List of Articles agency conflict

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  1 - The effect of transparency of information on the relationship between family ownership and cost of debt
  Zohre Hajiha Javad Oradi
  The main purpose of this research, The effect of transparency of information on the relationship between family ownership and cost of debt for companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. Statistical population consisted of 27 family and 76 nonfamily companies of the study perio More

  The main purpose of this research, The effect of transparency of information on the relationship between family ownership and cost of debt for companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. Statistical population consisted of 27 family and 76 nonfamily companies of the study period of 2009 to 2016 year-on behalf. In this study using a scores of ranking system of disclosure quality and information science Tehran Stock Exchange, for the separation of firms, the firms with low and high level of information disclosure. The statistical method, used in order to test the second research hypothesis, is panel data. The results of the first hypothesis of this research showed that there is a significant positive relationship between family ownership and cost of debt. In other words, the cost of debt in family firms is higher than nonfamily firms. Then, by examining the second hypothesis, it became clear that transparency of information on the relationship between family ownership and the cost of debt has a significant negative effect. This indicates the fact that the family enterprise-level higher information transparency, cost of debt decreases.     Manuscript profile
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  2 - The Effects of Earning Management on Corporate Cash Holdings: Empirical Evidence From Iran
  Seyed Ali Mohammad Taghavi Ali Javanmard
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  3 - Auditors’ Response to Agency Conflicts in Political Connected Firms
  Mohammad Hassani
  10.30495/jdaa.2024.709476
  AbstractBecause of interest conflicts between managers-owners and the possibility occurrence of agency problems, it is important to identify the potentially driving factors of agency costs and assess the role of monitoring mechanisms in order to reduce the intensity of More

  AbstractBecause of interest conflicts between managers-owners and the possibility occurrence of agency problems, it is important to identify the potentially driving factors of agency costs and assess the role of monitoring mechanisms in order to reduce the intensity of agency costs. This paper assessed the potentially impact of external auditing on agency conflicts in political connected firms. The ratio of operational expenses to operational sales revenues is used as an index of agency costs. Also, politically governance affiliation in either board structure or ownership structure is considered as a proxy of political connection. In addition, effective role of external auditors is analyzed using auditors’ quality control rating, rotation and industry specialization criterion. Research data include 1632 firm-year observations witch consist of 204 firms listed in Tehran Securities & Exchange. Research hypotheses investigated through multivariate regression models using panel data with fixed effect and generalized least squares method. Research evidences documented that political connected firms have high level of agency costs significantly. On other side, auditor’s quality control rating, rotation and industry specialization criterion significantly lead to reduce agency costs. In addition, findings showed that auditor’s quality control rating, auditor’s rotation and auditor’s industry specialization caused to weaken the positive relation between political connection and agency costs, so lead to decrease destructive consequences of interest divergence; In fact, reputable auditors to maintain professional reputation, new auditors to maintain audit independence, and industry-specific auditors to maintain audit efficiency and effectiveness are elements of mitigating agency conflicts, especially in firms with political connection. So, it is important to understand this issue from the aspect of political connection costs and its role in intensifying agency costs, as well as from the aspect of improving audit process and its role in weakening agency costs, especially in political connected firms. Manuscript profile