Critical Review of Maria Alvarez’s Viewpoint on the Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples

Subject Areas : Epistemological researches

Mohammadamin Khodamoradi ^{1 *} , Keramat Varzdar ²

1 - Department of Philosophy of Religion, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
2 - Lecturer in the Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, University of Tehran

Received: 2024-06-04 Accepted : 2024-10-29 Published : 2025-05-14

Keywords: Frankfurt-style counterexamples, Justin Capes, Maria Alvarez, Nature of Agency, Two-Way Causal Power,

Abstract :

The main issue of this research is the report of Maria Alvarez's point of view on the Frankfurt_style counterexamples and the purpose of that is the critical analysis of this point of view based on the criticism of her opinion on the nature of action. According to the "Principle of Alternative Possibilities", agent A is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. The purpose of the Frankfurt_style counterexamples is to show the falsity of this principle. In these examples, the agent is portrayed as being morally responsible for his action even though he cannot act otherwise. Alvarez, who is one of the supporters of the "Principle of Alternative Possibilities", relies on the necessity of the existence of the condition of "avoidability" in the structure of the "action", and challenges the Frankfurt_style counterexamples due to the non-compliance of this condition. This approach has been criticized by some contemporary philosophers such as Justin Capes. Citing the counterexample, Capes does not consider "avoidability" as an essential element of "action" and therefore believes that Frankfurt_style counterexample can be reconstructed in a way that is resistant to Alvarez's objection. Based on the results of this research, Capes's position has stronger intuitive support, and as a result, it is more reasonable to believe it.

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