A survey on possibility of an Intelligible Relation between “Conceptual Scheme” and “Empirical Content”

Subject Areas : Epistemological researches

Meisam  Mohammad amini ¹ (Assistant Professor at Institute for Science and Technology Studies, Shahid Beheshti University)

Received: 2017-08-22 Accepted : 2018-02-12 Published : 2018-03-21

Keywords: Conceptual Scheme, Empirical Content, Third Dogma of Empiricism, Proximal Theory of Meaning, Distal Theory of Meaning,

Abstract :

Davidson’s arguments against the validity of distinction between “conceptual scheme” and “empirical content”, namely “the third dogma of empiricism”, have caused numerous debates and several objections. Two general criticisms are as follows: 1. Davidson’s arguments, contrary to his claim, do not reject “the very idea of conceptual scheme,” but his critics merely can be applied to Quinces’ specific interpretation of conceptual scheme. 2. All Davidson’s arguments are based on his semantic views, accepting and denying the arguments rely on the standpoint which has been taken about his semantic theory. In this paper, after a brief description of Davidson’s main argument and the mentioned objections, we have presented another critic implying that even if regarded Davidson’s arguments successful, he has only shown that any attempt already made by empiricists has failed to justify the epistemic role of sensual experience. Despite of his claims, it cannot lead to providing such explanation principally is impossible. Particularly, one of the recent responses made by empiricists, at least will be kept safe from his anti-foundationalist objections.

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