A Model for Pricing Controlling Stock Blocks

Subject Areas : Financial Knowledge of Securities Analysis

حسین اعتمادی ^{1 *} , طوبی دهقانی ^{2 *} , عادل آذر ^{3 *} , علی اصغر انواری رستمی ^{4 *}

1 - مسئول مکاتبات
2 - ندارد
3 - ندارد
4 - ندارد

Received: 2013-04-07 Accepted : 2013-06-15 Published : 2013-09-11

Keywords: pricing, Control premium, block,

Abstract :

This research provides a model for pricing of controlling stock blocks anddeterminants of control premium. Pricing of 64 stock blocks of Tehran Stock Exchangelisted companies with size of 16.67 and more are reviewed. These blocks mostly werepriced at substantial premium to the exchange price. In this research by reviewingliterature and surveying financial and investment professionals determinants of pricingand control premium are find out and then by using multivariate regression significantfactors are determined and at the end the estimated block prices are compared with thereal price of blocks. Results show that significant factors in pricing controlling stockblocks and determining control premium are block size, firm size, leverage, profitabilityand previous performance, previous ownership of buyer and deadline to pay cashpayment.

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