Resource Mobilization Theory: Political Movement in Egypt

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Abstract: *This paper discusses the application of the resource mobilization theory (RMT) to clarify the activities of certain key socio-political groups and movements in Egypt up till 2011. It contends that the political movements in the country have utilized information and communication technologies (ICTs) and social networks sites (SNSs) as a tool for mobilizing people and coordinating anti-regime activities. It also deals with certain political movements prior and throughout the Arab Spring in Egypt, which played significant roles in the recent political changes taking place in the country. This work confirmed that ICTs in general, and social network outlets in particular, have become a crucial resource for political groups, such as The Kefaya Movement, The 6 of April Youth Movement (6 AYM), the "We Are All Khaled Said" Facebook page, and even the Muslim Brotherhood to bringing about collective and coordinated actions. Thus, this article elucidates the importance of the resource mobilization theory in the context of socio-political movements in Egypt and their subsequent influence by looking at the utilization of SNSs throughout political uprisings in the country. As per the resource mobilization theory, the internet and social network outlets could be used as a resource for promoting and succeeding anti-government political groups and activists, which subsequently ended the Mubarak regime.*

Keywords: *Political Movements, Resource Mobilization Theory, SNSs, Egypt, Resource, Mobilization.*

Introduction

The socio-political uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in 2010-11 turned into a full blown political upheaval, where millions of people demonstrated against their respective regimes. In a matter of weeks, some long-lasting dictators in the region were deposed, and the leaders of other countries in the Arab world prepared for the worst. These protests created uncertainty and wonder for the world, and people were keen to uncover its reasons and motivations. Some liberal economists contend that having higher levels of education, a receding state, and increased inequality led to combined grievances and aspirations that were enough to propel revolutionary challenges (Campante and Chor 2012, p.175). While others believed that certain socio-economic problems, such as widespread youth unemployment fueled public frustration (Filiu 2011, p. 67). Other researchers credited these uprisings to the swift growth and expansion of web-based network platforms in MENA, which diverted and channeled grievances into collective action (Howard and Hussain 2013, p.108). There are others who believe that the rise of a civil society provided new norms and organizational incentive to dissidents (Dalacoura 2012, p.64).

Many researchers believe that SNSs serve as a resource for the mobilization, organization, and collective actions of socio-political groups. Eltantawy and Wiest pointed out that social networks platforms have been utilized for organizing and mobilizing collective actions, and encouraging a sense of community and collective identity among marginalized group members, creating less-confined political spaces, establishing connections with other socio-political groups, and publicizing causes to gain support from the global community (Eltantawy and Wiest 2011, p.1207). The RMT might be a useful theoretical framework to explain the impact of SNSs and social media on political change. There are many researchers conducted on the role of social media in the Egyptian uprising and reconsidering RMT, such as those reported by Eltantawy, Nahed, and Wiest (Eltantawy and Wiest 2011, p.1207). Nonetheless, their work is limited to some digital activists and Hash-tags, who/which did not play a major role in

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mobilizing the public and organizing anti-regime demonstrations. Therefore, it is necessary to reconsider this theory and the instrumental role of social network platforms – as a resource – for four main groups and movements mentioned earlier.

Undoubtedly, the multilevel effect of the Internet influences the regular life of the people. In the age of ICT, internet and SNSs are basic instruments for socio-political movements for mobilizing hundreds of thousands of protesters, organize vital aid, spread their ideas, and diffuse information in real time. Indeed, there have been several resources that the protestors used to realize their goals. Recently, scholars began articulating an approach towards socio-political movements, called the resource mobilization theory, which consider some crucial questions concerning socio-political movement members and the utilization of new communication technologies. In this context, resource mobilization is an applicable theory to explain the provided tools and resources for socio-political movements during Egyptian uprising. The resource mobilization model emphasizes the interaction between resource availability and the socio-political groups' activities. Therefore, elucidating the link between socio-movements and SNSs as a resource for the four main groups is the main objective of this work. The RMT is based on the idea that the central factor shaping the rise, development, and outcome of socio-political movements are resources (Jenkins 2002, p.532). Resource mobilization theory underscores both societal help and constraint of the socio-political movement phenomena. It examines the resources that must be mobilized, the linkages of socio-political movements to other groups, the reliance of movements upon external support for success, and the tactics used by regimes to control or combine movements (McCarthy and Zald 1977, p.1213).

The Arab Spring in MENA in 2011 ignited interests on how SNSs could influence the mobilization of the public and precipitates an effective civil unrest. In order to truly understand the mechanism of political upheaval, it is essential to take into account the groups that were involved in the political, economic, and social circumstances of modern Egypt. This makes it possible to figure out the role SNSs in the context of instigating political uprisings. Political movements utilized the Internet and SNSs to advance a political cause that was difficult to advance offline, due to the lack of freedom of speech and assembly. The objective of online activism is often to create intellectually and emotionally compelling digital objects that tell stories of injustice, interpret history, and advocate for certain political outcomes. Egypt has had the highest number of cyber-activists across the region. By late 2010, the Centre for International Media Assistance suggested there were as many as 40,000 Arab bloggers (Sedra 2013, p.6). These bloggers and other activists have had a remarkable role in galvanizing the grassroots before and during the Egyptian Revolution.

Theoretical Framework
The resource mobilization theory was developed during the 1970s as another area researcher looked into to comprehend the growth, essentialness, and impacts of social movements of the 1960s, and the significance of association and organization, particularly the networks and ties between various populaces. The RMT stresses both societal assistance and constraint of the social development phenomena. It looks at the assortment of resources that must be activated and mobilized, the linkages of social movements to other gatherings and groups, reliance of movements upon outside help for progress and success, and the tactics used by the authorities to control or incorporate movements (McCarthy and Zald 1978, p.1213) The RMT also contends that social developments and movements prevail through the powerful preparation/mobilization of resources and the development and improvement of political open doors and opportunities for its members. Mobilization is the procedure by which a gathering amasses resources and protects them under aggregate control for the unequivocal reason of upholding the group's interests via collective action (Canel 1997, p.2).

The resource mobilization theory concentrates on how groups organize to achieve their goals by mobilizing and preparing resources, and it argues that social movements succeed through the effective mobilization of resources and the development of political opportunities for members. This is a theory based on the notion that resources, such as time, money, organizational skills, and certain social/political opportunities are basic and critical to the success of social movements (Jenkins 1983, p.533). Despite

the fact that resources vary among social movements, the accessibility of appropriate and applicable resources and of the actors' abilities to adequately and effectively utilize them are critical (Eltantawy and Wiest 2011, p.1208). RMT is introduced on the possibility that the focal factor shaping the rise, development, and outcome of social movements is resources. 'Resource' here is interpreted and taken extensively to mean any social, political, or financial asset or capacity that can contribute to collective action (Tyler, 1997, p.14369). According to RMT, socio – political movements can mobilize both material and non-material resources: the former include money, organizational facilities, manpower, means of communication, SNSs, while the latter include legitimacy, loyalty, personal connections, public attention, authority, moral commitment, and solidarity (Canel 1997, p.4). In other words, it focuses on the political nature of the new movements and interprets them as conflicts over the allocation of goods in the political market. RMT concentrates on an arrangement of logical and contextual procedures resource management decisions, organizational dynamics, and political changes that conditioned the realization of this structural potential. Resource mobilization scholars looked at how rational and often marginalized social actors mobilized effectively to pursue their desired social change goals (Edwards and Gillham 2013, p.2). They claim that open and affluent societies provide more favorable conditions for contentious groups to thrive, thus making protests more common (Dalton and Van Sickle 2005, p.7). Here, the presence of broad non-governmental organizations and other civil society groups provide the crucial variable linking dissatisfaction to political action, as they enable citizens to openly take part in an assortment of voluntary associations and build up the essential social and organizational skills to advance their respective interests (Coleman 1988, p.95). Such groups can raise funds, increase their membership, and take part in communication and awareness-raising strategies to bring about and realize their respective objectives. During times of political anxiety, or an adjustment in the 'political opportunity structure', such groups of disparate social movement organizations can meet up and come together in greater 'cycles of protest' for combating the government on substantial questions and concern of policy, such as social equality, civil rights, war, women's rights, and the environment (Tarrow 2011, p.127).

The key approach within RMT is a political interactive model, which utilizes a political model to examine the procedures offering ascent to socio-political movements. It concentrates on changes in the structure of a set of circumstances for aggregate activity and on the role of pre-existing networks and horizontal links within the aggrieved group. It examines issues of political power, interests, political resources, group solidarity, and so on (Canel 1997, p.3). From bits of knowledge, RMT allows a "digital elite" to break the national media shutdown by passing data and information to the mainstream media and provide a basis to intergroup joint effort and collaboration for a large "cycle of protest", report event magnitudes that raised the perception of success for potential free riders, and gives extra "emotional mobilization" by delineating the most exceedingly terrible abominations related to the government's reaction to dissent (Breuer, Landman et al. 2015, p.3). Such innovation and technology, in this manner, thus constitutes an important resource for achieving intergroup collaboration and challenging the strategies of social isolation ordinarily utilized by tyrant regimes (Breuer 2012, p.7).

The rise of the Internet (SNSs) created a dense communication infrastructure, as societies develop and provide a resource that can be utilized to organize dissent where institutional doubt poses a potential threat and civic activism is systematically stifled. Social networks are usually marked as a mechanism of connection, communication, mobilization and organization; this makes it highly compatible with RMT. To further develop RMT, it was disclosed that with a specific end goal to be successful, a movement must expend time, money, organizational skills, and other such resources. Under RMT, the SNSs showed one of the most lucrative resource/tools for the protester's flexibility at no additional costs. New media technologies can be utilized alongside a kind of contributory dynamics that are characterized less by formal relationships in civil society organizations and more by spatially dispersed, and loosely-knit personal networks increasingly mediated through electronic communication (Tarrow 2011, p.139). The availability of SNSs may enable activist groups to communicate with potential constituencies across large distances. As a consequence of this, social network platforms constitute vital resources towards attaining and accomplishing intergroup-coordinated effort and challenging policies of social detachment and isolation normally utilized by despotic regimes to discourage and obstruct the formation of civil

society. It stands to reason that web-based social media has great power as an organizational instrument. One can easily reach anywhere and anybody throughout the world. It far outpaces the underground newspapers and pamphlets in terms of speed, interactivity, and accessibility. These platforms could turn out to be a key resource for the arrangement and orchestration of protest, where the government poses a potential threat to the socio-political activism via a systematically suppressed process (Wellman, Quan-Haase et al. 2003, p.11). As a consequence of this, SNSs assumes roles as both organizer and inciter, while also drawing outside consideration and pressure. It ought to be pointed out that even though the Arab Spring protests used web-based networking media, they are not dependent on it. The social media platforms provided a crucial space for individuals and activists to avoid regime suppression and create a community of like-minded individuals who by coming together, gained the confidence needed to take collectively risks that they were unwilling to individually (Olesya Tkacheva 2013, p.47). For example, when the Mubarak regime shut down the internet, the protests grew in estimate and size. SNSs enabled communication with the more traditional media, who in turn spread the news. It should also be noted that in the context of RMT, leadership is critical, and as such, some sort of social revolution, which is purely crowd-organized, is no doubt inconceivable and impossible, even with social media. Mohamed ElBaradei, 2005, who is a former head of the IAEA, was one such pioneer who reached out to Egypt's youth, urging them to change the socio-political landscape. ElBaradei was one the premier figures in the utilization of SNSs, but he was not the only one. Social Media can also play a revolutionary role in terms of more frequent updates. It is sensible to assume that the Internet provided an alternative communication means that enabled political activists to create networks in spite of substantial state control over the public sphere and the media. In accordance with the contentions of RMT, the Internet thus provided the resource of a mostly uncontrolled space that undermined the administration's attempt at social segregation and isolation and encouraged solidarity among people due to their common sentiments of constraint and repression (Breuer 2012, p.25).

Political activists these days intensely depend on the Internet/SNSs as a resource to keep up and strengthen various engagements, connections, and relationships across issues and organizational boundaries. Lynch pointed out that the SNSs can prompt political change and upheaval in four ways: (1) stimulating contentious collective action; (2) limiting the mechanisms of state repression; (3) affecting international support for the regime; and (4) affecting the overall control of the public sphere (Lynch 2011, p.304). It can thus be accepted that the Internet is helpful for expanded consciousness about collective action events, such as the mass demonstrations observed during the Arab Spring. The more embedded an individual SNSs user is in terms of memberships in different online social networks and the number of contacts in these networks, the higher the likelihood of them being targeted by an online mobilization attempt.

Finally, the accessibility of the SNSs as a resource for the socio-political movements enables activist groups and individuals to communicate with potential constituencies over large distances. These platforms constitute an essential resource for reaching intergroup cooperation, coordination, and fighting social isolation plans and policies regularly posed by repressive governments. We deal with some prior political movements through the Egyptian uprising in 2011, which played significant roles in the recent political changes taking place throughout the country.

Egyptian Political Movements
Prior to and during the Arab Spring there were four main that mobilized the public in Egypt and used SNSs as a main resource in their activities. Those groups including:

The Kefaya Movement
It could not possibly be probable to grasp the roots of the role Kefaya movement in the political upheaval in Egypt without mentioning SNSs as a critical resource, nor would it be possible to understand the successes of Kefaya without discussing usage of SNSs. The relationship has been described as a close, organic relation between blogging and a debatable political movement (Price 2010, p.4). Kefaya could be considered as a sort of NGOs, which was beyond the regime's control in Egypt. Mubarak's inevitable wish to stay in power in 2005, plus the possible succession associated with his son Gamal to the

presidency, triggered dissatisfaction in Egypt, which gave way to the rise of Kefaya (Oweidat, Benard et al. 2008, p.10). This movement was by all means a novel mobility that was unprecedented in modern Egypt. It did look like a political rainbow, with its various political ideologies mingled together for a common goal, which was rejection of the President's fifth term, regardless of those ideologies and of any political ambitions. Kefaya's existence was a short-term mobility movement; once the objectives are accomplished, the movement would automatically dissolve itself (Mohamed 2005, p.1). The movement establishes a new model of mobilization outside the realm of political parties. Regime change was Kefaya's principal objective, with all the chants simply pointing to deny 5th term (extension to Mubarak), and reject the presidency succession to Gamal. Its other goals also include ending corruption, political and economic recession, and inequality within the society. The most obvious approach they were using to obtain these aims was through protests. They were creating a channel to voice their denial to the regime through street protests and press releases, along with making the entire world notice it, displaying that there was a substantial rejection to the regime (Mohamed 2005, p.1). This movement was originally named "the Egyptian Movement for Change." It took shape in 2004, as a movement against the US led invasion of Iraq in 2003, and developed into a new protest movement opposed to the nepotism of the Egyptian presidency. In 2004, they protested and chanted against the US in addition to ask for the close down of the embassy in Egypt. They also blamed Mubarak's regime for its failure to take lasting implications of the Iraqi invasion seriously. They were chanting, "Mubarak Wake up! Tomorrow the bombing would be in Cairo" (Sowers and Toensing 2012, P.87).

There are several reasons behind their success, such as keeping their message simple, by using the word, "Enough," to form public dissatisfaction with the regime. Their chants are usually centered around the theme of no succession, and no to extension, which served concentration of public attention in Egypt on the issue of inherited rule seemed by President Mubarak's blueprints (Oweidat, Benard et al. 2008, P.11). As soon as this group protested for the first time in December 2004, the online platforms were their major tools to mobilize a grassroots protest, which was harmonized by the group that had been dealing with harakamasria.com. Since its formation, this group was both a virtual and offline movement (Price 2010, P.4). Thus, Kefaya's protest was unique in that they were utilizing SNSs to mobilize and coordinate the demonstrations. As the movement arranged for further demonstrations, immediately the mainstream media in Egypt rejected coverage of their activities. Nonetheless, the blogs and other social media platforms became a part of their campaign to create greater consideration of contribution in mass protests and break the paralysis of Egyptian politics and discourse. Cyber activists utilized text messages to organize protests. Mass texting enabled the protestors to tip down one another in regard to the location of the security forces, and help to make any changes related to the time and location of the demonstration. The Kefaya's tactics of mass texting had triggered an educated class by the use of SMS texts, which then had been carried to a far-reaching audience through the blogosphere (Price 2010, p.5). In 2005, another mass protest was held against transferring power to Gamal. Protestors were chanting "Mubarak Leave! Leave!" and "Alaa (President's son) tell your dad that millions hate him." However, as reported by human rights groups, a massive campaign of arrests picked up over one thousand people, including two MPs (Sowers and Toensing 2012, p. 86). In April 2005, one more protest was planned in thirteen cities under the banner "No Constitution without Freedom." The demonstrators, many of whom were liberal and secular university professors, held a silent protest, rooting for an end to state control of campuses (Khosrokhavar 2016, p.45).

This movement also pursued a multidimensional Internet strategy to diffuse information. The group spread banners and political cartoons through their own online platforms and other assisting bloggers. It reported violations by police using digital photography, and distributed the images online (Oweidat, Benard et al. 2008, p.11). This encouraged a Misr Digital, the country's very first unbiased digital journal, to be the principal source of information on Kefaya's activities in 2005 (Khosrokhavar 2016, p.45). A year later turned out to be a very ruthless year for the movement and Egyptian blogosphere, as over a hundred social media activists were detained. A part of them were supporters of Kefaya, and stemming from that situation, the Paris Based Reports without Borders added Egypt to its list of the "Internet Enemies" (Cook 2011, p. 195)

Kefaya efficiently mobilized vast segments of the Egyptian society. In March 2007, they protested, and some of their activists were abducted and arrested (El-Hamalawy 2007, p.1). Abdel-Halim Qandil, the spokesman for the movement, claimed that their movement targeted Egyptians, and they wanted them to eliminate their fears and demand their political and economic rights (Khosrokhavar 2016, p.45). Accordingly, this requires social justice, job creation, good education, also cancellation of the state of emergency law, and all special laws that restricted liberty. The Kefaya's new media outlets also reported physical and sexual exploitation committed by the police. A video posted on You Tube showed that a uniformed officer slaps a prisoner who tried to protect his face, likewise, another tape displayed several detainees being humiliated, with many police officers surrounding them. Alongside this, they were also publishing photos of police brutality victims like Khaled Said. These bloggers helped this movement, and played a role to draw internal and external attention to human rights violation by the Egyptian regime. Bloggers also supplied Kefaya with the means to mobilize. Many bloggers adhered to the same political message as Kefaya, opposing the succession plan, corruption, and police brutality. If Kefaya had offered the political arena for anti-regime groups to raise their voice, SNSs have provided the resource for organization and coordination of mass protests by this group.

During the Arab Spring, Kefaya organized a protest in Texas, with the involvement of numerous groups of protestors, college-aged, or younger. One of the most outstanding signs, held by a defiant teenager, said, "The Mubarak regime is older than I am" (Lane 2011, p.1). This movement received the attention of the global media as a pressure for change, yet their achievements had been handful during the Mubarak years. The volume of participants tended to be minimal, although protests had been held consistently. Kefaya revealed that Al-Jazeera, BBC, Washington Post, New York Times, CNN, and NGOs had reported violations of human rights. Irregularly, independent newspapers in Egypt (like Al-Karama) published posts written by bloggers without prior changes (Oweidat, Benard et al. 2008, p.24). The movement has made some major changes since the Arab Spring, along with coming up with a new mission statement with new targets, the most important being the political, economic, and national targets of the revolution. The movement also continues to organize a new political manifest involving national and social concerns in the light of a popular revolt that ended three decades of Mubarak's rule in 2011. Kefaya, thus, was considered a mother movement to the history of the January 25th Revolution, which had built a successful experience of utilizing SNSs to mobilize and organize peace protests.

The 6 of April Youth Movement (6 AYM)
Until 2008, the Egyptian regime to a certain extent ignored the electronic activities regarding dissidents, preferring to react just to the actual physical manifestations of any opposition. Rather than blocking SNSs, the regime used different ways of suppression, for example, detention of journalists, threatening their relatives, plus mobilizing the state-run media to slander the oppositions (Price 2010, p.6). Even so, the utilization of SNSs allowed the Egyptian youth in 2008 to form what came to be known as the 6 AYM. The group got its name on the day of the initial protest backing a workers' strike planned for April 6, 2008, in el-Mahalla el-Kubra, a significant area for the Egyptian textile sector. To mobilize the protest power, the activists used social media outlets to report events, alert participants about security situations, and offer appropriate help to those rounded up by the state's security forces (Ishani 2011, p.1). The Otpor movement in Serbia, which often utilized nonviolent techniques to topple Slobodan Milosevic, motivated the group. For two years, the particular team arranged rallies every now and then, with only a few hundred people attending (Khosrokhavar 2016, p.47). In 2008, one 6 AYM member visited the US to participate in the State Department "Alliance of Youth Movements Summit," whereby, the activists talked over with other activists regarding techniques to avoid regime monitoring. In 2009, blogger and 6 AYM activists "Mohammed Adel" went to Serbia to take part in a training course regarding strategies for mobilizing the public in non-violent revolutions. The training course was dedicated to prepare activists to use SNSs as a resource for mobilizing the public. The instructors were made up of people who had organized the overthrow of Milosevic in the 1990s (Eltahawy 2009, p.1). Since that time, SNSs permitted the group to put together initiatives swiftly, which was often simplified to Western observers, pushing the success to the movement and the future of "Facebook activism." The group invited about 300 people to join its Facebook page; and within a day received such a number of fans, and within a few weeks, 70,000 people joined the call for strikes across Egypt in support of

Mahalla's workers. By April 6, thousands of workers were rioting, but the Egyptian security police struck back, killing four and arresting 400 protestors (Eltahawy 2009, p.1).

The plan was to stay home and not report to work or school, and alternatively to join others in street marches coming together on main city squares. The activists called on participants in the strike to begin their social media campaign using the key word *"Stay Home."* This mobility utilized Facebook, Twitter, personal blogs, and other social network platforms to document the basic strike, alert their networks about police activity, and organize protests (Radsch 2008, p.10). The protestors were chanting "Down, Down with Hosni Mubarak!" they defaced any poster of Mubarak and stomped on it. Such protest was practically non-existent in the three decades of Mubarak's rule. In all possibilities, the Mahalla uprising prompted the rise of new resistance mobility, and the SNSs activists utilized lasting links with labor leaders and associations between factories. Since that event, the very first weak points inside the regime appeared, says Gamal Eid, the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information. Nothing has been exactly the same within Egypt thereafter (Gopal 2011, p.1). The 2008 strike was possibly a path for information diffusion more than a large-scale mobilization. As Ferris notes, it was a day where SNSs played a crucial role on the updates coming out of Mahalla, and the people were exchanging information on Facebook about the strike, they were mobilizing, and asking how can we help, this and that (Price 2010, p.7).

In regard to January 25th, Ahmed Maher and other activists were established the "Operations room" two weeks before the scheduled protests. They would meet regularly to talk about their plan, and how to use SNSs to call for protests, also investigating data and information that was being provided to citizens to study revolutionary mechanisms regarding protesting, aimed to defeat the strategy that the state security forces always use to pre-empt step to crackdown protests. Maher states that two days before the protests, they had utilized the latest method to connect with operations that found activists being split up into separate groups. Every single group comprised of between 30 and 50 activists, who would then be posted to central areas and public squares to provoke protests. Whilst, only the best of each group would be well informed of the precise location where the protests had been planned to begin, meeting his group in a pre-selected location just before start of the protest, and then guiding this group to the primary meeting point (Al-Awsat 2011, p.1). Mahfouz, a blogger and co-founder of 6 AYM was likely one of the most instrumental figures in the call and spark of the protests in 2011. In a video blog she posted a week before January 25th, she urged people to join her on January 25th in Tahrir Square to depose Mubarak's regime. Mahfouz's video went viral over the social media, and within a couple of hours, a Facebook group was set up for the event, captivating over 80,000 fans within a few days (Sedra 2013, p.6). The movement also refused dialogue with Egypt's Vice President Omar Suleiman. They called for no negotiation until Mubarak's resignation, and any discussions ought to be related to the transfer of power. This demand would be agreed on by all the youth groups that called for January 25th protests (Jadaliyya 2011, p.1). Mahalla workers joined the protests only two days before the resignation of Mubarak. This was stimulated simply by momentum in favor of the Tahrir Square protestors (Gopal 2011, p.1). Their participation signaled the end to Mubarak's rule.

The movement did not favor any political currents in Egypt, and it was the very first to call for the January 25th protests. Following the January uprisings, the group was instrumental in laying the groundwork for the January 25th Revolution and movement's efforts via SNSs, significantly contributing to the "One Million March" in February. Later in 2011, the group launched a "Black Circle, White Circle" political consciousness campaign via SNSs, aiming to prevent former members of the regime from winning seats in the post-revolution parliament (Sedra 2013, p.5). The 6 AYM, along with Kefaya, became the most vital organizers of the 18-days nonviolent revolution that concluded with Mubarak's departure on February 11, 2011. Since its launch, this movement has built considerable usage of ICTs/SNSs to spread awareness and mobilize youths. In 2012, they had around 15,000 private members, and command a base of over 100,000 followers, having all-around half a million people following both their Facebook and Twitter accounts (Ramsey 2013, p.1). 6 AYM have been constantly attempting to reach people in universities, in cafes, and in social clubs, and the youths who have not been enthusiastic about politics in order to coordinate and pull together people to increase anti-regime collective actions.

We Are All Khaled Said

Khaled Said has symbolized several, if not the important make, of political upheaval in 2011. On June 6, 2010, a couple of police officers checked an Internet cafe in Alexandria and also demanded the ID of everyone present. As soon as 28-year-old Khaled made an objection to being checked without consent, based on eyewitness accounts, a dispute erupted between him and the offices, led to them physically assaulting him that ended in his death (Abdelaty 2010, p.1). The bloodied images of the victim from the morgue, extensively displayed on SNSs, were circulated. Often, the case of Said is wretchedly representative of police brutality and emergency law under Mubarak's rule, in which coercion and abuse of human rights were common. Indeed, police brutality was systematic and well foreseen since Mubarak's second term. Said's case was gruesome, since his murder was graphically circulated to internal and international audience via Facebook and other SNSs (Abdelaty 2010, p.1). Ghonim indicated that looking at Said's photo after his death; he just felt that they were all Khaled Said. And they were all of these young Egyptians who could die, and no one would be held accountable. He had to do something, and he believed that bringing Said's case to the public would be helpful (Kumar 2012, p.1). Ghonim created a Facebook page to mobilize protests. The strategy for the Facebook page ultimately seemed to be to mobilize public support for the cause. Initially, it persuaded people to become a member of the page, and flip through its posts. The following was to prompt them to start interacting with the content by "Liking" and "Commenting" on it. Next, was to get them to take part in the page's online campaigns and to contribute to its content through share their points of view. The last stage would likely occur as soon as people decide to take activism to the street. This was the supreme and last aspiration (Ghonim 2012, p.68).

The Facebook page, helped activists mobilize hundreds of people and sparked wide-spread protests in the street, and utilizes it to get their messages across and coordinate their actions. Ghonim brought the emergency law to the public's consideration by coordinating through Facebook and Twitter in case of Said's death (Sedra 2013, p.3). Before January 25th, Ghonim organized a couple of protests called for a silent protest, where people went to the public places, stood calmly, dressed in black and carried posters that expressed their anxieties, and demanded justice for Said (Ghonim 2012, p.71). He affirmed that the SNSs can help link people along with shared information to the world, yet, were not able to develop social reforms by themselves. He applied the much available equipment to deliberate, cooperate and came to an agreement on a date, a time and a location for the start of the revolution (Kumar 2012, p.1). Ghonim was the administrator of the "We Are All Khaled Said" Facebook page, intended to memorialize Said's death. It had been the actual page's call for public protests in Egypt, along with the spark provided by nearby Tunisia that lit the flame of the revolution (Hounshell 2011, p.1). After the ousting of the Tunisian President, Ghonim posted, "Today is the 14th…January 25th is Police Day, and it's a national holiday ... If 100,000 take to the streets, no one can stop us" (Ghonim 2012, p.134). Dr. Mohsen examines the role of Ghonim and his Internet activists counterparts, and believes that they were really smart and well educated, and added that their decision to choose January 25th, was in fact a proper time, because there were protests in their neighbor countries, and without them, the revolution might had occurred a few years late. (M. A. Hassan, July 29, 2013)

At "Night of Rage," Ghonim, before sleeping, wrote on the January 25th event page: "January 25th is not the end ... It is the beginning of the end" (Ghonim 2012, p.187). Which means, it was the start of the end of a long-term dictator in Egypt? He was arrested because of his virtual activities and the authorities interrogated him about how the protests had been organized, with the focus on foreign involvement. Ghonim's release gave a momentum to the protests. He appeared on TV Channel, and gave passionate interviews that discredited the image of the regime had been trying to paint of the protestors. Within minutes of the interview, his personal Facebook page surged with popularity, plus the tweets were coming so fast that #Ghonim lightly grew to be a trending subject on Twitter (Hounshell 2011, p.1). He applied the Facebook page as a specialized means to plan and organize protests. For that reason, Ghonim called the Arab Spring as the Internet revolution (considering Internet as a resource), because of unprecedented role of SNSs during the revolts, because he began with 100 people on Facebook, and ended with millions moving towards the squares and streets demanding regime change, stated Egyptian

a Coptic Christian Sally Moore (Sennott 2011, p.1). The social media platforms, particularly Facebook, were the main resource of any mass mobilization throughout the country since the revolution.

Muslim Brotherhood during the January 25ᵗʰ Revolution

Muslim Brotherhood was established in 1928 in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna, a school teacher. Just then, Islam was divorced from the Egyptian political landscape. Brotherhood believed that Islam holds the solution to the political and social problems of the time, and in its first two decades, gained about half-million of followers in 200 branches all over the country. Their main work was charity, but they were never far from politics (Zahid and Medley 2006, p.693). Regardless of its religion-based ideology, the Brotherhood is seen as more of a political movement instead of a religious one. It has also embraced the revolution in the Muslim world, and it is always at the helm of movements that is poised to grab power and transform whatever society it happens to operate in (Rubin 2011, p.1). In the 1950s, the Brotherhood started picking up their pace in politics, and communication has been vital to the survival of the group, which has carried out through a number of regular publications, such as Majallat al Ikhwan al Muslimin (a weekly paper) and al Nadhir (a weekly magazine) (Sattar 1995, p.12). This group was officially banned during the rule of Mubarak. In 2006, those who were connected to the Brotherhood started to use blogs in an enthusiastic manner. A young journalist, Abd Al Moneim Mahmoud, was the very first blogger to clearly identify himself as a member of Brotherhood on his blog *Ana Ikhwan* (I am the Muslim Brotherhood) (Radsch 2008, p.7). He is symbolized as the new face of the organization's youth, who were politically driven, pragmatic, at ease with non-Islamist activists, and independent-minded (Lynch 2007, p.5). By early 2007, more young brotherhood members, men and women, started their own blogs. The blog is possibly the best accepted tool for facilitating collective action. Therefore, the Brotherhood's bloggers tried to effect the situation in Egypt by the use of blogging. In the last quarter of 2006, a group of Brotherhood students unveiled the website YallaTalaba (Come On, Students), originally in defense of al-Azhar students, after posting certain pictures to help the university students, which was considered as first step in involving younger members in utilizing blogs. The transformative impression of the new media technologies have thus affected the youth of Brotherhood, just as they had the rest of Egyptian political society. As of 2007, there were nearly 150 bloggers in the organization (Lynch 2007, pp. 1-6). Brotherhood had used the blog as a platform for contesting the regime's jailing of a number of its members. The blogs relied heavily on photos, videos, interviews, which included the regime's mistreatment of the Brotherhood (Lerner 2010, p.569). In January 2007, the path-breaking Brotherhood blogger, Abdal-Rahman Rashwan wrote in frustration that even as blogs became more robust and influential, they were more focused on the left and liberals. He thought that Brotherhoods' blogs should pay more attention to local issues, and contended the fact that the Egyptian community has become much more prepared to handle many thoughts, and the Brotherhood really should no longer be apprehensive in expressing themselves (Lynch 2007, p.6).

For challenging the regime, this group had been cooperating with other groups. In the fall of 2010, the leader of the Brotherhood, Muhammad Al-Badie, highlighted a new policy, he openly called for jihad and revolution (Rubin. B, 2011, p.1). The group continued to be, for quite some time, allied with 6 AYM, a new left-oriented secular group, which utilized SNSs as a resource of coordination. In the course of the 2010 parliamentary elections, a group of young people sympathetic to the Brotherhood helped launched a Facebook page called "Monitoring-2010 Parliament." These people referred themselves as "Rasd," which means, "monitoring." The page had over 40,000 fans prior to the election (and now has 10,912,772 funs) (Ghonim 2012, p.119). Their particular objective was to help prove that the election had been fraudulent; knowing that the outcome of the parliament might, in effect, lack legitimacy, and this page, through the election, released intensive news and substantial evidence. Likewise, Miriam Amir one of the top administrators of @Ikhwanweb, the official Twitting site of Egypt's Brotherhood, started the Twitter account @Ikhwanweb back in 2009 (Bohn, L. E, 2011, P.1). Miriam assisted in the transformation of the account into a virtual space for some of Egypt's most heated debates. The Brotherhood had forbidden the usage of traditional media outlets. In 2010, they developed their unique SNSs, referred to as the Ikhwanbook. At that time, the site was functioning on a trial basis, but the Brotherhood had plans for a full release after more people had signed up (Weingarten 2010, P.1). However, Mohamed Hassan underestimated the role of Ikhwanbook in the revolution, and despite his

registering for it, he did not rely on it, as its role was not substantive as other SNSs (Hassan M., June, 26, 2013).

The Brotherhood's Ikhwanbook appears comparable to Facebook, albeit with more Islamic oriented motives. Its launch had been a component of a wider work to further improve and increase the Islamic group's existence on-line (Weingarten 2010). Dr. Ala Hussan, an assistant lecture in International Islamic University Malaysia (UIAM), and a prominent member of Brotherhood, mentioned that "the Ikhwanbook and other social media outlets have had an essential role to promote Islamic values and awareness among Brotherhood's members" (Hassan M., June, 26, 2013). Above all, the Brotherhood has adopted media outlets in their activities and in challenging the regime. Even so, they were not as active as other liberal groups. When the cyber-activists decided to begin protests in January 2011, the Brotherhood was well informed of this plan, but they did not instantly take part in it. On January 20, Ghonim asked Amr El-Qazzaz, one of the co-founders of Rasd, to join the scheduled protest, because if the Brotherhood's senior members joined in the protests, their significant volumes would subsequently guide the actual protests. El-Qazzaz however, realized that the Brotherhood would not officially join the protests, yet its younger members could play a substantial role there individually (Ghonim 2012, pp. 169-170). For that reason, they did not initiate the revolution, and saw no need to jump on its bandwagon. The Brotherhood had its excuse to take the back seat, because of the sensitivity of the situation. The group wanted to inform the West that the revolution was a mass revolution, and was not hijacked by Islamists. They feared that the initial protests would be viewed as an Islamic coup, and would be violently repressed by the regime. Nevertheless, on January 28th, the Brotherhood dispatched its youth to the Squares. Thus, they went to Tahrir Square on the day that was a seminal moment for the Egyptian protestors. Ghonim was of the opinion that El-Baradei could have possibly persuaded the group on the eve of Friday of Anger on January 28th, to hold an urgent meeting with key figures of the Brotherhood, and finally; the group was publicly involved and assisting the popular revolution. Political scientist Carrie R. Wickham classifies three currents within the contemporary Egyptian Brotherhood (Gelvin 2015, p.60). The first comprises those who have rejected political activity altogether in favor of preaching and pious activities. The second is the largest faction, which combines conservative religious views with political participation. The last group, are those who have chosen to get involved in politics, but whose interpretation of Islam is more liberal. According to Wickham, the members of the last wing who called for reform of the Brotherhood's structure, were employed together with their secular counterpart, and are usually proficient in utilizing social media and have been at the cutting edge of the uprising. Their media was not limited to @Ikhwanweb and Ikwhanonline and Ikhwanbook. The Brotherhood's media extends to an extensive network of portals such as, Ikhwanwtube, Ikhwanwiki, Ikhwanophobia, and Ikhwanscope, (Bohn 2011, p.1). All of which have played a role in mobilizing and keeping the followers updated regarding the revolution. This group found the time to express them online, as they would not relinquish this digital space to their respective rivals. The Brotherhood thus, adopted new online platforms to enhance their presence in the Egyptian political landscape, through twitting and applying Facebook in order to interact and communicate with internal and external audiences. The argument on the Brotherhood can be concluded with the view of Ramadan, who states that the Brotherhood was fully conversant with SNSs, and had cultivated broad social and political relationships, participating in virtual debates well beyond the boundaries of their religious and ideological ties (Ramadan 2012, p.14). This group yet was not leading the popular uprising that was bringing down Mubarak, but they participated with a majority influence later on.

Conclusion
It can be seen how the political movements played role in the Egyptian political landscape through utilizing SNSs, for organizing and mobilizing public and facilitating communication across the country that produce a mass protests in 2011. It is clear that the social media have used as a resource to galvanize anti-Mubarak activities, and organize of the street marches. The resource mobilization theory could clearly justify utilization social network platforms as an available and affordable resource by the four highlighted groups in Egypt.

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