Entrance of values in the process of scientific research
Subject Areas : Epistemological researches
GholamHossein
Javadpoor
1
(Iranian Institute of philosophy)
Keywords: Method, Objectivity, Value and knowledge, the process of scientific research,
Abstract :
Assessing the permissibility or impermissibility of the impact of unscientific values on the knowledge process and its consequences has become an important issue in the philosophy of science in recent decades, and many arguments have been put forward to defend or reject this influence. One of the prerequisites for analyzing this issue is explaining the course of scientific research and drawing the contexts and pores of the involvement of values. It seems that each scientific activity has three major parts: entry, main process (preliminary and inference) and application, each of which includes several more detailed steps, and the inclusion of unscientific values can be effective in choices and preferences and thus in the fate of scientific activity. The first and last stages of science are often valuable, and this does not interfere with the mission of scientific activity, that is, scientific objectivity. The middle and main stage of scientific activity in cases such as data analysis, method selection, weighting of evidence and selection of hypotheses, is pregnant with the influence of values and arguments in the impermissibility of values also indicate the slippage of scientific progress in these stages and avoidance of scientific and mental objectivity. It is personalization. In this research, by dividing the process of scientific research into three stages, the involvement of unscientific values is outlined and shown that science is prone to be influenced by unscientific values in different sections; The extent to which this influence is normatively permissible is a secondary issue.
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