مدلسازی غیرخطی اثر فساد بر درآمدهای مالیاتی در ایران: رویکرد MTNARDL با آستانه های چندگانه

محورهای موضوعی : فصلنامه اقتصاد محاسباتی

فرشته عبدالهی ¹ , عبدالخالق غبیشاوی ²

1 - دانشگاه ازاد اسلامی واحد اهواز
2 - گروه علوم انسانی. دانشکده اقتصاد

تاریخ دریافت : 1404/02/25 تاریخ پذیرش : 1404/07/12 تاریخ انتشار : 1404/10/03

کلید واژه: فساد, حکمرانی, درآمدهای مالیاتی, مدل NARDL, مدل MTNARDL,

چکیده مقاله :

فساد در نظام مالیاتی ایران یکی از موانع اصلی افزایش درآمدهای دولت است و به کاهش تمایل مؤدیان برای پرداخت مالیات منجر شده است. سوءاستفاده از رانت‌های اطلاعاتی و ارتباطی توسط برخی گروه‌ها، فرار مالیاتی را افزایش داده و بار مالیاتی را بر دوش بخش‌های رسمی اقتصاد مانند تولیدکنندگان تحمیل می‌کند. این وضعیت درآمدهای مالیاتی را کاهش داده و بودجه دولت برای خدمات عمومی و زیرساخت‌ها را محدود می‌سازد. همچنین، گسترش اقتصاد غیررسمی و فرار مالیاتی، اجرای سیاست‌های مالی را با مشکل مواجه کرده است. در نهایت، این چرخه معیوب، فساد را عمیق‌تر کرده و توسعه اقتصادی را تحت تأثیر منفی قرار داده است. این پژوهش با هدف آسیب‌شناسی نظام حکمرانی سازمان امور مالیاتی ایران و ارائه الگوی بهبود، اثر فساد بر درآمدهای مالیاتی را طی دوره 1377-1400 بررسی می‌کند. با استفاده از مدل‌های خودرگرسیونی با وقفه‌های توزیعی غیرخطی (NARDL) و آستانه‌ای چندگانه(MTNARDL)، نتایج نشان می‌دهد که در کوتاه‌مدت، افزایش کنترل فساد درآمدهای مالیاتی را کاهش می‌دهد، اما کاهش کنترل فساد آن را افزایش می‌دهد. در بلندمدت، شوک‌های مثبت و منفی کنترل فساد اثر مثبت بر درآمدهای مالیاتی دارند. همچنین، کنترل فساد در سطوح آستانه‌ای متفاوت (کمتر از 25% و بیش از 75%) اثرات متفاوتی بر عملکرد مالیاتی نشان می‌دهد. متغیرهایی نظیر ارزش افزوده بخش صنعت، تورم، رشد اقتصادی و آزادسازی تجاری نیز بر درآمدهای مالیاتی تأثیر دارند. مطالعه پیشنهاد می‌دهد که اصلاحات سیاستی مانند تقویت شفافیت، بهبود نظام قضایی، و ارائه مشوق‌های مالی برای مأموران مالیاتی می‌تواند فساد را کاهش داده و عملکرد مالیاتی را بهبود بخشد

چکیده انگلیسی:

Extended‏‏ Abstract

Purpose

Corruption in Iran’s tax system is a major obstacle to increasing government revenues and has led to a decrease in taxpayers’ willingness to pay taxes. The abuse of information and communication rents by some groups has increased tax evasion and imposed a tax burden on formal sectors of the economy, such as producers. This situation has reduced tax revenues and limited the government’s budget for public services and infrastructure. In addition, the expansion of the informal economy and tax evasion have made it difficult to implement fiscal policies. Ultimately, this vicious cycle has deepened corruption and negatively affected economic development.

This study aims to diagnose the governance system of the Iranian Tax Administration and provide an improvement model, and examines the effect of corruption on tax revenues during the period 1377-1400. Using autoregressive models with nonlinear distribution lags (NARDL) and multiple thresholds (MTNARDL), the results show that in the short run, increasing corruption control reduces tax revenues, but reducing corruption control increases it. In the long run, positive and negative shocks to corruption control have a positive effect on tax revenues. Also, corruption control at different threshold levels (less than 25% and more than 75%) shows different effects on tax performance. Variables such as industrial value added, inflation, economic growth, and trade liberalization also have an effect on tax revenues. 

Methodology

In specifying the tax model, the present study relies on the tax compliance theory of Gertz et al. (1986). Other studies that the authors used in specifying the model include Flatters and McLeod (1995), who presented a model that shows that some levels of corruption can be tolerated to make the tax system efficient, especially if the salaries of tax officials are very low and there are many limitations to accurate information about taxpayers' debts. In support of this argument, Akdeh (2006) and Elm et al. (2014) suggested that corruption can provide a favorable environment for tax compliance. The authors argued that if the costs of evasion (i.e., the amount of bribes that taxpayers have to pay to officials to evade taxes) are higher than the costs of paying taxes, it will increase the level of tax revenue.

Finding

The findings of this model indicate that corruption not only reduces tax revenues directly, but also weakens the efficiency of the tax system through indirect mechanisms. The asymmetric effect of corruption shows that when corruption increases, tax evasion becomes more widespread and the tax base becomes smaller, but improving the state of corruption control, even slightly, can have a significant impact on increasing tax compliance. The role of the industrial sector as a variable affecting tax revenue is also worth considering in the Iranian economy. The value added of the industrial sector with a positive and significant coefficient indicates that industrial development can expand the tax base. 

Conclusion

The results of this study, using advanced econometric methodology, provide a clear picture of the challenges and opportunities of Iran’s tax system in the face of macroeconomic variables. The findings not only reveal the asymmetric impact of corruption and inflationary shocks on tax revenues, but also highlight structural contradictions in the role of productive sectors such as agriculture and industry. These analyses, which are conducted with due regard to the unique characteristics of the Iranian economy (including successive external shocks, dependence on oil revenues, and heterogeneous production structure), show that tax system reform requires moving beyond piecemeal solutions and adopting a comprehensive, flexible, and transparency-based approach. In this regard, the following policy proposals can be considered by policymakers as a roadmap for achieving sustainable, equitable, and resilient tax revenues against macroeconomic instability.

منابع و مأخذ:


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