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Profit efficiency in non-competitive markets

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Abstract

This paper develops a non-radial linear programming model based on the concept of directional distance function to examine the profit efficiency (inefficiency) of decision making units (DMUs) in the case where the market prices are available but can be controlled by units, and DMUs can influence simultaneously the prices and quantities of inputs and outputs to maximize the total profit. The optimal solution of the proposed model can help decision makers to evaluate and improve the profit efficiency of DMUs by changing the prices and quantities of inputs and outputs. The proposed model satisfies the important properties, units invariance and translation invariance. We present a decomposition of the profit inefficiency obtained by the optimal solution of the proposed model which can individualize quantity and price contributions to the profit inefficiency of under evaluation DMU. Finally, an empirical application to a set of 50 bank branches will be presented to illustrate the proposed approach.

Keywords: Data envelopment analysis; linear programming; directional distance function; profit efficiency

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1. Introduction

Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is one of the best approaches to evaluate the performance of DMUs. DEA studies about the efficiency of DMUs help decision maker to identify and remove the sources of inefficiency. There are various DEA models that can be used for measuring the efficiency of DMUs in situations where unit cost or price is not known. For instance, radial models such as CCR and BCC [1,2] as well as non-radial models such as additive [3] and SBM models [4].

Other DEA models also have been developed to examine the efficiency of DMUs for the case where input/output prices are available. For example, Farrell [5], Ray and Kim [6], Tone [7], Tone and Sahoo [8], Maniadakis and Thanassoulis [9] and Sahoo and Tone [17] developed models for measuring the cost efficiency (CE), revenue efficiency (RE) and profit efficiency (PE) when the market prices are exactly known. In such markets that are named competitive markets, the input/output prices are exogenously fixed and units are named price taker. Hence, for improving the efficiency, DMUs are only allowed to change input or output quantities.

In non-competitive markets, DMUs have the ability to influence somewhat the market prices. In this situation, DMUs can maximize the CE, RE and PE measures by changing the input/output quantities as well as input/output prices. In this connection, Portela and Thanassoulis [11] proposed a model to evaluate the cost efficiency of DMUs. In their approach quantities and costs of inputs can vary simultaneously, and quantity and price contributions to the cost inefficiency can be individualized [11-15].

In this paper, a directional distance function approach is developed to measure a degree of profit inefficiency in the case where DMUs can influence the prices as well as quantities of inputs and outputs to maximize the total profit. By the proposed

model we can have simultaneously non-radial improvements in the input/output prices and also input/output quantities along any arbitrary selected direction vector. In addition, we decompose the obtained profit inefficiency and study the effects of changing the prices and quantities to it.

The rest of paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the DEA methodology. Section 3 develops a model to study about profit efficiency. In section 4 we decompose the profit inefficiency. Section 5 shows the application of the proposed approach. Section 6 concludes.

2. Methodology

Assume that there are n DMUs ; each DMU j , $j = 1, \dots, n$, consumes m inputs, x_{ij} , $i = 1, \dots, m$, and produces s outputs, y_{rj} , $r = 1, \dots, s$. In addition, assume that $c_j = (c_{1j}, \dots, c_{mj})$ and $p_j = (p_{1j}, \dots, p_{sj})$ be respectively observed input and output price vectors corresponding to DMU j .

The profit efficiency of DMU_o (under evaluation DMU) can be defined in ratio form by $(p_o y_o - c_o x_o) / (p_o y^* - c_o x^*)$. The term $p_o y^* - c_o x^*$ is the maximum profit that can be obtained by correcting the input/output combination at the market prices. Maximum profit can be computed by solving the following profit maximization problem [16]:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & p_o y^* - c_o x^* = \\
 & \max \left\{ \sum_{r=1}^s p_{ro} y_r - \sum_{i=1}^m c_{io} x_i \mid x_i = \sum_{j=1}^J \lambda_j x_{ij} \leq x_o, i = 1, \dots, m, \right. \\
 & \left. y_r = \sum_{j=1}^J \lambda_j y_{rj} \geq y_o, r = 1, \dots, s, \lambda_j \geq 0, j = 1, \dots, J \right\}
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{1}$$

Model (1) can be applied in situation where the market prices are exogenously

fixed and DMUs have no control over the prices.

The concept of the directional distance function was presented by Chambers et al. [17] to examine the efficiency of DMUs. They introduced a non-zero directional vector $g = (g_x, g_y)$ and solved the following optimization problem:

$$\max \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \beta \left| \sum_{j=1}^n \lambda_j x_{ij} \leq x_{io} - \beta g_i, \quad i=1, \dots, m, \right. \\ \sum_{j=1}^n \lambda_j y_{rj} \geq y_{ro} + \beta g_r, \quad r=1, \dots, s \\ \lambda_j \geq 0, \quad j=1, \dots, n, \beta \geq 0 \end{array} \right. \quad (2)$$

This model provide a radial measure of inefficiency of DMU_o . If $\beta^* = 0$, DMU_o will be efficient and it will be inefficient if $\beta^* > 0$. The directional distance function can also be extended to the non-radial form (see e.g. [15]).

In this paper, we extend the non-radial form of the directional distance function for the case where the market prices can be controlled by DMUs.

3. A directional profit efficiency when prices are not fixed

In order to measure a degree of profit inefficiency of DMU_o in a non-competitive market, we consider an arbitrary directional vector $g_o = (g_{x_o}, g_{y_o}, g_{c_o}, g_{p_o}) \neq 0$ where, $g_{x_o}, g_{c_o} \in R^m$ and $g_{y_o}, g_{p_o} \in R^s$, and propose the non-radial linear programming model as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{D}_o^* = \bar{D}_o(x_o, y_o, c_o, p_o, g_o) = \\ \max \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \frac{1}{4} \left(\frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^m (\alpha_i + \sigma_i) + \frac{1}{s} \sum_{r=1}^s (\beta_r + \gamma_r) \right) \\ \sum_{j=1}^n \lambda_j x_{ij} \leq x_{io} - \alpha_i g_{x_{io}}, \quad i=1, \dots, m, \\ \sum_{j=1}^n \lambda_j y_{rj} \geq y_{ro} + \beta_r g_{y_{ro}}, \quad r=1, \dots, s, \\ \sum_{j=1}^n z_{ij} c_{ij} \leq c_{io} - \sigma_i g_{c_{io}}, \quad i=1, \dots, m, \\ \sum_{j=1}^n k_{rj} p_{rj} \geq p_{ro} + \gamma_r g_{p_{ro}}, \quad r=1, \dots, s, \\ \sum_{j=1}^n z_{ij} = 1, \quad i=1, \dots, m, \quad \sum_{j=1}^n k_{rj} = 1, \\ r=1, \dots, s, \quad \alpha_i, \sigma_i \geq 0, \quad \theta_{i1} \leq \sigma_i \leq \theta_{i2} (\forall i), \\ \beta_r, \gamma_r \geq 0, \quad \eta_{r1} \leq \gamma_r \leq \eta_{r2} (\forall r) \end{array} \right. \quad (3) \end{aligned}$$

The parameters θ_{i1} and θ_{i2} are determined by decision maker and are respectively the lower and upper bound for the level of the input prices. These parameters have the values between 0 and 1. The parameters η_{r1} and η_{r2} have the same interpretation for the output prices of DMU_o .

The feasible activities (x, y) that define the production possibility set in model (1) are considered as the feasible activities in model (3). Furthermore, based on the constraints, $\sum_{j=1}^n z_{ij} c_{ij} \leq c_{io} - \sigma_i g_{c_{io}}$ and $\sum_{j=1}^n z_{ij} = 1$, the feasible price for an input is defined as a convex combination of observed prices for it across the DMUs. In fact, the observed input prices help decision maker to make the best prices for each input. The output prices constraints, $\sum_{j=1}^n k_{rj} p_{rj} \geq p_{ro} + \gamma_r g_{p_{ro}}$ and

$\sum_{j=1}^n k_{rj} = 1$, have also the similar interpretation.

In model (3), we assume that there is no causal correspondence between input and output prices and also between input/output prices and input/output quantities. Thus, the different intensity variables λ_j , z_{ij} and k_{rj} have been considered for input/output quantities, input prices and output prices, respectively. For example, if we assume that there is a causal correspondence between input and output prices, then we can use the intensity variables z_{ij} instead of k_{rj} in the output price constraints. The model (3) is developed under CRS assumption. The constraint $\sum_{j=1}^n \lambda_j = 1$ can be added in the case of VRS technology.

In this study, we select the directional vector g_o as: $g_{x_{io}} = x_{io}; i = 1, \dots, m$, $g_{y_{ro}} = y_{ro}; r = 1, \dots, s$, $g_{c_{io}} = c_{io}; i = 1, \dots, m$, and $g_{p_{ro}} = p_{ro}; r = 1, \dots, s$.

Model (3) has a feasible solution $\lambda_o = 1$, $\lambda_j = 0 (j \neq o)$, $\alpha_i = \sigma_i = 0 (\forall i)$, $\beta_r = \gamma_r = 0 (\forall r)$, $z_{io} = 1$, $z_{ij} = 0 (\forall i, \forall j \neq o)$, $k_{ro} = 1$, $k_{rj} = 0 (\forall r, \forall j \neq o)$. Therefore, the proposed model is always feasible.

Definition 3.1 (Directional profit efficiency)

A DMU is directional profit efficient if and only if $\overrightarrow{D}_o^* = 0$.

We consider the value of \overrightarrow{D}_o^* as a degree of profit inefficiency of DMU_o

and it follows that, if $\overrightarrow{D}_o^* > 0$, DMU_o is directional profit inefficient.

The value of α_i estimates the possible improvement in the quantity of i th input of DMU_o . Thus, $\frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i$ presents the average inefficiency score for its input quantities. Interpretations of the values of σ_i , β_r and γ_r are similar to that of α_i .

Based on the optimal solution to model (3), directional profit efficiency measure for DMU_o will be as

$$PE_o = \frac{PR_o}{PR_o^*} = \frac{\sum_{r=1}^s P_{ro} Y_{ro} - \sum_{i=1}^m C_{io} X_{io}}{\sum_{r=1}^s P_{ro}^* Y_{ro}^* - \sum_{i=1}^m C_{io}^* X_{io}^*}, \quad (4)$$

where,

$$x_{io}^* = x_{io} - \alpha_i^* g_{x_{io}}, \quad i = 1, \dots, m, \quad (5)$$

$$y_{ro}^* = y_{ro} + \beta_r^* g_{y_{ro}}, \quad r = 1, \dots, s,$$

$$c_{io}^* = c_{io} - \sigma_i^* g_{c_{io}}, \quad i = 1, \dots, m, \quad (6)$$

$$p_{ro}^* = p_{ro} + \gamma_r^* g_{p_{ro}}, \quad r = 1, \dots, s.$$

(5) and (6) are respectively the quantity and price targets of DMU_o . DMU_o can maximize its profit by choosing the targets.

It is clear that, the new measure of the degree of profit inefficiency is monotone increasing in each α_i , $\sigma_i (\forall i)$ and β_r , $\gamma_r (\forall r)$. In addition, the proposed measure satisfies the following important properties:

a) Units invariance: By selecting a direction vector g_o so that the units of measurement of its components, $g_{x_{io}}, g_{c_{io}} (\forall i)$ and $g_{y_{ro}}, g_{p_{ro}} (\forall r)$, are respectively the same as those of x_{io}, c_{io}, y_{ro} and p_{ro} , the proposed measure, \overrightarrow{D}_o^* , will be units invariant. To show this

property, consider the constraint of the i th input quantity. We rescale the i th input quantity x_{ij} into $q_i x_{ij}$. The i th component of the direction vector, $g_{x_{i_o}}$, will also change to $q_i g_{x_{i_o}}$. Thus, we have

$$\sum_{j=1}^n \lambda_j (q_i x_{ij}) \leq (q_i x_{i_o}) - \alpha_i (q_i g_{x_{i_o}}), \quad (7)$$

$$i = 1, \dots, m,$$

After eliminating q_i on both sides, the above constraint is translated into

$$\sum_{j=1}^n \lambda_j x_{ij} \leq x_{i_o} - \alpha_i g_{x_{i_o}}, \quad i = 1, \dots, m, \quad (8)$$

that is the i th input quantity constraint in (3). Similarly, we can show this for the output quantity, input cost and output price constraints.

b) Translation invariance: In order to satisfy this property, two conditions must be met. The first condition is $\sum_{j=1}^n \lambda_j = 1$

, and the second is the direction vector g_o should be selected in a way that it does not change after translating the input/output quantities and input/output prices [1]. For example, the components of g_o can be selected as

$$g_{x_{i_o}} = x_{i_o} - \min_j \{x_{ij}\},$$

$$g_{c_{i_o}} = c_{i_o} - \min_j \{c_{ij}\} (\forall i),$$

$$g_{y_{r_o}} = \max_j \{y_{rj}\} - y_{r_o} \text{ and}$$

$$g_{p_{r_o}} = \max_j \{p_{rj}\} - p_{r_o} (\forall r). \text{ We show this}$$

property by translating x_{ij} into $\tilde{x}_{ij} = x_{ij} + w_i$. In this case, we have:

$$\sum_{j=1}^n \lambda_j (x_{ij} + w_i) \leq x_{i_o} + w_i - \alpha_i g_{x_{i_o}}, \quad i = 1, \dots, m, \quad (9)$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^n \lambda_j x_{ij} + w_i \sum_{j=1}^n \lambda_j \leq x_{i_o} + w_i - \alpha_i g_{x_{i_o}}, \quad i = 1, \dots, m, \quad (10)$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^n \lambda_j x_{ij} + w_i \leq x_{i_o} + w_i - \alpha_i g_{x_{i_o}}, \quad i = 1, \dots, m, \quad (11)$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^n \lambda_j x_{ij} \leq x_{i_o} - \alpha_i g_{x_{i_o}}, \quad i = 1, \dots, m. \quad (12)$$

It can be seen that the obtained constraint in (12) is the same as the original constraint in (3). It can be proved for all other constraints of model (3). It means that under the conditions mentioned above the proposed measure satisfy translation invariance.

In the special cases, if the input price vector be only known, model (3) is transformed to a cost model and if the output price vector be only at hand, the model is converted to a revenue model.

Theorem 2.1 The projection of DMU_o defined by (5), is profit efficient under the prices defined by (6).

Proof. The degree of profit inefficiency of $(x_{i_o}^*, y_{r_o}^*)$ under the prices $c_{i_o}^*$ and $p_{r_o}^*$ can be evaluated by solving model (3). Let an optimal solution and the optimal value of the model (3) for $(x_{i_o}^*, y_{r_o}^*, c_{i_o}^*, p_{r_o}^*)$ are respectively, $\hat{\alpha}_i, \hat{\sigma}_i (\forall i), \hat{\beta}_r, \hat{\gamma}_r (\forall r), \hat{\lambda}_j (\forall j), \hat{z}_{ij} (\forall i, \forall j), \hat{k}_{rj} (\forall r, \forall j),$ and \hat{D}_o . Hence, it holds that

$$\sum_{j=1}^n \hat{\lambda}_j x_{ij} \leq x_{i_o}^* - \hat{\alpha}_i g_{x_{i_o}} =$$

$$x_{i_o} - \alpha_i^* g_{x_{i_o}} - \hat{\alpha}_i g_{x_{i_o}} = \quad (13)$$

$$x_{i_o} - (\alpha_i^* + \hat{\alpha}_i) g_{x_{i_o}}, \quad i = 1, \dots, m,$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^n \hat{\lambda}_j y_{rj} \geq y_{r_o}^* + \hat{\beta}_r g_{y_{r_o}} =$$

$$y_{r_o} + \beta_r^* g_{y_{r_o}} + \hat{\beta}_r g_{y_{r_o}} = \quad (14)$$

$$y_{r_o} + (\beta_r^* + \hat{\beta}_r) g_{y_{r_o}}, \quad r = 1, \dots, s,$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^n \hat{z}_{ij} c_{ij} \leq c_{io}^* - \hat{\sigma}_i g_{c_{io}} = c_{io} - \sigma_i^* g_{c_{io}} - \hat{\sigma}_i g_{c_{io}} = c_{io}^t - (\sigma_i^* + \hat{\sigma}_i) g_{c_{io}}, \quad i = 1, \dots, m, \quad (15)$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^n \hat{k}_{rj} p_{rj} \geq p_{ro}^* + \hat{\gamma}_r g_{p_{ro}} = p_{ro} + \gamma_r^* g_{p_{ro}} + \hat{\gamma}_r g_{p_{ro}} = p_{ro} + (\gamma_r^* + \hat{\gamma}_r) g_{p_{ro}}, \quad r = 1, \dots, s, \quad (16)$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^n \hat{z}_{ij} = 1, \quad i = 1, \dots, m, \quad (17)$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^n \hat{k}_{rj} = 1, \quad r = 1, \dots, s, \quad (18)$$

We can rewrite the above constraints as,

$$\sum_{j=1}^n \hat{\lambda}_j x_{ij} \leq x_{io} - \tilde{\alpha}_i g_{x_{io}}, \quad i = 1, \dots, m, \quad (19)$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^n \hat{\lambda}_j y_{rj} \geq y_{ro} + \tilde{\beta}_r g_{y_{ro}}, \quad r = 1, \dots, s,$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^n \hat{z}_{ij} c_{ij} \leq c_{io} - \tilde{\sigma}_i g_{c_{io}}, \quad i = 1, \dots, m, \quad (20)$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^n \hat{k}_{rj} p_{rj} \geq p_{ro} + \tilde{\gamma}_r g_{p_{ro}}, \quad r = 1, \dots, s,$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^n \hat{z}_{ij} = 1, \quad i = 1, \dots, m, \quad (21)$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^n \hat{k}_{rj} = 1, \quad r = 1, \dots, s.$$

It means that $\tilde{\alpha}_i, \tilde{\sigma}_i (\forall i), \tilde{\beta}_r, \tilde{\gamma}_r (\forall r), \hat{\lambda}_j (\forall j), \hat{z}_{ij} (\forall i, \forall j), \hat{k}_{rj} (\forall r, \forall j)$, is a feasible solution of model (3) for $(x_{io}, y_{ro}, c_{io}, p_{ro})$. For this feasible solution, the value of the objective function will be

$$\tilde{D}_o = \frac{1}{4} \left(\frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^m (\tilde{\alpha}_i + \tilde{\sigma}_i) + \frac{1}{s} \sum_{r=1}^s (\tilde{\beta}_r + \tilde{\gamma}_r) \right) = \hat{D}_o + \bar{D}_o^*$$

. Since in the evaluation of

$(x_{io}, y_{ro}, c_{io}, p_{ro})$ by model (3),

$$\bar{D}_o^* = \frac{1}{4} \left(\frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^m (\alpha_i^* + \sigma_i^*) + \frac{1}{s} \sum_{r=1}^s (\beta_r^* + \gamma_r^*) \right)$$

is maximal, we have $\tilde{D}_o \leq \bar{D}_o^*$ and hence,

$$\hat{D}_o = 0.$$

Since $\hat{\alpha}_i, \hat{\sigma}_i (\forall i), \hat{\beta}_r, \hat{\gamma}_r (\forall r)$, is considered as the optimal solution of the model (3) in the evaluation of $(x_{io}^*, y_{ro}^*, c_{io}^*, p_{ro}^*)$, we have

$$\hat{D}_o = \frac{1}{4} \left(\frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^m (\hat{\alpha}_i + \hat{\sigma}_i) + \frac{1}{s} \sum_{r=1}^s (\hat{\beta}_r + \hat{\gamma}_r) \right) = 0$$

. On the other hand, according to model (3), $\hat{\alpha}_i, \hat{\sigma}_i, \hat{\beta}_r, \hat{\gamma}_r \geq 0 (\forall i, r)$. Therefore, it can be conclude that $\hat{\alpha}_i = \hat{\sigma}_i = \hat{\beta}_r = \hat{\gamma}_r = 0 (\forall i, r)$, and hence, according to the definition 3.1, the projection of DMU_o obtained by model (3) is profit efficient. \square

4. Decomposition of the proposed directional profit efficiency measure

Directional profit efficiency measure presented in the former section cannot be decomposed. Therefore, one cannot individualize quantity and price contributions to the profit inefficiency of under evaluation DMU. Following Portela and Tanassoulis [14], we can compute a directional profit inefficiency measure to express the proportion of optimal profit which can be obtained after applying the quantities (x_{io}^*, y_{ro}^*) and prices (c_{io}^*, p_{ro}^*) for DMU_o . We can compute and decompose this inefficiency into two components respectively, as

$$1 - PE_o = 1 - \frac{PR_o}{PR_o^*} = \frac{PR_o^* - PR_o}{PR_o^*}, \quad (22)$$

$$1 - PE_o = \frac{\sum_{r=1}^s p_{ro}^* (y_{ro}^* - y_{ro}) - \sum_{i=1}^m c_{io}^* (x_{io}^* - x_{io})}{PR_o^*} + \frac{\sum_{r=1}^s y_{ro} (p_{ro}^* - p_{ro}) - \sum_{i=1}^m x_{io} (c_{io}^* - c_{io})}{PR_o^*} \quad (23)$$

= quantity effect + price effect.

The first ratio in the right hand side of (23) represents the proportion of the increase in profit that is obtained after replacing the observed quantities of inputs and outputs with the optimal quantities (input/output inefficiency) and the second ratio represents the proportion that is obtained after replacing the observed prices of inputs and outputs with the optimal prices (market price inefficiency).

Decomposition of directional profit inefficiency measure can also be performed in a way that changes in quantities are weighted by observed prices instead of optimal prices and changes in prices are weighted by optimal quantities instead of observed quantities. This type of decomposition is shown in (24).

$$1 - PE_o = \frac{\sum_{r=1}^s p_{ro} (y_{ro}^* - y_{ro}) - \sum_{i=1}^m c_{io} (x_{io}^* - x_{io})}{PR_o^*} + \frac{\sum_{r=1}^s y_{ro}^* (p_{ro}^* - p_{ro}) - \sum_{i=1}^m x_{io}^* (c_{io}^* - c_{io})}{PR_o^*} \quad (24)$$

= quantity effect + price effect.

Furthermore, since the set of weights is arbitrary [11], decomposition can be expressed as follows:

$$1 - PE_o = \frac{\sum_{r=1}^s \left(\frac{p_{ro}^* + p_{ro}}{2} \right) (y_{ro}^* - y_{ro}) - \sum_{i=1}^m \left(\frac{c_{io}^* + c_{io}}{2} \right) (x_{io}^* - x_{io})}{PR_o^*} \quad (25)$$

$$+ \frac{\sum_{r=1}^s \left(\frac{y_{ro}^* + y_{ro}}{2} \right) (p_{ro}^* - p_{ro}) - \sum_{i=1}^m \left(\frac{x_{io}^* + x_{io}}{2} \right) (c_{io}^* - c_{io})}{PR_o^*}$$

$$= \text{quantity effect} + \text{price effect.}$$

= quantity effect + price effect.

Each component in (25) can be decomposed into two components, radial and mix components, which can consider instead of technical and allocative efficiency in classical cost decomposition. The decompositions for quantity and price effects are respectively exhibited in (26) and (27),

$$\text{quantity effect} = \frac{\sum_{r=1}^s \left(\frac{p_{ro}^* + p_{ro}}{2} \right) (y_{ro}^{*R} - y_{ro}) - \sum_{i=1}^m \left(\frac{c_{io}^* + c_{io}}{2} \right) (x_{io}^{*R} - x_{io})}{PR_o^*} + \quad (26)$$

$$\frac{\sum_{r=1}^s \left(\frac{p_{ro}^* + p_{ro}}{2} \right) (y_{ro}^* - y_{ro}^{*R}) - \sum_{i=1}^m \left(\frac{c_{io}^* + c_{io}}{2} \right) (x_{io}^* - x_{io}^{*R})}{PR_o^*},$$

price effect =

$$\frac{\sum_{r=1}^s \left(\frac{y_{ro}^* + y_{ro}}{2} \right) (p_{ro}^{*R} - p_{ro}) - \sum_{i=1}^m \left(\frac{x_{io}^* + x_{io}}{2} \right) (c_{io}^{*R} - c_{io})}{PR_o^{*R}} + \frac{\sum_{r=1}^s \left(\frac{y_{ro}^* + y_{ro}}{2} \right) (p_{ro}^* - p_{ro}^{*R}) - \sum_{i=1}^m \left(\frac{x_{io}^* + x_{io}}{2} \right) (c_{io}^* - c_{io}^{*R})}{PR_o^*}, \quad (27)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} x_{io}^{*R} &= x_{io} - (\min_i \alpha_i^*) g_{ix}, \\ c_{io}^{*R} &= c_{io} - (\min_i \sigma_i^*) g_{ic}, \quad i = 1, \dots, m, \\ y_{ro}^{*R} &= y_{ro} + (\min_r \beta_r^*) g_{ry}, \\ p_{ro}^{*R} &= p_{ro} + (\min_r \gamma_r^*) g_{rp}, \quad r = 1, \dots, s. \end{aligned} \quad (28)$$

In fact, $(\min_i \alpha_i^*)$ and $(\min_i \sigma_i^*)$ estimate respectively the maximal feasible

proportionate reduction in input quantities and prices. Similarly, $(\min_r \beta_r^*)$ and $(\min_r \gamma_r^*)$ estimate the maximal feasible proportionate expansion in output quantities and prices respectively, without altering the mix. Further reduction and expansion can be accomplished by changing the input/output quantities and prices proportions that are associated with the second components in (26) and (27).

The present decomposition is an extension of the approach expressed by Portela and Thanassoulis [11]. They used the Bennet indicators [18-20] to decompose the total cost savings and could separate the contribution of total cost which can be saved by changing the prices of inputs from that can be saved by changing the quantities.

5. Numerical example

5.1. Discussion on profit inefficiency and its decomposition

To demonstrate the ability of the proposed approach for evaluating the profit efficiency of DMUs, we design an illustrative example including five DMUs with two inputs and two outputs. We assume that the input and output price vectors are known, but units can somewhat influence them and therefore, improve their profit efficiency by selecting better price vectors and/or changing the input/output quantities. The input/output data are shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Quantity and price of inputs and outputs

DMU	x_1	x_2	c_1	c_2	y_1	y_2	p_1	p_2
DMU1	2	4	3	6	4	8	6	12
DMU2	4	8	3	6	2	4	6	12
DMU3	4	8	1	2	2	4	18	36
DMU4	4	8	4	2	2	4	30	50
DMU5	10	16	2	1	3	6	2	5

DMU1 and DMU2 use the same input/output price vectors. Input levels consumed by DMU1 are half of those of DMU2, but its output quantities are the double of the output quantities of DMU2. Thus, we expect the degree of inefficiency of DMU2 be

more than the degree of inefficiency of DMU1. This can be obtained by solving model (3) that its results are shown in Table 2. From the results in Table 4 it can be seen that two DMUs have the positive price effects, but quantity effect of DMU2 is only positive. It means that

for reducing the profit inefficiency, DMU2 must change either quantity or price of its inputs and outputs, but DMU1 only need to change its price vectors.

Table 2. Results of model 1

DMU	\bar{D}_o	α_1	α_2	β_1	β_2	σ_1	σ_2	γ_1	γ_2
DMU1	0.25	0	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
DMU2	1	0	0	3	3	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
DMU3	0.924	0	0	3	3	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.39
DMU4	0.875	0	0	3	3	0.5	0.5	0	0
DMU5	1.296	0.2	0	4.33	4.33	0.5	0	0.5	0.5

The results in Table 2 show that the degree of profit inefficiency of DMU3 is less than that of DMU2. It is because of the price vectors used by DMU3 is better than that of DMU2. From Table 4 we can also see that these two DMUs have almost the same quantity effects but different price effects. In addition, based on the obtained results, DMU5 is the most inefficient among other DMUs. From the value of its price and quantity effects, we can conclude to improve the profit efficiency, this DMU must improve its input and/or output levels and also their prices. These results are also clear from data in Table 1 and 3.

It can be seen that from Table 3, how DMUs change the quantities and prices of their inputs and outputs to be profit efficient. For example, DMU5 should change its input/outputs quantities and their prices from (10,16), (3,6), (2,1) and (2,5) to (8,16), (16,32), (1,1), and (3,7.5) respectively, to be profit efficient.

Table 5 shows the measure of radial and non- radial changes in quantity and price vectors that are needed to improve the profit efficiency of under evaluation DMU.

Table 3. Projection points and profit efficiencies

DMU	i_1	i_2	o_1	o_2	c_1	c_2	p_1	p_2	PE_o
DMU1	2	4	4	8	1.5	3	9	18	0.55
DMU2	4	8	8	16	1.5	3	9	18	0
DMU3	4	8	8	16	1	1	27	50	0.16
DMU4	4	8	8	16	2	1	30	50	0.22
DMU5	8	16	16	32	1	1	3	7.5	0

Table 4. The results of stage 1 of decomposition

DMU	$1 - PE_o$	quantity effect	price effect
DMU1	0.45	0	0.45
DMU2	1	0.68	0.32
DMU3	0.84	0.65	0.19
DMU4	0.78	0.76	0.02
DMU5	1	0.75	0.25

Table 5. The results of stage 2 of decomposition

DMU	Non-radial part of quantity effect	Radial part of quantity effect	Non-radial part of price effect	radial part of price effect
DMU1	0	0	0	0.45
DMU2	0	0.68	0	0.32
DMU3	0	0.65	0.02	0.17
DMU4	0	0.76	0	0.02
DMU5	0.01	0.74	0.03	0.22

5.2. An empirical application: profit efficiency in U.S. banking

In this section, we apply the proposed approach for evaluating the profit efficiency of 50 U.S. bank branches during the year 1996 (Tables 6 and 7). The data was taken from Ray [21]. In this example units are price taker, but we assume that they are interested to examine the contribution of market prices in their profit inefficiency and also to know which price vector is the best for earning the maximum profit. By using the proposed decomposition, we can identify the reasons of their profit inefficiencies (Tables 8) and present the target levels of input/output quantities and prices (Table 9 and 10). Each unit consumes four inputs consist of, transaction deposits (i_1), non-transaction deposits (i_2), labor (i_3), and

capital (i_4) for producing five outputs consist of, industrial loans (o_1), consumer loans (o_2), real estate loans (o_3), investments (o_4), and other income (o_5). We evaluate the profit efficiency of units by using the optimal solution of model (4) for an special direction vector as $g_{x_{io}} = x_{io}; i = 1, \dots, m$, $g_{y_{ro}} = y_{ro}; r = 1, \dots, s$, $g_{c_{io}} = c_{io}; i = 1, \dots, m$, and $g_{p_{ro}} = p_{ro}; r = 1, \dots, s$. In Table 8, the column 4 shows the obtained results of evaluating the profit inefficiency of bank branches by the proposed approach.

Table 6. Bank input quantity and price data

B	i_1	i_2	i_3	i_4	c_1	c_2	c_3	c_4
1	111.805	434.194	0.411	19.356	0.006905	0.054842	34.8856	0.22928
2	154.721	311.423	0.203	8.266	0.010044	0.029718	32.3448	0.46443
3	76.975	396.428	0.083	5.795	0.008522	0.049931	55.807	0.12045
4	77.369	361.009	0.205	7.576	0.013326	0.052387	29.3659	0.18598
5	33.051	424.549	0.189	9.207	0.010741	0.04696	32.312	0.23297
6	130.316	363.854	0.178	5.67	0.001727	0.046073	28.3483	0.21746
7	95.421	369.313	0.185	11.238	0.009547	0.058695	30.227	0.11799
8	141.98	284.723	0.248	8.822	0.008776	0.052089	37.4435	0.3854
9	84.012	422.808	0.192	7.861	0.008606	0.043124	38.1719	0.24539
10	79.081	354.272	0.256	6.988	0.013315	0.04072	31.3477	0.32055
11	36.78	382.783	0.142	10.189	0.023355	0.045605	37.9507	0.14516
12	94.138	284.341	0.218	10.237	0.007383	0.048108	28.8119	0.2152
13	64.621	316.446	0.144	3.07	0.005184	0.044077	28.6736	0.20651
14	101.855	338.586	0.21	11.547	0.002278	0.034839	30.4857	0.22517
15	99.539	316.927	0.27	20.199	0.006148	0.041928	31.5185	0.15149
16	181.594	304.163	0.205	8.888	0.010061	0.032657	50.4537	0.28904
17	79.715	382.693	0.255	7.698	0.010299	0.035185	27.9412	0.20512
18	171.637	297.141	0.191	8.668	0.015632	0.046608	40.7853	0.20558

19	108.916	287.656	0.184	6.237	0.024422	0.051249	29.9565	0.24964
20	215.757	279.379	0.195	8.01	0.013436	0.052527	32.851	0.26841
21	116.651	340.618	0.214	5.253	0.012207	0.049539	31.028	0.45764
22	78.89	351.791	0.212	9.458	0.006515	0.046061	34.9434	0.2639
23	171.298	285.875	0.251	5.186	0.007875	0.042718	35.6892	0.61955
24	131.046	282	0.229	5.471	0.005555	0.039862	35.3974	0.26595
25	129.676	316.831	0.226	10.43	0.017027	0.04534	29.208	0.21055
26	136.549	310.071	0.275	9.483	0.008297	0.041249	34.32	0.24096
27	168.394	301.344	0.261	18.676	0.006633	0.049667	43.5402	0.18082
28	174.401	274.875	0.207	9.586	0.000872	0.038396	42.7633	0.26966
29	174.94	302.552	0.247	5.857	0.009243	0.046518	34.081	0.45433
30	231.463	330.746	0.209	12.092	0.006558	0.039988	43.5789	0.27464
31	108.419	327.439	0.251	11.223	0.013881	0.04781	27.8486	0.18337
32	144.217	336.406	0.273	15.439	0.008515	0.046685	29.3956	0.15804
33	221.628	294.729	0.259	10.933	0.019831	0.04726	37.938	0.16811
34	85.677	354.134	0.18	7.776	0.010003	0.052525	30.1222	0.19792
35	139.87	337.857	0.28	3.926	0.009652	0.048334	29.0357	0.68161
36	187.583	294.983	0.241	8.219	0.012618	0.043379	48.0747	0.31099
37	118.168	369.407	0.273	9.955	0.007904	0.043545	35.8901	0.25364
38	155.287	430.204	0.299	8.993	0.012158	0.048689	31.097	0.35316
39	223.944	283.096	0.186	8.244	0.014352	0.046807	50.629	0.29415
40	154.83	280.436	0.263	9.201	0.004741	0.043525	35.4791	0.35811
41	131.127	365.442	0.32	16.014	0.006627	0.048002	29.9063	0.18446
42	94.432	368.091	0.229	8.505	0.0097	0.052302	34.5109	0.31193
43	222.651	282.545	0.299	15.718	0.004905	0.034143	38.759	0.29648
44	116.617	326.074	0.231	8.274	0.009741	0.046244	29.1515	0.29236
45	193.806	236.212	0.175	5.151	0.018446	0.044308	43.6743	0.56688
46	73.233	486.438	0.22	3.46	0.007032	0.04908	49.705	0.82601
47	151.344	349.154	0.359	8.551	0.015567	0.024725	34.1309	0.42042
48	161.773	549.27	0.257	6.58	0.004179	0.04266	35.5681	0.49635
49	179.098	354.372	1.313	12.878	0.010257	0.047176	36.8104	0.8176
50	95.447	321.75	0.264	11.692	0.008832	0.045887	36.4924	0.17918

Table 7. Bank output quantity and price data

B	o_1	o_2	o_3	o_4	o_5	p_1	p_2	p_3	p_4	p_5
1	42.654	281.66	141.454	75.657	14.688	0.21967	0.1325	0.05154	0.06377	1
2	32.985	70.183	109.357	191.057	4.318	0.07849	0.10477	0.06728	0.024	1
3	75.474	8.832	290.18	155.438	0.944	0.0996	0.07892	0.07404	0.06026	1
4	57.935	74.259	196.96	98.871	2.433	0.09431	0.09999	0.07976	0.0555	1
5	39.382	49.084	316.682	48.674	3.138	0.12155	0.12601	0.06853	0.06811	1
6	41.054	33.29	247.589	148.686	3.751	0.08245	0.08567	0.08244	0.0547	1
7	50.278	75.52	286.727	53.148	3.015	0.09453	0.07766	0.09412	0.06933	1
8	87.693	52.779	165.261	56.463	9.432	0.09712	0.1374	0.05984	0.063564	1
9	28.026	55.779	239.118	208.537	6.249	0.09591	0.094	0.08016	0.057088	1
10	58.602	31.585	278.365	128.449	4.912	0.2933	0.15533	0.03119	0.054917	1
11	35.884	44.263	174.7	256.871	4.111	0.0938	0.09191	0.08498	0.05187	1
12	44.125	48.241	210.124	158.738	3.225	0.10701	0.092	0.08069	0.0529	1
13	55.637	64.486	150.87	185.25	4.47	0.07427	0.14135	0.07607	0.064092	1

14	31.702	105.386	200.102	85.255	6.652	0.0917	0.09085	0.08456	0.062401	1
15	34.788	50.011	246.324	159.393	3.236	0.10423	0.0797	0.08195	0.055	1
16	56.553	6.625	222.897	157.066	6.156	0.10938	0.19668	0.07467	0.0527	1
17	18.52	222.234	165.645	66.92	3.985	0.11134	0.08149	0.08404	0.0761	1
18	44.031	29.02	243.223	171.917	5.783	0.12314	0.08218	0.06223	0.06659	1
19	52.169	36.165	119.37	205.256	1.862	0.08449	0.08199	0.06468	0.05557	1
20	120.032	87.585	208.67	87.041	6.371	0.08048	0.07669	0.08122	0.07804	1
21	19.113	28.154	262.832	162.963	6.074	0.08743	0.12531	0.08745	0.06515	1
22	45.141	14.585	225.703	169.499	4.402	0.10492	0.0964	0.07889	0.063493	1
23	61.691	101.368	180.709	90.164	6.773	0.25077	0.07519	0.03253	0.056985	1
24	65.723	86.496	249.611	52.84	11.689	0.0881	0.09345	0.07759	0.066976	1
25	44.266	88.868	235.361	116.791	4.256	0.09987	0.10655	0.07983	0.069517	1
26	38.908	75.033	229.876	111.597	2.511	0.12327	0.08522	0.0766	0.068174	1
27	109.58	33.155	184.179	176.744	5.741	0.0689	0.11045	0.08624	0.068421	1
28	159.743	35.745	156.233	107.137	3.785	0.08646	0.08351	0.08051	0.0584	1
29	72.329	53.262	137.252	140.817	7.591	0.09664	0.11355	0.10683	0.07362	1
30	106.34	23.693	226.54	161.803	5.431	0.10021	0.10328	0.08419	0.053299	1
31	54.868	69.261	168.534	166.432	3.497	0.11752	0.09523	0.0743	0.060139	1
32	32.195	35.251	209.341	143.877	4.257	0.07625	0.1059	0.08361	0.062129	1
33	78.17	118.097	209.424	103.907	11.349	0.09687	0.11053	0.08966	0.05992	1
34	84.317	54.948	229.375	99.756	6.116	0.08989	0.09938	0.07628	0.067625	1
35	81.401	55.116	180.483	149.994	5.789	0.08437	0.09975	0.07544	0.0548	1
36	40.884	10.652	233.734	186.361	4.739	0.08568	0.08271	0.09283	0.061853	1
37	61.556	73.014	263.974	103.391	8.075	0.10053	0.10191	0.08727	0.0463	1
38	112.47	105.948	239.786	139.941	3.848	0.09438	0.06856	0.08076	0.057238	1
39	14.875	109.965	62.685	131.78	6.642	0.0876	0.13264	0.07739	0.060426	1
40	59.532	78.519	187.906	59.538	9.14	0.1007	0.08664	0.07836	0.069367	1
41	85.824	73.366	191.824	207.116	5.657	0.20274	0.08764	0.03422	0.061444	1
42	79.859	100.083	230.688	88.693	4.363	0.09003	0.09947	0.07976	0.05592	1
43	48.902	4.89	333.867	56.814	7.527	0.09431	0.20716	0.08438	0.07774	1
44	30.466	42.9	289.771	156.866	3.087	0.09607	0.10193	0.08328	0.062289	1
45	40.999	5.203	304.792	114.665	4.191	0.08456	0.12839	0.08187	0.066167	1
46	279.037	0.428	28.666	27.217	9.76	0.10653	0.09346	0.03436	0.05515	1
47	40.818	30.847	191.266	206.572	9.231	0.16385	0.184	0.05278	0.057956	1
48	63.333	86.147	167.996	280.677	16.237	0.09663	0.1114	0.0765	0.0695	1
49	51.656	107.739	228.967	57.192	77.482	0.07426	0.09884	0.0754	0.067107	1
50	17.836	6.684	204.33	321.243	4.704	0.07053	0.07346	0.08183	0.064001	1

Table 8. Profit inefficiency and its decomposition in U.S. banking

B	\bar{D}_o	PE_o	$1 - PE_o$	quantity effect		price effect	
				radial part	Non-radial part	radial part	Non-radial part
1	0.183	0.41	0.59	0	0	0.12	0.47
2	0.287	0.17	0.83	0	0.27	0.1	0.47
3	0.182	0.33	0.67	0	0	0.01	0.66
4	0.343	0.2	0.8	0	0.24	0.03	0.53
5	0.183	0.27	0.73	0	0	0.1	0.63
6	0.32	0.32	0.68	0	0.21	0.01	0.46
7	0.13	0.41	0.59	0	0	0	0.59

8	0.298	0.22	0.78	0	0.19	0.16	0.43
9	0.299	0.34	0.66	0	0.13	0.15	0.38
10	0.157	0.5	0.5	0	0	0.08	0.42
11	0.176	0.37	0.63	0	0	0.12	0.5
12	0.182	0.4	0.6	0	0	0.02	0.58
13	0.167	0.52	0.48	0	0	0.01	0.47
14	0.273	0.43	0.57	0	0.18	0.04	0.35
15	0.231	0.36	0.64	0	0.11	0.07	0.46
16	0.658	0.27	0.73	0	0.27	0.11	0.35
17	0.141	0.51	0.49	0	0	0	0.48
18	0.219	0.36	0.64	0	0.02	0.21	0.41
19	0.193	0.15	0.85	0	0	0.07	0.78
20	0.169	0.46	0.54	0	0	0.09	0.46
21	0.171	0.46	0.54	0	0	0.07	0.47
22	0.375	0.28	0.72	0	0.19	0.12	0.41
23	0.18	0.42	0.58	0	0	0.16	0.42
24	0.177	0.55	0.45	0	0	0.09	0.35
25	0.252	0.4	0.6	0	0.13	0.02	0.45
26	0.453	0.26	0.74	0	0.3	0.09	0.35
27	0.219	0.35	0.65	0	0.06	0.26	0.34
28	0.158	0.43	0.57	0	0	0	0.57
29	0.238	0.46	0.54	0	0.12	0.11	0.3
30	0.196	0.42	0.58	0	0	0.22	0.37
31	0.342	0.27	0.73	0	0.22	0	0.51
32	0.436	0.18	0.82	0	0.4	0.03	0.39
33	0.171	0.49	0.51	0	0	0.15	0.36
34	0.17	0.4	0.6	0	0	0.05	0.55
35	0.242	0.28	0.72	0	0.11	0.03	0.59
36	0.381	0.31	0.69	0	0.16	0.29	0.24
37	0.267	0.38	0.62	0	0.15	0.12	0.36
38	0.326	0.24	0.76	0	0.21	0.06	0.49
39	0.204	0.22	0.78	0	0	0.39	0.39
40	0.277	0.36	0.64	0	0.15	0.12	0.38
41	0.24	0.35	0.65	0	0.11	0.04	0.51
42	0.193	0.32	0.68	0	0	0.14	0.54
43	0.476	0.37	0.63	0	0.28	0.13	0.22
44	0.171	0.46	0.54	0	0	0.03	0.51
45	0.187	0.43	0.57	0	0	0.23	0.34
46	0.217	0.1	0.9	0	0	0.44	0.46
47	0.291	0.32	0.68	0	0.32	0	0.36

48	0.178	0.49	0.51	0	0	0.14	0.37
49	0.186	0.47	0.53	0	0	0.25	0.29
50	0.172	0.44	0.56	0	0	0.17	0.38

Table 9. Target levels of input/output quantities

B	i_1	i_2	i_3	i_4	o_1	o_2	o_3	o_4	o_5
1	111.805	434.194	0.411	19.356	42.654	281.66	141.454	75.657	14.688
2	73.579	311.423	0.203	6.424	43.172	70.183	153.721	191.057	6.255
3	76.975	396.428	0.083	5.795	75.474	8.832	290.18	155.438	0.944
4	77.369	361.009	0.205	4.614	60.294	74.259	196.96	173.222	7.441
5	33.051	424.549	0.189	9.207	39.382	49.084	316.682	48.674	3.138
6	102.956	363.854	0.178	5.146	71.731	64.929	247.589	148.686	6.813
7	95.421	369.313	0.185	11.238	50.278	75.52	286.727	53.148	3.015
8	129.566	284.723	0.237	6.015	87.693	65.774	165.261	126.318	9.432
9	84.012	422.808	0.192	5.305	73.943	62.683	239.118	208.537	6.249
10	79.081	354.272	0.256	6.988	58.602	31.585	278.365	128.449	4.912
11	36.78	382.783	0.142	10.189	35.884	44.263	174.7	256.871	4.111
12	94.138	284.341	0.218	10.237	44.125	48.241	210.124	158.738	3.225
13	64.621	316.446	0.144	3.07	55.637	64.486	150.87	185.25	4.47
14	101.855	338.586	0.21	5.507	60.538	105.386	200.102	129.879	7.731
15	99.539	316.927	0.211	8.232	34.788	50.011	246.324	159.393	4.308
16	156.599	304.163	0.205	6.907	59.68	65.925	222.897	157.066	6.907
17	79.715	382.693	0.255	7.698	18.52	222.234	165.645	66.92	3.985
18	148.424	297.141	0.191	5.842	44.031	29.02	243.223	171.917	5.783
19	108.916	287.656	0.184	6.237	52.169	36.165	119.37	205.256	1.862
20	215.757	279.379	0.195	8.01	120.032	87.585	208.67	87.041	6.371
21	116.651	340.618	0.214	5.253	19.113	28.154	262.832	162.963	6.074
22	78.89	351.791	0.188	8.517	46.036	59.301	225.703	169.499	6.532
23	171.298	285.875	0.251	5.186	61.691	101.368	180.709	90.164	6.773
24	131.046	282	0.229	5.471	65.723	86.496	249.611	52.84	11.689
25	129.676	316.831	0.226	6.312	56.517	88.868	235.361	116.791	8.545
26	122.394	310.071	0.275	5.315	62.072	76.241	229.876	111.597	13.178
27	157.226	301.344	0.261	10.372	109.58	35.675	184.179	176.744	6.61
28	174.401	274.875	0.207	9.586	159.743	35.745	156.233	107.137	3.785
29	77.584	302.552	0.226	3.86	72.329	58.341	137.252	140.817	9.934
30	231.463	330.746	0.209	12.092	106.34	23.693	226.54	161.803	5.431
31	81.628	327.439	0.251	4.165	60.557	70.911	168.534	166.432	11.202
32	144.217	336.406	0.273	6.316	85.804	85.667	209.341	143.877	11.761
33	221.628	294.729	0.259	10.933	78.17	118.097	209.424	103.907	11.349
34	85.677	354.134	0.18	7.776	84.317	54.948	229.375	99.756	6.116

35	93.967	337.857	0.178	3.926	81.401	60.044	180.483	149.994	6.513
36	155.066	294.983	0.22	8.219	47.062	43.735	233.734	186.361	6.252
37	118.168	369.407	0.209	5.582	75.63	78.496	263.974	134.895	8.877
38	155.287	430.204	0.299	7.051	112.47	105.948	266.957	139.941	13.331
39	223.944	283.096	0.186	8.244	14.875	109.965	62.685	131.78	6.642
40	102.089	280.436	0.205	4.905	59.532	78.519	187.906	101.779	9.14
41	131.127	365.442	0.214	6.744	85.824	73.366	204.212	207.116	6.291
42	94.432	368.091	0.229	8.505	79.859	100.083	230.688	88.693	4.363
43	205.957	282.545	0.227	6.06	53.012	27.052	333.867	115.225	7.527
44	116.617	326.074	0.231	8.274	30.466	42.9	289.771	156.866	3.087
45	193.806	236.212	0.175	5.151	40.999	5.203	304.792	114.665	4.191
46	73.233	486.438	0.22	3.46	279.037	0.428	28.666	27.217	9.76
47	108.967	349.154	0.252	6.276	66.064	67.984	191.266	206.572	9.231
48	161.773	549.27	0.257	6.58	63.333	86.147	167.996	280.677	16.237
49	179.098	354.372	1.313	12.878	51.656	107.739	228.967	57.192	77.482
50	95.447	321.75	0.264	11.692	17.836	6.684	204.33	321.243	4.704

Table 10. Target levels of input/output prices

B	c_1	c_2	c_3	c_4	P_1	P_2	P_3	P_4	P_5
1	0.003	0.027	27.849	0.118	0.293	0.199	0.077	0.078	1
2	0.005	0.025	27.849	0.232	0.118	0.157	0.101	0.036	1
3	0.004	0.025	27.904	0.118	0.149	0.118	0.107	0.078	1
4	0.007	0.026	27.849	0.118	0.141	0.15	0.107	0.078	1
5	0.005	0.025	27.849	0.118	0.182	0.189	0.103	0.078	1
6	0.001	0.025	27.849	0.118	0.124	0.129	0.107	0.078	1
7	0.005	0.029	27.849	0.118	0.142	0.116	0.107	0.078	1
8	0.004	0.026	27.849	0.193	0.146	0.206	0.09	0.078	1
9	0.004	0.025	27.849	0.123	0.144	0.141	0.107	0.078	1
10	0.007	0.025	27.849	0.16	0.293	0.207	0.047	0.078	1
11	0.012	0.025	27.849	0.118	0.141	0.138	0.107	0.078	1
12	0.004	0.025	27.849	0.118	0.161	0.138	0.107	0.078	1
13	0.003	0.025	27.849	0.118	0.111	0.207	0.107	0.078	1
14	0.001	0.025	27.849	0.118	0.138	0.136	0.107	0.078	1
15	0.003	0.025	27.849	0.118	0.156	0.12	0.107	0.078	1
16	0.005	0.025	27.849	0.145	0.164	0.207	0.107	0.078	1
17	0.005	0.025	27.849	0.118	0.167	0.122	0.107	0.078	1
18	0.008	0.025	27.849	0.118	0.185	0.123	0.093	0.078	1
19	0.012	0.026	27.849	0.125	0.127	0.123	0.097	0.078	1

20	0.007	0.026	27.849	0.134	0.121	0.115	0.107	0.078	1
21	0.006	0.025	27.849	0.229	0.131	0.188	0.107	0.078	1
22	0.003	0.025	27.849	0.132	0.157	0.145	0.107	0.078	1
23	0.004	0.025	27.849	0.31	0.293	0.113	0.049	0.078	1
24	0.003	0.025	27.849	0.133	0.132	0.14	0.107	0.078	1
25	0.009	0.025	27.849	0.118	0.15	0.16	0.107	0.078	1
26	0.004	0.025	27.849	0.12	0.185	0.128	0.107	0.078	1
27	0.003	0.025	27.849	0.118	0.103	0.166	0.107	0.078	1
28	0.001	0.025	27.849	0.135	0.13	0.125	0.107	0.078	1
29	0.005	0.025	27.849	0.227	0.145	0.17	0.107	0.078	1
30	0.003	0.025	27.849	0.137	0.15	0.155	0.107	0.078	1
31	0.007	0.025	27.849	0.118	0.176	0.143	0.107	0.078	1
32	0.004	0.025	27.849	0.118	0.114	0.159	0.107	0.078	1
33	0.01	0.025	27.849	0.118	0.145	0.166	0.107	0.078	1
34	0.005	0.026	27.849	0.118	0.135	0.149	0.107	0.078	1
35	0.005	0.025	27.849	0.341	0.127	0.15	0.107	0.078	1
36	0.006	0.025	27.849	0.155	0.129	0.124	0.107	0.078	1
37	0.004	0.025	27.849	0.127	0.151	0.153	0.107	0.069	1
38	0.006	0.025	27.849	0.177	0.142	0.103	0.107	0.078	1
39	0.007	0.025	27.849	0.147	0.131	0.199	0.107	0.078	1
40	0.002	0.025	27.849	0.179	0.151	0.13	0.107	0.078	1
41	0.003	0.025	27.849	0.118	0.293	0.131	0.051	0.078	1
42	0.005	0.026	27.849	0.156	0.135	0.149	0.107	0.078	1
43	0.002	0.025	27.849	0.148	0.141	0.207	0.107	0.078	1
44	0.005	0.025	27.849	0.146	0.144	0.153	0.107	0.078	1
45	0.009	0.025	27.849	0.283	0.127	0.193	0.107	0.078	1
46	0.004	0.025	27.849	0.413	0.16	0.14	0.052	0.078	1
47	0.008	0.025	27.849	0.21	0.246	0.207	0.079	0.078	1
48	0.002	0.025	27.849	0.248	0.145	0.167	0.107	0.078	1
49	0.005	0.025	27.849	0.409	0.111	0.148	0.107	0.078	1
50	0.004	0.025	27.849	0.118	0.106	0.11	0.107	0.078	1

For instance, it can be seen in the $1 - PE_o$ column in Table 8, DMU2 is profit inefficient. It is clear that; the contribution of price inefficiency is 0.56 and is greater than the amount of quantity inefficiency 0.27. It means that the market prices have the important contribution in the inefficiency of DMU2. In addition, the results show that DMU2 can remove only a small part of its profit inefficiency by the proportionate changes in the input/output prices. Further improvement can be accrued with altering the mix of input/output prices and also quantities.

Tables 9 and 10 show the target levels of input/output quantities and prices, respectively. For instance, in order to improve the profit efficiency, DMU2 must decrease the quantities of its inputs 1 and 4 respectively, to 73.579 and 6.424 and also decrease all input prices respectively, to 0.005, 0.025, 27.849 and 0.232. To further improvement in profit efficiency it must increase the quantities of outputs 1, 3 and 5 respectively, to 43.172, 153.721 and 6.255 and also increase all output prices except output 5, respectively, to 0.118, 0.157, 0.101 and 0.036.

6. Conclusion

In competitive markets, profit maximization may be accomplished by correcting the quantities of inputs and/or outputs. If DMUs have ability to vary the market prices, to maximize profit they can correct both the input/output quantities and prices. This paper developed a non-radial directional distance function approach to determine a degree of profit inefficiency of DMUs in non-competitive markets. The proposed measure satisfies the important properties, units invariance and translation invariance.

The current approach can help to units for examining their performances and identify the reasons of their inefficiency and remove its resources. The optimal solution of the proposed model presents the best input/output quantities and prices, and by using them, DMUs can have minimum cost and maximum revenue, and hence maximum profit. The profit inefficiency measure obtained by the optimal solution to the proposed model was

decomposed into two components. This type of decomposition determines the amount of the profit inefficiency that is occurred because of the inappropriate selection of input/output quantities and input/output prices.

In fact, the approach proposed in the current paper yields information about profit efficiency and help decision makers to improve it by correcting the input/output quantities and prices simultaneously.

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