تحلیل استراتژیک کشته شدن رستم در شاهنامه با رویکرد نظریه بازیها
محورهای موضوعی : سامانه های پردازشی و ارتباطی چند رسانه ای هوشمند
مجید اسحاقی
1
(دانشگاه سمنان)
هادی ضیایی
2
(گروه ریاضی، دانشگاه سمنان)
کلید واژه: نظریه بازیها, بازی سواری رایگان, بازی هژمونی, شاهنامه فردوسی.,
چکیده مقاله :
در این مقاله، یک تحلیل استراتژیک برای کشته شدن رستم در شاهنامه با رویکرد نظریه بازیها ارائه شده است. در نگاه اول، استراتژی حکیم فردوسی استخراج میشود که با کشته شدن رستم در شاهنامه نمیخواهد به شاعران قرنهای آینده سواری رایگان بدهد. بازی فردوسی و شاعران آینده یک بازی ترتیبی ایستای اکید میباشد که با استفاده از جدول اطلس نظریه بازیهای 2×2 مدل سازی میشود. در نگاه دوم، بازی شغاد و رستم با استفاده از مدل بازیهای استراتژیک، پس از طراحی استراتژیهای بازیکنان، عایدیهای آنان در موقعیتهای مختلف با توجه به محیط بازی محاسبه و تحلیل شده است. این بازی 2×2 یکی از بازیهای ترتیبی ایستا اکید و بازی هژمونی میباشد. با توجه به جدول این بازی، بازیکن P_1 (شغاد) که برای فریب بازیکن P_2 (رستم) از شرایط بازی استفاده میکند و بازی را طوری پیاده سازی کرد تا به خواسته خود برسد. یکی از مهم ترین نتایج این مقاله، اثبات ژرف اندیشی تفکر راهبردی فردوسی است که به عنوان یک استراتژیست مطرح و بررسی شده است.
In this paper, a strategic analysis for the killing of Rostam in Shahnameh is presented with the approach of game theory. At first glance, the strategy of Hakim Ferdowsi is extracted, who doesn't want to give a free ride to the poets of future centuries after Rostam was killed in Shahnameh. The Ferdowsi and future poets game is a static and strict sequential game that is modeled using the 2x2 game theory atlas table. On the other hand, the game of Shoghad and Rostam using the strategic game model, after designing the strategies of the players, their earnings It has been calculated and analyzed in different situations according to the game environment. This 2x2 game is one of the static and strict sequential games It is hegemony. According to the table of this game, player p1 (Shaghad) who uses the conditions of the game to deceive player p2 (Rostam) and the game implemented in order to achieve his desire. One of the most important results of this article is to prove the deep thinking of Ferdowsi's strategic thinking, which as a strategist, it has been discussed and reviewed.
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