خط مشی گذاری نهادی سرمایه گذاری خارجی در چارچوب معاهدات سرمایه گذاری چندجانبه و منطقه ایی

محورهای موضوعی : دانش سرمایه‌گذاری

مصطفی حیدری هراتمه ¹ , وحید آرایی ² , سید محمود اسلامی ³

1 - گرو ه اقتصاد، واحد نراق، دانشگا ه آزاد اسلامی، نراق، ایران.
2 - گروه مدیریت دولتی و خط مشی گذاری عمومی، واحد تهران مرکزی، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، تهران، ایران
3 - گروه مدیریت دولتی و خط مشی گذاری عمومی، واحد تهران مرکزی، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، تهران، ایران

تاریخ دریافت : 1402/02/11 تاریخ پذیرش : 1402/05/10 تاریخ انتشار : 1403/10/01

کلید واژه: " معاهده سرمایه گذاری ", " سرمایه گذاری خارجی", " مدل جاذبه", " خط مشی نهادی",

چکیده مقاله :

مطالعه حاضر با استفاده از داده های 22 کشور در دوره زمانی 1390 تا 1400، رویکرد معاهدات سرمایه گذاری چندجانبه و منطقه ایی و تأثیر آن بر سرمایه گذاری خارجی، را از طریق یک مدل جاذبه، مورد بررسی قرار داد. همچنین تعامل بین معاهدات سرمایه گذاری چندجانبه و نهادهای کشور میزبان و اینکه چگونه این رابطه بین شرکای توسعه یافته- در حال توسعه و شرکای درحال توسعه - درحال توسعه متفاوت است، را ارزیابی می کند. نتایج نشان داد: 1) تاثیر متغیرهای کنترلی بازار بزرگ و زبان مشترک در همه مدل‌ها، مثبت و معنادار، اما تاثیر متغیر فاصله، منفی و معنی‌دار است. متغیرهای جمعیت کشور میزبان و همسایگی به جزء، جفت کشورهای در حال توسعه، تعیین کننده معنی داری برای جریان سرمایه گذاری مستقیم خارجی نیستند. معاهدات سرمایه گذاری دو جانبه در همه مدل‌ها مثبت و معنی‌دار است، ولی بین کشورهای در حال توسعه تأثیر بیشتری بر سرمایه گذاری مستقیم خارجی دارد. 2) با اضافه شدن متغیرهای کیفیت نهادی، رابطه استعماری و متغیر ساختگی توافق تجارت آزاد، به مدل، با انعقاد معاهده سرمایه گذاری چندجانبه، کشور میزبان به سرمایه گذاران خارجی یک چارچوب نهادی خارجی ارائه می دهد که به طور قابل اعتمادی آنها را متعهد می کند که از سرمایه گذاری خود، بهتر از توان نهادهای داخلی محافظت کنند. در این صورت آنها جایگزین هستند و انتظار یک رابطه منفی وجود دارد.

چکیده انگلیسی:

The present study, using the data of 22 countries in the period from 2011 to 2021, examined the approach of multilateral and regional investment treaties and its effect on foreign investment through an Gravity model. It also assesses the interaction between bilateral investment treaties and host country institutions and how this relationship differs between developed-developing partners and developing-developing partners. The results showed: a) The effect of control variables of large market and common language in all models is positive and significant, but the effect of distance variable is negative and significant. The population variables of the host country and the neighborhood, except for the pair of developing countries, are not significant determinants for the flow of foreign direct investment. Bilateral investment treaties are positive and significant in all models, but between developing countries, they have a greater impact on foreign direct investment. b) By adding the variables of institutional quality, the colonial relationship and the dummy variable free trade agreement, to the model, by Conclusion a bilateral investment treaty, the host country provides foreign investors with a foreign institutional framework that reliably commits to protect their investment better than domestic institutions can. In this case, they are substitutes and a negative relationship is expected.

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