

The Role of Political Elite Relations in the Elites Circulation

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Abstract: *Political elite's relations for maintaining power is an important key to analyse the government's behaviour. This paper presents a new network policy among the Iranian political elite using Social Network Analysis Method. How do they make the network? Is there Elite to Elite family relation based on ideological united or common interests? Network boundary is the political elites who have kinship relationship between themselves. The data were gathered by studying documents, biographies, interview, and web pages of Iranian political elites. We found "Marriage" is a new policy for raising, gaining and holding the power. We found there are 88 family groups and 1193 political elites who have family ties. The largest group consists of reformers and conservatives and has 690 actors. There are a strong family relation and weak elite circulation. The relationship between political elites is based on the concentration of power, wealth, and information in an intra-group network, so that the positioning of each group according to its structural position in the power layers (centre, half-perimeter, around).*

Keywords: *Social Network Analysis, Kinship Relationship, Islamic Republic of Iran, Elite Circulation, Political Elite.*

Introduction

Power arises from occupying advantageous positions in networks of relations (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005) "People, who are in a good position in the social relationship network, can set up the relationships of others and with themselves. In this case, power is a structural ability and condition that enables a person to influence others and achieve his desired goal" (Rafipour, 2004). Climbing the steps of power by bridging others (authorities and powerful people) can question social mobility on the basis of competency. But how can one bridge important people? "Kinship can be a basic source for those who marry an important person," (Bruggeman, 2008, p. 103). But kinship becomes more important when it comes to the structure of power. Marriage is one of the options for bridging to important others and is the most lasting relationship in a power network. If this happens in the core of political power, the result will be that influential and powerful groups would have networks with diverse and varied resources, and in addition to social influence, having access to information in the power layers, while the Powerless groups will have weak networks and will be stuck in kind of a network enclosure; that is, the structural conditions and the desire to network with a group similar to the pyramid of political power, will result into social reproduction of social inequalities in a structural way, which is one of the main obstacles in political development, democracy, social mobility, and equal opportunities. In other words, network relations and social closure have made political development difficult and face a crisis.

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“Governments are different from each other, as our societies, both in their political and in their daily life. Yet, governments and societies are not that different, making it impossible to find categorizations that would cover the nature of various political systems under one notion. For better understand the nature of a political system, one has to look at both the similarities between, as well as the uniqueness of governments and societies” (Rakel, 2008, p. 28). In Iran, after the Islamic revolution (1979), new political elite raised to power who share Kinship Relations and marriage in many cases. Building a Kinship Relation with an important person in Iranian politics, especially with important clergy, is a start to gain power. Not only they have taken monopoly over valuable resources (power, wealth, social capital, information, prestige), political factions have more challenges in their relations over more benefit from valuable resources. Therefore, Inequalities and discrimination are the most fundamental problems in society. Familialism has caused people to rely solely on the seat of power for reasons of relative and relative meritocracy. Leonard Binder, a former professor of political science at UCLA said: Familialism in Iran is a serious commitment. More than half a century after this comment, it is still the case (Boroujerdi & Rahimkhani, 2018).

The relationship between elites is from a complete consensus to a complete contradiction; Ideological consensus and common interests, agreeing on common interests without ideological consensus, the coalition against the third group for temporary interests such as elections, the conflict of interests which is more in favor of economic interests, and, ultimately, ideological contradictions and conflicts over fundamental principles (Yazdaninasab, 2015). Marriage represents a structural consensus (for gaining interests) and value correlation (ideological). Is there Elite to Elite family relation based on ideological united or common interests? How they make policy and govern? And who are the key actors?

The Framework of Elite to Elite Relationship

According to **classical theories**, the elites have an ideological consensus and shared interests, which is why they form a class. Classical Schools of Elitism like Mosca (1911), Pareto (1991) and Michels (1911) emphasized on consensus. Pareto emphasized the psychological and intellectual superiority of elites and capabilities in their work or in some activities (Higley & Burton, 1998). Mosca and Michels emphasized the sociological and personal characteristics of elites. Mosca considers the elite as a class; a class that is integrated, coherent, and uncontroversial. In his view, there is the only conflict between the elite class and the majority of the masses. The organization and relations of the minority group hold power in their hands. Based on Mosca, the source of elite capacity for the government is the organized relations of the elite class (Mills, 1956).

According to contemporary elitism, elite relationship based on consensus. C. Wright Mills by “The Power Elite” refers to political, economic, and military circles which as an intricate set of overlapping cliques share key decisions. They know privately each other, often married to each other, and have shared schools and clubs (Mills, 1956). In Michael Mann view (1986), there are four main sources of powers: Ideological, Economic, Military and Political power; IEMP model of organized power network (1986, pp. 1-2). In William Dom Hoff’s view, overlapping networks of power (IEMP Model) are the best suits power structure research. He believes that there are three primary indicators of power, which can be summarized as (1) who benefits? (2) Who governs? And (3) who wins? He considers the best way to achieve the overall structure of power is the small social upper class at the top of the wealth, income, and status ladders. This is due to the social upper class is the most visible and accessible aspect of the power equation. It is not necessarily the heart of the matter, but it is nonetheless the best place to get a handle on the overall power structure. "Social class" is a set of intermarrying and interacting families who see each other as equals, share a common style of life, and have a common viewpoint on the world. These various social institutions are important in creating "social cohesion" and a sense of in-group "we-ness." This sense of cohesion is heightened by the fact that people can be excluded from these organizations. Members of the upper class usually come to think of themselves as "special" or "superior." They think they are better than other people, and certainly better able to lead and govern (Domhoff, 2005).

Pierre Bourdieu's discussion in the "distinction" is that the power elite make culture as a tool for domination. They create their own lifestyle and make a distinction between themselves and others. For him, class relations are impotent. He begins by asking what the relationship between the cultural behaves of people and their social class. In his view, power is a kind of social relationship, because the analysis of this relationship is an analysis of inequalities and distinctions (Bourdieu, 1984). Using the concept of capital, he states that the power elites legitimate the unequal distribution of capital by reproducing dominant positions; so that capital flows into each other in a rotating process and the network. They give the values to the power elites. He believes that capital is not an object but a set of relationships. "Culture (or power) is always the product of the social relations of production and consumption. Also, he uses the field to analyze society, and his most important goal is to examine the process of social domination. For Bourdieu, "the overall volume of capital, understood as the set of actually usable resources and powers--economic capital, cultural capital and also social capital" (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 131). The field is a network of relationships that exist between objective positions. According to Bourdieu, the ruling class seems to share interests and consensus (Jenkins, 2002). The ruling class has an ideological consensus and common interests. At this modern elite theory, their focus is the state, that analysis of state can be a key to understanding the elite's roles and functions in the society. "As the dramatic globalization slowly intervenes in every nation-state, there occurs an external hollowing-out that creates another elite called policy-making elite. These are the elites higher than the state elite which influence the policy-making of state because of its established international policies. This approach aims to help comprehend that elite, as stated by Evans, is present in every organized society. Another approach to understanding contemporary society is the statecraft which puts its focus on political elites – party leaders, top civil servants, and policy advisers. This approach determines the tactics and strategies of politicians to win in elections and maintain and preserve power in the state. Policy-network is an approach "categorizes the relationship between groups and governments.

The New Elitism paradigm is trying to understand modern society and try to provide four propositions for understanding new questions; hence, new concepts are created: State, Policy-making elite (These are the elites higher than the state elite which influences the policy-making of state because of its established international policies like party leaders, top government officials, politician advisers), Policy-network (is an approach categorizes the relationship between groups, third sector organizations and government/government agencies), and, the Urban Regime Theory (URT; an approach towards understanding contemporary society). The theory assumes that the collaboration of government and business leaders makes a successful system. The relationship between business and government leaders is symbiotic where both can benefit (Meldgyriemae, 2014). "New elitists propose a typology of elite configuration; elites could be (a) *disunited*, (b) *consensually united* or (c) *ideologically united*. Consensual unity is associated with stable democracies, while elite disunity is associated with unstable democracies and authoritarian regimes. Ideological unity relates to totalitarian regimes, adopting Linz's (2000) typology, where elites legitimize and submit to a highly centralized ideological command ... How elite configuration is an important cause of political regimes" (López, 2013, p. 5).

New Elitism argues that how consensually united elites have fostered forty-five liberal democracies and how disunited or ideologically united elites have thus far prevented liberal democracy in more than one hundred other countries (Higley & Burton, 2006). In fact, most democratization processes are a result of elite settlements. "An elite settlement is a rare event in the history of national communities, in which previously confronting elites choose to negotiate a new political order, thus recognizing each other as legitimate political actors" (Higley & Gunther, 1992; Higley & Burton, 2006; Lopez, 2013, p. 5).

According to Lachmann approach; elite conflict seems yet more tenuously related to the rise of capitalism (DuPlessis, 2002). He shows in "Capitalists in Spite of themselves" (2000) that relations among elites (monarchy and church, or between farmers and businessmen) rather than class struggle, or any other set of factors proposed by other historians, primarily determined the creation or non-creation of capitalism). In his view, Reformation is as a "structural transformation" in Europe, not an ideology. The revolution is also the result of two parallel processes: the elite conflict and the occasional movement

of the masses. Therefore, Lachman believes in the elite conflict rather than the consensus among them (Foran, 2003).

As a consequence, the contemporary and classical elite theorists agree that the functioning of governments can be explained through elite behavior; “thus, the core of elite theory relies on explaining elite behavior, elite interaction, elite transformation and, ultimately, the connection between those instances and state outcomes” (Lopez, 2013, p. 1) and modern theories of elitism for understanding modern society are trying to create new concepts; state, policies, and network policy. In which, groups and organizations (to maintain power) have a network connection between themselves (Meldgrime, 2014).




Fig (1): Elite to Elite Relation based on the severity of the conflict

Elite Research Approaches

Who has the power and influences the social-political decision-making process? (Arslan, 1999). Who are the elite? There are three types of theories; classical, contemporary, and modern theories. According to elite theories “Elite” is who has power or influence on public opinion (Hoffmann- Lange, 2006) and as actors control resources, occupy key positions and relate through power networks (Yamokoski & JK, 2008). “On the other words, Elite is a person or a group that has the capacity to utilize power resources, and his actions having a systematic and continuous social impact on a macro level over time” (Yazdaninasab, 2015, pp. 106-107). The concept of ‘Elite’ is based on the notion that every society holds a ruling minority, a group that controls and disputes the most important power sources. (Lopez, 2013, p. 1). Four basic methods of elite identification are available; the three most widely used methods of identifying political elite: Decisional, Positional, Reputational methods (Higley & Pakulski, 2012) and the Reported Elite method that has been introduced by Hicks and his co-authors (Hicks, J., Traag, V., Reinanda, R., 2015). This work used all models for identifying political elite in IRI.

- **The Positional Method** starts out from the formal structure of authority and used for studying national elite (Hoffmann- Lange, 2006). Weber calls them "command positions" (Pakulski, 2005; Scott, 2003), Also according to Mills, the power elite is politicians, corporate executives, and military leaders (Mills, 1956). “As done by decisional analysts, they concentrate on formal power and direct participation” (Arslan, 1999, p. 28).
- **The Decisional Method** identifies elite by studying the decision-making process for key political issues. “The validity of this method depends primarily on the choice of the policy issues used for determining the influential actors” (Hoffmann- Lange, 2006, p. 4). Robert Dahl’s study is a classic example. This method focuses on acting political decision making and influence on strategic policy decisions (Hoffmann- Lange, 2006).
- **“The Reputational Method** relies on experts who are asked to name the most powerful individuals in the community” (Hoffmann- Lange, 2006, p. 3). “Reputational analysts are concerned with the reputation, asking selected respondents who have more power in the organizational hierarchy, who is at the top and who is at the bottom. They understand power more widely and are concerned with either formal power or informal power, as well as direct or indirect participation in the political decision-making process” (Arslan, 1999, p. 28)

- **The Reported elite method** identifies elite by repetition in the media. The basic technique of the reported elite method is the automatic extraction of people's names from the digitized newspaper article. This method is a combination of the three old methods that lead to better identification of political elite and has two major assumptions: the media (which the political elite pulled out of them) are representative of society, and the frequency of repeated pressures represents the political power of individuals. Compared to the other existing methods, this method casts a much wider net when searching for the political elite, resulting in many more people from civil society, far fewer formal politicians, and challenging conventional notions of who is political elite. (Hicks, J., Traag, V., Reinanda, R., 2015).

Methodology

This research seeks to find out the structure and pattern of political elite kinship relation in Iran, therefore, it has been done by network analysis and computational methods and technique, because network analysis method focuses not on the characteristics of actors but on the links between them (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). Also, Social network analysis is a perfect tool for studying these concepts (Ketabchi Khonsari, Amin Nayeri, & Fathalian, 2010), because "an important premise for the structural analysis is that the pattern depicting relationships between social positions helps to explain the functioning of the system and its components" (Knoke, 1990, p. 236) "Analysts using this perspective seek to uncover the various mechanisms underlying the cleavages and coalitions among state managers, political parties, corporations, interest groups, social movements, mass publics, class segments, and other social formations" (Knoke, 1993). The observation unit was the political elite, and the analysis unit is the kinship relations between them. The network boundary (Who is in the network) is the political elite of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The network nodes are Iranian political elites and the network edges are family ties among them.

Data-gathering Method and Instruments

Methodologically, this study is based on documents; memories, biographies, official websites of elites, telecasts, and congratulations from the authorities in the newspapers, the archive of the Islamic Revolutionary Docs Organization and interview with politicians. There are two types of data: (1) Network boundary (statistical population) (2) Kinship relation data among political elites. For identifying the elite the multi-method approach; Positional, Decisional, Reputational and Reported method was used in this work. The Whole Network Approach applied and there is no sample was selected, because its purpose is to all kinship relationships among elites, and the whole network approach reflects better social construction and this approach. A total number of the political elite who have kinship relation with each other are 1152.

The collecting of kinship relation data among political elite has been based on snowball sampling. Therefore, collecting the family ties data began of the most powerful political clerics authorities and decision makers, and then, gathering the ties of the authorities continued in a cumulative manner, until no other tie was found, and to the very marginal nodes that had only two ties (Triplets), one relationship (binary), or no ties in the elite network (isolated individuals. At this stage, the data collection was stopped. The network is a one-mode type and *one* set of nodes that are similar to each other, and the ties between them are one kind of relationship, like friendship, kinship, buying and selling, and so on. For example, if we study the pattern of relationships among students in a school, we are investigating a one-mode network (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). For the case, the network of this research is one-mode, because the political elite of the Islamic Republic of Iran is the same, and only the family relationship of them is measured together. Relationships in this research are not directed but are simple, or bi-directional. Therefore, the type of research graph is simple and non-directional.

Results

Political elite kinship relationship network is a large network with a big data (1193 actor and 1136 ties).

1. Network structure parameters

Network level statistics is presented in Table 1. Based on results Graph Type is undirected because family ties are the same relation and undirected.

Table (1): Network Metrics

Graph Metric	Value
Graph Type	Undirected
Vertices	1193
Total Edges	1136
Number of components	88
Maximum Vertices in the largest component	690 (57.8374)
Maximum Edges in a Connected Component	734
Maximum Geodesic Distance (Diameter)	43
Avg. Geodesic Distance	17.030541
Graph Density	0.0017
Modularity	0.556432

- **Network Size** is the number of contacts and in a network. The total number of edges of the research graph is (1136); in other words, the numbers of kinship relationships that exist between the political elite is (1136). Total Political Actors or elites in the network are (1193) and total Family Relationship between elites is 1136. There are 88 political elite family groups in the network (Table 2). There is the biggest group with (690) (57.8374) actors and (734) family ties between them in the network.
- **Network Density** is the proportion of direct ties in a network relative to the total number possible (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). In other words, the density of the number of links, the internal connection of the nodes and the relationships observed in a network is shown in relation to the total relationships (Lewis & others: 2008). The density measure shows the cohesion of the whole relationships between the network actors. When the average network density is high, the actors in the network have many links are closely related to each other, so, density in the larger network is lower (Tsvetovat & Kouznetsov, 2011) and "in a high - density interconnected network, there is a direct relationship between members. This is the situation of the old village or working groups" (Wellman, 1999).

If *Actual Ties = Possible Ties: Density=1* (Cook, 2016)

$$\text{Possible Ties} = \frac{n*(n-1)}{2} = \frac{1136*(1136-1)}{2} = 644,680 \quad (1)$$

$$\text{Network Density} = \frac{\text{Number of Actual Ties}}{\text{Number of Possible Ties}} = \frac{1136}{628881} = 0.0017$$

In this study the overall network density is (0.0017) with 1136 actual connections out of (644,680) possible connections; that is, the network density is low and the network was large. Large networks, in general, have less dense and structural holes (Kadushin, 2012, p. 50). The large network means that the number of people in the network is many and the links are more dispersed. In the political elite network of Iran, the presence of two-part and triple political relatives is the main reason for the low density of the network. Density related to network cohesion, so, the network is not coherent because of pairs and triads. There are 31 pairs (groups) of political elite family ties and 9 triads (groups) in the network. Density is based on the idea of connection. (Kadushin, 2012, p. 39). But one can focus on the lack of a connection (Burt, 2000). Density, the number of connections contained within the network, and its opposite, *Structural Holes*, a category concerned with the lack of connections (Kadushin, 2012, p. 37).

- **Network diameter** of the graph is the length of the shortest path between the farthest nodes, in other words, the diameter of the graph, the number of edges between the farthest nodes. The maximum diameter of the research graph is (32), that is, the distance between the furthest relatives of the political elite is (43). In other words, the political elite are on the distant side with 43 people. The average distance is (17.030541).

2. Group parameters

Who are the members of the most powerful group in IRI? In the network analysis, power can be studied at both levels (macro and micro) because the network approach connects these two levels” (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005, p. 145). The division of network actors in groups, sub-structures, and clusters is a very important aspect of the social structure analysis, because the study of the sub-groups of networks and the way they connect them together in understanding this way the network behaves, in general, is important. So, to understand the behavior of the network, we need to analyze the network components and Clusters. In this work, identified and explored the integration of a core of the powerful political elite network in IRI and the inner circle of the corporate elite (Larsen, 2018).

Table (2): Frequency of vertices in the network of political elite’s kinship relationship

Number of Component	Node Frequency	Frequency	Total nodes in Components	Frequency
1	690	57.8374	690	57.8374
1	29	2.4308	29	2.4308
1	25	2.0956	25	2.0956
2	23	1.9279	46	3.8558
3	13	1.0897	39	3.2691
2	12	1.0059	24	2.0118
1	11	0.9220	11	0.922
3	10	0.8382	40	3.3528
7	8	0.6706	56	4.6942
6	7	0.5868	42	3.5208
7	6	0.5029	42	3.5203
8	5	0.4191	40	3.3528
5	4	0.3353	20	1.6765
9	3	0.2515	27	2.2635
31	2	0.1676	62	5.1956
88	-	100	-	100

One of the network groupings is component. Each component represents the link of its members and is a disconnection of others. In kinship relationships, the members in each component have a family tie and have not made any family ties with other components. Table (6) shows the number of Iranian political elite family network components, frequencies, and representatives. Iranian political elite network divided into 88 connected components and family groups. Many of them are small groups (pairs and triads). They are independent groups and not connected to other components. There is a big component with 690 elites and many clusters in the center of the network. The number, size, and connections among the sub-groupings in a network can tell us a lot about the likely behavior of the network as a whole. How fast will things move across the actors in the network? The biggest component has 690 (57.8374) vertices (elites) and 750 edges (family ties). And the other components have 29, 25, 23, 13,12,11,10, 8, 7, 6, 5,4,3,2 nodes.




Fig (2): 88 independent political elite family components (groups)

Based on Fig.1 the biggest component is in the core of the network, while smallest components are in the peripheral. The largest component is the powerful group in Iran.

- **The Largest Component (family group)**

The largest components have many connected clusters. They are political elites who have kinship ties with each other. The largest component is the most powerful group in Iran. In this component, all 690 elites have had political and economic power for four decades and have family ties with together.

Table (3): The largest component values

Graph Metric	Value
Graph Type	Undirected
Vertices	690 (57.837)
Total Edges	750
Maximum Geodesic Distance (Diameter)	43
Avg. Geodesic Distance	17.030541
Graph Density	0.003
Modularity	0.90




Fig. (3): Largest Component Clusters

Discussion

Are relative and marriage the important factor to gain power? Analysis of the family network of the political elite in Iran shows that there are (88) components of family groups. Each family group established of own component. There is a big family group with 690 (58%) political actors. These elites are composed of religious scholars, religious leaders, commanders of the powers, Islamic Republican leaders, strategic decision makers, militants, economic activists, and others. Previous researches on the political elites in Iran emphasize that relatives have been important factors in gaining political power. Zonis refers to Hassan Ali Mansour, who was relationally dependent on large families (Zonis, 1971). He has considered relations (including kinship relations) as the most important factor in gaining power in Iran. Buchta (2000), and Raekel (2008) also in their study of informal power in IRI. They have divided the political power in Iran into formal and informal. Buchta assumes that the informal power structure (such as family relations between political elite) in Iran has four rings; (the "Patriarchs, the highest-

ranking governmental functionaries and administrators, the regime's power base, formerly influential individuals and groups), although each of the rings has different political influences, but there are interdependencies between them, such as friendship, co-school, co-party, and kinship relations that transform them into a set (network). Nanami's research (1999) regards kinship relation as the most important factor affecting the entry/exit or promotion/degradation (movement) of the political elite of the Islamic Republic of Iran. From all of 88 groups, the biggest component is the stable component in the power area in Iran during four decades. Other groups or clusters, with fewer relationships and smaller graphs, are located on the margin of the network. Some peripheral groups have appeared in the Iranian politics for a period and have left or removed (such as Hossein Ali Montazeri, Mehdi Bazargan, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad). Also, the binaries and triplets are on the margins of the network have not much power. So, the model of the kinship relations of the Iranian political elite is the Core-Periphery model. The biggest group (Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's group) is in the core of power and authority and the other groups of the political elite, with fewer relationships are in Semi-Periphery of the network, and finally, elite who have much fewer kinship relations and couldn't be made marriage relation with authorities, are in the marginal of the network.

Dynamic family groups have a stable position and more power. The number of nodes in the network is (1152), and the number of kinship relationships is (1193). The network has (88) kinship group. That is, the network does not have sufficient coherence in this regard. And this is due to small groups with strong ties. But the biggest component has (690) member with large members and weak ties because there are much more families who have kinship relation. In general, the research network does not have high coherence, as it is divided into several components (88). That is the smaller groups (such as Ahmadinejad, Banisadr, Montazeri, Bazargan, and other small family groups) have strong ties between themselves but in the biggest component, they have made a large family group with weak ties. Because of that, this group has a very stable condition, high social capital, and power for a long time. This is due to "The Strength of Weak Ties" (Granovetter, 1983). "A strong tie is someone within a close circle of family and friends. Strong ties are essential for a real community but they are typically groups with a great deal of similarity and, as such, less likely than more tenuous connections to carry new information and perspectives to their groups" (weak tie theory, 2017). He notes that weak ties influence group dynamics and are sources of new information. So, the biggest group in the network is a dynamic group with many family relationships among political elites. They have more social capital, stable condition, and a powerful group.

Elite to Elite family ties, in general, based on common interests. Family relationship and marriage with an important person does not only lead to political power, but also the types of others (Ideological, Economic, Political, Social Capital, Information, and so on) which these capitals reproduce each other. They have made a new class (Parvenu). New social class (Elite to Elite Relation) not based on just ideological consensus, but also based on common interests. That is, they organized power network by marriage and family relation. In Michael Mann view, there are four main sources of powers: Ideological, Economic, Military and Political power; IEMP model of organized power network (1986, pp. 1-2). According to William Domhoff, overlapping networks of power (IEMP Model) are the best suits power structure research. He considers the best way to achieve the overall structure of power is the small social upper class at the top of the wealth, income, and status ladders. This is due to the social upper class is the most visible and accessible aspect of the power equation. "It is not necessarily the heart of the matter, but it is nonetheless the best place to get a handle on the overall power structure." Social class" is a set of intermarrying and interacting families who see each other as equals, share a common style of life, and have a common viewpoint on the world. These various social institutions are important in creating a sense of in-group "we-ness". This sense of cohesion is heightened by the fact that people can be excluded from these organizations. Members of the upper class usually come to think of themselves as "special" or "superior". "They think they are better than other people and certainly better able to lead and govern" (Domhoff, 2005). They named their self "Good Blood" and "Superior Gene" (Golabi, 2017; Very Secret Program, 2017) or "Aghazadeh" (Golabi, 2017; Wikipedia, 2018) in Iran. They create their own lifestyle and make a distinction between themselves and others by "Good Gene" and "Bad Gene". Power is a kind of social relationship because analysis of this relationship is an analysis of inequalities

and distinctions (Bourdieu, 1984). Using the concept of capital, Bourdieu states that the power elites legitimate the unequal distribution of capital by reproducing dominant positions; so that capital flows into each other in a rotating process and the network. He believes that capital is not an object but a set of relationships. "Culture (or power) is always the product of the social relations of production and consumption. Also, he uses the field to analyze society, and his most important goal is to examine the process of social domination. For Bourdieu, "the overall volume of capital, understood as the set of actually usable resources and powers--economic capital, cultural capital and also social capital" (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 131). The field is a network of relationships that exist between objective positions. The ruling class seems to share interests and consensus (Jenkins, 2002).

There are three categories of decision-makers who have been responsible for the formation, maintenance and development of the revolution, respectively; the creators, the preservationists, and the developers in the IRI (Saeedabadi, 2010). Ideology is the dominant factor in the creators and the preservationists (Decision-Making Centers in Iran, 2015) but there is a wide consensus on common interests in the developer sides. So, the decision-making process is bewildering and extremely complex. "The IRI has a formal power structure derived from its state institutions and the informal power structure is based on personal networks (such as kinship relationship and marriage) or alliances between the members of the political factions with high positions in state institutions, but also those who fall outside the institutional power structure, such as, writers, intellectuals, journalists" (Rakel, 2008, p. 22).

According to Buchta (2000) and Rakel (2009) the policy of the IRI is not under the control of a single group or individual, but also formal and informal structures, even the opponents of the IRI, deal with the exercise of power in Iran and affect strategic decisions (Rakel, 2008; Buchta, 2000). Rakel used "politically relevant elite" concept to define and categorization the political elite in IRI, (Rakel, 2008; Perthes, 2004). "To the politically relevant elite belong, not only members of the government but also politicians in opposition, journalists, high bureaucrats, members of the security institutions, leading economists, non-establishment clerics, intellectuals etc. That means the politically relevant elite consists not only of those people who have power according to their position in state institutions but also of those individuals that influence or attempt to influence the political discourse" (Rakel, 2008, p. 41). According to Buchta (2000), informal relation structure in IRI is very important. He divided it to four rings; (1) The patriarch who is the most powerful political clerics, (2) state functionaries and administrators, (3) The power based on the revolution, and (4) formerly influential individuals and groups (Buchta, 2000). Family networking is a new key to understanding political elite behavior, networking and governing. Previous researchers found that there is a lack of Elite Circulation (Nademi, 1999). Thus, political elite family connection and networking is an important factor in understanding this point, because political elites related to biggest group are much powerful actors for four decades in Iran, because the biggest group consists of one component, so variable sources (information, wealth, power, honor, social capital and dignity) may travel to each elite via social ties (Nooy, 2005). On the other hand, most of the groups in the network, have known as a clique with strong ties. They don't have more information to exchange between themselves. But the largest component develops into more cliques with weak ties. So, more networking and more clusters with weak ties is an important key for dispiriting of information and capital and stable position for governing in biggest component.

The relationship between political elites is based on the concentration of power, wealth, and information in an intra-group network, so that the positioning of each group according to its structural position in the power layers (center, half-perimeter, around). Thus, political elites, by bridging power centers through kinship relations, draw a network of relationships that lead to uneven distribution of valuable resources, and this leads to social gaps in the society. The power elite with the networking mechanism (one of which is marriage) may play a role in the Distribution Crisis and the Influence Crisis, and this kind of social closure in creating an opportunity Equal proportions are for citizens and social mobility, because the criterion for the selection and promotion of elites in the pyramid determines the power of membership in the home network (kinship, friendship, class, etc.). As a result, citizens outside the network do not find the opportunity to find out in the ring of power. Meanwhile, powerful groups in two ways maintain and sustain their privileges; one through the legitimization and consolidation of their

group values, and secondly through the social obstruction. New elitism proposes consensually united is associated with Stable Democracies and Liberal Democracy. By family networking, there is a stable government in Iran for four decades. Is the Iranian Political Elite behavior (Family networking to gain power and interests) to create a Stable Democracy?

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