Analyzing the relationships of the foundations of moral knowledge with an emphasis on the basis of reason in the discovery of values From the point of view of Barbara Herman and Mulla Sadra

Subject Areas : Epistemological researches

saeideh Hamledari ¹ (Ph. D. condidate of Ethics, university of Qom, Qom, iran)
Ahmad Fazeli ² (Assistant professor of Ethics, University of Qom, Qom, iran)

Received: 2022-10-25 Accepted : 2023-06-05 Published : 2023-06-22

Keywords: reason, Mulla sadra, Basic relations of moral knowledge, discovery of values, Barbara Herman,

Abstract :

One of the most important topics in the field of moral epistemology is the discussion about "foundations". Although each of the factors of desire, motivation, mandatory ends, emotions, revelation and intuition are known as the basis of moral knowledge, special attention has always been focused on the basis of reason. However, if the influence of reason in discovering moral values is measured on the one hand and other bases on the other hand, how will the influence of each of the mentioned bases be and what relationships can be imagined between these knowledge bases and the basis of reason? Barbara Herman, an American philosopher, and Mulla Sadra have considerable opinions in explaining this issue, so it was important and necessary to examine their views. The research was carried out by descriptive-analytical method and using text analysis and the findings showed that assuming other bases of moral knowledge besides reason, three different relationships were extracted between them. Both thinkers claimed that desire, motivation, and obligatory ends, among other things, are necessary and dependent on reason, therefore, they have an "efficacy" relationship with reason. Considering that Mulla Sadra considered the foundations of revelation and intuition to be the support of reason, the relationship of revelation and intuition with reason was considered to be of the type of "effect" relationship, and finally, Herman claimed that emotions are neither the support of reason nor dependent on it, but a complete basis. It is independent, therefore emotions and reason were placed in an "independent" relationship.

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https://doi.org/10.5840/apapa201395.