited amount exported based on the United Nations program in return for food and medicine, all ruined Iraq. (<http://www.dowran.ir>)

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441

The UN Security Council approved Resolution 1441 on 8 November 2002 unanimously. Resolution 1441 was the outcome of a series of attempts made by the United States for convincing the public opinion of America as well as International community in order to prepare the ground for military action against Iraq and changing the government. In other words, the resolution is important as the reflection of the efforts made by US and its

allies in the international arena. (<http://www.bagherpour.persianblog.com>)

The above resolution mentions introductory statements and points out the history of the efforts taken by the UN Security Council to issue several resolutions on the situation of Iraq since 1990 so far, after that provides that Iraq's failure to comply with previous resolutions of the Security Council and its attempt to expand weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles is considered a threat to international peace and security. The Council also regretted that the Iraqi government, despite commitments under Resolution 687 (1991) didn't provide the programs related to the development of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles (with a range of more than 150 km) and equipment related to the production of nuclear weapons and other programs not accurately, and also this country repeatedly disrupts the job of UNSCOM and IAEA and finally stopped all cooperation with these two organizations in 1998. In addition, although UNMOVIC, pursuant to Resolution 1284 (1999), was created as the successor to UNSCOM, according to the members of the Security Council, the Iraqi government has refused to cooperate with the commission. Violation of the treaties related to fighting against terrorism, no repression of the people of Iraq, cooperation with international humanitarian organizations to access deprived people in Iraq to these organizations and the release of prisoners from Kuwait and other countries is among other issues considered by the council.

Therefore, the council decided to guarantee the conformance of the Iraqi government from their previous commitments (pursuant to Resolution 687 and other relevant resolutions) without any conditions. In this way, the effective activity of UNMOVIC as an alternative to UNSCOM) and the IAEA to im-

plement Resolution 687 and other relevant resolutions is necessary and essential. (Bagherpour, 2004)

The Iraqi government on December 7, i.e. one day before the deadline set by Resolution 1441 of the UN Security Council to provide a complete list of their forbidden military activities, provided a list of twelve thousand pages of information with CDs to the authority of the UN. Baghdad confirmed that the list contains all the Iraqi military activities to build weapons of mass destruction in the past and includes new points as well, again emphasized that they have no weapons of mass destruction. In addition, Hessem Mohammed Amin, the Iraqi authority to monitor the activities of UN weapons inspectors, stressed that Iraq possesses no weapons of mass destruction in a news conference in Baghdad.

According to the United Nations Security Council, weapons inspectors are allowed to analyze the Iraq's declaration about its weapons before the copy it received by the Security Council members. Hans Blix, Chairman of the Weapons Inspectors Board in Iraq, before the introduction of the list, said that he is waiting to receive new information from the Iraqis about the use of dual-use military and civilian equipment. In contrast, Mohammed al-Douri, Iraq's representative in the United Nations, declared that this document contains no new information about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. (Institute for Cultural Studies and Research in International, Abrar Moaser, Tehran, 2003)

The failure of inspectors and plan of attack

In February of 2003, Colin Powell, Secretary General of the United States, at a General Conference in front of the United Nations meeting announced that international inspector's board has failed to disarm Iraq. America

and the UK announced that they intend to draft a resolution to the Security Council, which allows military attack on Iraq to disarm this country. Some permanent members of the Security Council, such as France, China, Russia and Germany have already announced their opposition to such legislation. However, President Bush declared that America has decided to disarm the Iraqi government and establish freedom in the country. (Amini, 2003)

A short review on the decision by America to attack Iraq can suggest that it was difficult to tolerate the Baathist regime for policymakers in Washington following to September 11 and the new unprecedented threats for the security and interests of America, also due to the black history of Iraqi regime in using the weapons of mass destruction in the war with Iran and even the use of weapons against the Iraqi people in Halabja. On the other hand, the inefficiency of the economic sanctions on Iraq after more than a decade has been proven and repeated attempts to overthrow the Iraqi regime of Saddam by opposition groups from inside was unsuccessful. Accordingly, American military strategy was upgraded from the containment of Saddam to the overthrow of Saddam, and the new administration of George W. Bush clearly declared the approach of regime change for Saddam even by resorting to military force and attempted to win the support of regional countries to attack Iraq. (Iranian Embassy in Doha, 2003, pp. 54-57) In this regard, America announced the need to combat terrorism through extensive and high-volume advertisement and particularly stated that all countries should accompany the United States in the fight against terrorism. Therefore, whoever is not with us is with the terrorists. (Gharasooei, 2005) Since early in March 2003, it was revealed that the Penta-

gon is preparing for the invasion of Iraq. European countries' opposition and the massive anti-war protests in many countries did not dissuade the United States' decision to invade Iraq. In mid-March, inspectors of the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq were recalled. On March 17, 2003, George W. Bush gave Saddam Hussein 48 hours to leave Iraq or be prepared for a military attack. In response to the message, Saddam Hussein said that we would never leave Iraq. Finally, on the evening of 20 March, missile attack of America and Britain began in Iraq. (Amini, 2003)

Here, the question arises that on which thinking the United States required itself to the invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of the Baathist regime. This goes back to the neo-conservative foundations, which are already the thinking governing the structure of the US government and the US military attack on Iraq is originated from this idea. In the following, the foundations of neo-conservatism in the United States are briefly mentioned.

Neocons

Epistemological and theoretical foundations of the American Neocons should be addressed in the ideas of Leo Strauss. Leo Strauss, the contemporary and late political philosophers of the United States fled to the US with some of the prominent German Jewish intellectual community like Neumann, Arendt, and Marcuse after a brief stop in England during the tyranny of Hitler's Germany. Strauss, who was born in a Jewish fanatic family, after immigrating to the United States, established one of the world's most powerful Political Thought circles at the University of Chicago together with Hannah Arendt.

Strauss is known as the inspiring teacher of neo-conservatism in the United States.

Neocons were inspired by Strauss's book "on dictatorship" and decided to undermine all the world's authoritarian regimes. In this book, Strauss denounces the malpractice democracies and says that the military power is needed and a lot of personal freedom should be sacrificed in order to overcome tyranny. He believes that the United States embodies power, ethics and civilization and the anti-Americans such as the Europeans are either deceived or dangerous invaders. According to Strauss, diplomacy and compromise act loosely, because they undermine freedom and strengthen tyranny, relativism and chaos. Therefore, survival needs military dominance on various threats. The thoughts of Strauss bequeathed the ideology of fear for the first generation of the American Neocons.

But the fear that trapped the American Neocons by the events of September 11 opened a new window to US foreign policy and its outcome can be evaluated in the new doctrine of Bush called preemptive attack. Senator Joseph Biden, Senior Senator of Democrat Party in the US Senate Committee for International Affairs, has explained the preemptive attack as follows: "The right to preemptive military action against an imminent threat has been always a part of US foreign policy and should be remained, but the important point is that the Bush administration and Neocons have converted the right from a necessary choice to a new doctrine with no specific definition." Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy of Defense Secretary and the mastermind behind the invasion of Iraq and also the Neocons member of the project "A project for the New American Century", explains the importance of the September 11 as below: "I think the Lesson of September 11 was that even if you are not ready for action based on questionable information, you have to take action later that used to be the means

of horrors for the country. If we had gone to war in Afghanistan to deal with Osama bin Laden in the year 2001 or 2000 or 1999 and said that the reason for our war is 3000 dead people in New York, then people would say that you have no evidence. But September 11 taught that we shouldn't wait until the documents reach the truth." The opponents of the Neocons' doctrine are Joseph Nye, one of famous political experts; Kissinger, the old US politician; and Michael Elliot, the popular writer of Time magazine who described the risks and weaknesses of this strategy. (Mestkin, 2004)

Bush's National Security Doctrine

The history of intervention policy of America in other countries returns to the Monroe Doctrine in the early twentieth century, stating that no country has the right to intervene in Latin America. Woodrow Wilson, twenty-eighth President of America (1913-1921) in the first year of his presidency issued a statement about Latin America and announced that he would not tolerate the Latin American politicians who serve the political power for their own personal interests and desires, and human rights should be taught to the people of Latin America. According to this view, American Army occupied the Veracruz Port in Mexico in 1914 (Although the California and Texas and Florida that belonged to Mexico were already captured). Wilson doctrine, like the presidents before and after him, was based on the need to transform the Third World in favor of the national interest of America. However, the ethics were also added to these doctrines.

National Security Doctrine of George W. Bush was no exception and emphasizes on the element of morality more clearly. Following the incident of September 11, the Bush administration unprecedentedly moved its

military policy forward and launched wide propaganda against terrorism and its serious threat for the national security of the United States. Bush, in the name of fighting terrorism, opened a new window and even in this way could restrict citizens' fundamental freedoms in America and started the intellectual terror of his opposition. (Valizadeh, 2005, pp. 58-59) In a speech on 11 December 2001 at the military headquarters in Charleston, South Carolina, he declared that the next stage of the fight against terrorism is preventing the access of some anti-American states to the weapons of mass destruction and the use of weapons. He also pointed out that undoubtedly, evil governments are the suppliers of all weapons of mass destruction for terrorists and everybody know that United States of America does not accept that some states harbor terrorists or give them educational, financial or arm assistance. The governments that violate these principles are considered as hostile regimes. ([www. Whitehouse.org / Response. Htm](http://www.Whitehouse.org/Response.Htm))

With this statement, the Bush's national security doctrine to further strengthen the ascendancy of America over the world was emerged as a major actor and a power that has superiority on other political actors, which would be the beginning of a new era of the functional role of the United States and the country's new style. (Hosseini Matin, 2005, p. 203)

According to the developers of this doctrine, national security and interests of the United States depends on providing the security of democracy. Therefore, the world should be safe for democracy. Hence, a major part of George W. Bush's doctrine is based on military occupation of the territories of threatening countries and their regime change in the framework of preventive action, and establishment of a democratic regime desired

by America. Afghanistan and Iraq are to date examples. In addition, using nuclear weapons by America is not subjected to nuclear attack in this doctrine, but the use or threat of using nuclear weapons against the countries seeking to access it has been predicted in classic wars. However, it seems that the center of George W. Bush's national security doctrine is the strategy of "axis of evil".

Axis of Evil Strategy

George W. Bush in his speech at the annual gathering of members of Congress and Senate in January 2002 openly accused and criticized North Korea, Iraq and Iran of supporting terrorism and trying to produce and spread of weapons of mass destruction. In this doctrine, terrorism, especially in its modern evolved and complex form, is no longer considered as a criminal act and the response is not trial and punish the perpetrators in court, but also regarded as a declaration of war. Bush, after being aware of the September 11, declared that: "This attack is like a war and America will certainly win it." Axis of Evil theory is based on the assumption that the regimes of countries possessing weapons of mass destruction or countries trying to develop and expand such weapons are likely to cooperate with terrorists and provide them with such weapons due to their opposition to America and its interests in the region. Therefore, the cause of threat is far more important than the source of threat. As a result, the policy of "deterrence" in this condition was replaced by the strategy of "preventive measure" and thus, the policy of violence, military intervention and ending hostile states under the pretext of possession of WMD and cooperation with terrorism, drawn the attention of policymakers in the United States of America; a policy that first proposed by Paul Wolfowitz and a group of Hawks War in the

George W. Bush administration. (Zahrani, 2003, p. 69) According to the preemptive action strategy, American troops must be prepared preemptively and surprise the enemy before their attack. This military doctrine, in fact, allows the American government to use its own troops anywhere in the world against the countries that wish to do military operations against America. According to international law, America's government was already unable to take military action against a country that may attack America in the future. However, Bush believes that America should not wait until the enemy takes terrorist attacks; America's military forces have the right to be mobilized against the countries that may use weapons of mass destruction to carry out terrorist operations against America. The military doctrine is a part of the Bush administration's National Security Strategy, and he has spoken on the details of the scheme in his remarks since September 2001. (Bronwell, 2003, pp. 1-3)

The reasons for America to attack Iraq

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, the Bush administration took many efforts to eliminate terrorist groups and provided a new strategy to prove the people of America that he would stand against enemies and terrorists. (Payvar, 2004)

The Bush administration has proposed several reasons for the invasion of Iraq that some of them are as follows:

- Saddam Hussein is one of the most odious dictators of modern history and responsible for evident human rights violations in Iraq. He frequently bothered the neighbor countries and attacked them. Saddam violated international laws and breached its obligations in the treaties. Supporting international

terrorism, defying the dictates of the United Nations and the international community's will, the use of chemical weapons in the war against Iran and Iraqi civilians and attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction are other parts of Saddam Hussein's cruel acts against humanity. Undoubtedly, he is one of the most hated leaders of the modern age. According to the reasons cited, the Bush administration argued that the overthrow of Saddam from power is a desirable goal. Of course, a more civilized regime with less violence instead of Saddam's regime will be in favor of international community and especially the people of Iraq.

- UN reaction to Saddam's long disobediences from several resolutions issued after the Persian Gulf War had been at least disheartening, if not humiliating. It has raised deep concern about the international community's will to impose an arms control and agreements on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, at least in America's political context, and strengthened the doubts regarding the value of treaties and other instruments of law.
- Of the arguments of the Bush administration before the invasion of Iraq was that Saddam may be more dangerous in the future. If he could finally achieve nuclear weapons or strengthen his capabilities in the field of chemical and biological weapons, he will probably become more dangerous in

the future and it will be more difficult to deal with him. The fear of the future and concern about the possible growth of Saddam's WMD capabilities were the basic arguments in favor of war with Iraq and constituted the reasonable essence of a preventive war. Accordingly, the Bush administration argued that it is better to enter the war now rather than in the future.

- Another reason of the Bush administration was its claim to have sufficient military strength to achieve its goal and regime change in Baghdad. In fact, military superiority of America over Iraq is surprising and this superiority has become even greater after the Persian Gulf War. (Kisín, 2003, pp. 28-31)

The Bush administration also somewhere else cites the UN resolutions to explain the legal reasons for the use of force against Iraq. For instance, the Security Council in the early 1990s dealt with Iraq by issuing the resolutions 678 and 687. The Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1441, considered Iraq as the violator of previous resolutions, and ensured that if Iraq is not fully and immediately disarmed, it will face serious consequences. Accordingly, George W. Bush in his speech stressed that the United States and its allies are allowed to use force to destroy weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. He also elsewhere stated that: "We are entitled to attack Iraq with or without the Security Council's permission and we believe that the United States is authorized to use force for preserving its national security". Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary of Britain, also believes that Resolution 1441 and other earlier resolutions on the disarmament of Iraq, in case of

violation of the resolutions issued, are authorized to use military force in Iraq. (<http://www.bbc.co.uk>)

Domestic reasons for the fall of Saddam

At the end of this chapter, some domestic reasons for the fall of Saddam are mentioned by Michael Eisenstaedt (a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near Eastern Studies and the author of articles on the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran and military capabilities of America after the Cold War) who is one specialist at World Research Center in International Affairs.

First: mainstay of Saddam's regime on a city – Baghdad-based strategy - was an evident mistake and I am not sure that the Iraqis had no choice other than this! The Iraqis surrendered almost 95% of the country to the coalition forces from the beginning of the war by adopting the Baghdad-based strategy, although the Iraqi forces created some problems for the coalition forces in their way to Baghdad. The Iraqi regime hoped that the battle of Baghdad would determine the fate of war, surrendered left almost many parts of the country to the coalition forces. Iraq adopted a strategy similar to the war of 1991; i.e. the long-term war, inflicting heavy casualties on the coalition and hope to the international diplomatic intervention to maintain the regime.

Second: The Saddam's regime did not delegate defending Baghdad to the Republican Guard due to lack of confidence. The establishment of the Republican Guard near Baghdad made them vulnerable to the coalition forces' air attacks.

Third: the reason for the failure of the Iraqi regime to implement the scorched territory policy (destruction of dams and bridges and burning oil fields) to slow the advance of coalition forces remained a mystery. Ameri-

can senior military officials' views, stating that the speed of coalition forces did not give the Iraqis the opportunity to carry out this policy, is not acceptable. The important note for the failure of such broad destruction was that Euphrates River Bridge was not destroyed. About the reason of this action by the Iraqi Army, it can be said that Saddam's regime was sure about its defeat and thus did not want to destroy national resources that will be under the control of the Iraqis once again. In addition, such a move would lose the support of the people and their ability to provide nationwide riots.

In the field of command and control, the conditions varied from unit to unit. When the war began, the Fedayeen Saddam and the Republican Guard were given orders and they had to obey the commands. The duty of Fedayeen Saddam (young people with minimal training) was resistance against the enemy forces anywhere possible, because some units of the Republican Guard were heavily defeated. The young people returned home on their will. Other forces also returned home due to a command on April 9 and at the same day, many senior government officials were disappeared.

Therefore, it can be inferred that the regime of Saddam had the ability to control and direct the power until the last moment of the war, but the fact is that government officials had despaired of the situation and ordered to leave the positions of the Guard Republic. (authors of the Center for Global Research in International Affairs, 2004)

Discussion and Conclusion

After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and subsequently Desert Storm Operation and the defeat of Saddam, his regime was seriously weakened and gradually the international community's attitude toward Saddam and the

Baath regime was changed. Iraqis, especially Shiites, believe they have gained valuable opportunities to topple Saddam and, on the other hand, believe that US will support them, so they made a nationwide uprising and shortly captured 14 provinces under their control. However, the uprising, known as the "intifada Shabania", ended with the massacre of hundreds of thousands people and eventually defeat the militants for many reasons, including America's decision in leaving and abandoning the Shiites. Because the Iraqi Shiites' power was unpleasant to the interests of US and its allies in the region.

However, Iraqi opponents, especially Shiites, continued to struggle with the Ba'ath regime. One of their measures was holding several meetings and conferences began by the victory of the Islamic Revolution and continued until the coalition forces attack in Iraq. In addition to efforts by the Iraqi opposition in the fight against Saddam Hussein, America gradually tried to establish a relationship with the Iraqi opposition in order to limit Saddam Hussein' maneuverability. For this purpose, they initially negotiated with Ahmed Chalabi and then with the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (when they see Chalabi is not desirable choice) in order to create unity and convergence among opposition. Despite all these efforts, the Iraqi opposition groups were not able to dismantle the dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein and finally the involvement of other actors in the international system led to the overthrow of the Baathist regime.

After the defeat of Saddam Hussein in Operation Desert Storm, the US adopted the strategy of "dual containment" in order to neutralize the threats of Iran and Iraq to its own interests. On the one hand, the United Nations sent the Special Inspector for monitoring economic sanctions and disarming

weapons of mass destruction in Iraq to implement the Security Council resolutions. Nevertheless, Saddam Hussein's regime disrupted the inspection work by any excuse and made any cooperation conditional to removing the economic sanction. The struggles were continued until November 2002 when UN Security Council issued Resolution 1441 and warned the Iraqi government to make cooperation with international inspectors and also publish the list of all weapons of mass destruction; otherwise serious consequences will be followed. Baghdad confirmed that the list contains all the Iraqi military activities to build weapons of mass destruction in the past and includes new points as well, again emphasized that they have no weapons of mass destruction.

However, in February of 2003, Colin Powell, Secretary General of the United States, at a General Conference in front of the United Nations meeting announced that international inspector's board has failed to disarm Iraq. America and the UK announced that they intend to draft a resolution to the Security Council, which allows military attack on Iraq to disarm this country. Accordingly, despite the opposition of some permanent members of the Security Council and also the disagreement of European countries and holding mass anti-war protests in many countries of the world, on March 20, 2003, America and Britain started a rocket attack in Iraq.

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