Emotion, Will and Rationality of Religious Belief (An Interpretation of William James' Criyique of Clifford's "Ethics of Belief")
Subject Areas : Intellectual explorations
zahra Ramezanlu
1
(
Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy and Theology, Azad University, Zanjan, Iran
)
Keywords: William James, rationality of religious beliefs, ethics of belief, evidentialism, will to believe,
Abstract :
The question of religious belief and its rationality has become a serious issue in the philosophy of religion due to the claims of modern philosophers. One of the most controversial positions in this regard is evidentialism, which emphasizes that our beliefs should be accompanied by evidence and reasons. In modern times, Clifford, by introducing the idea of "the ethics of belief," advocated evidentialism in its most extreme form. William James, by emphasizing the role of will and emotions in the formation of belief, criticizes Clifford's theory and tries to defend the rationality of religious belief. This paper attempts to answer the question of how James, based on the same evidentialist principles of the evidentialists, criticizes Clifford. It also examines whether his view can respond to the criticisms raised. The aim is to analyze and evaluate James's approach to evidentialism from a non-fideistic perspective using a library-based research method. Considering James's views, especially in his essay "The Will to Believe," it can be concluded that his position in defending the rationality of religious belief against evidentialism is relatively coherent. According to William James, Clifford's evidentialist position is, contrary to its claim, irrational and dogmatic, and desire and will logically play a necessary role in truth-seeking.